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3Abstract
The relation between economic choice theories and empirical psychology varied
over the last centuries: Whereas early neo-classical economists were influenced by
psychology, beginning with the 20th century, economists started to focus on axiomatic
descriptions of decision-making devoid of psychological explanations. Since the rise of
behavioral economics in the eighties of the last century, psychological methods and
theories are again widely accepted in economics. Building on that development, this
thesis presents three manuscripts that experimentally investigate the psychological and
cognitive foundations of economic choices. Manuscript 1 examines the e ect of a
reduction of cognitive capacities on economic choice behavior. As a result it was found
that such a reduction a ects choice consistency, that is the extent to which a
participant makes choices in line with a single utility function, rather than economic
preferences. Manuscript 2 explores the cognitive foundations of economic choices. Two
experiments compare behavioral patterns in a number estimation task with economic
behavior in giving certainty equivalences for monetary lotteries. As a result, similar
distortions in both tasks were observed, suggesting that parts of economic behavior can
be accounted for by basic cognitive distortions instead of economic preferences. Another
area of interest within behavioral economics are social preferences, that is the
observation that people are a ected by the outcomes of other (relevant) people.
Manuscript 3 examines how anti-social motives, that is gaining utility from reducing
another person’s outcome relative to one’s own, can explain di erences in the amount of
risk-taking for oneself compared to someone else. In addition, the manuscript shows
that these anti-social preferences are only expressed in choices under uncertainty and
not under certainty. Together, these three manuscripts advance the field of behavioral
economics by introducing cognitive theories about the perception and integration of
choice options as well as the interaction between social motives and uncertainty to
economic choice theory.
4Introduction
We hope to establish satisfactorily, after developing a
few plausible schematizations, that the typical problems
of economic behavior become strictly identical with the
mathematical notions of suitable games of strategy.
Von Neuman and Morgenstern, Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior (1944)
With the appearance of the book of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), the
rational and mathematical revolution of neo-classical microeconomics was at its peak.
With this book the interest of economists in psychological constructs and theories
finally vanished and economics was developed into a discipline focusing on
mathematical maximization tasks. Historically, however, most economic contributions
were closely linked to psychological theories. This holds true, for example, for classic
economists like Adam Smith, who wrote a whole book about The theory of moral
sentiments (1759/ 2010). Also, basic economic preferences like the aversion to take risks
and the preference for immediate over delayed outcomes had been first derived from
psychological observations: The concept of risk-aversion was formally introduced by
Bernoulli (1738/ 1954), who stated that monetary outcomes are transformed by means
of a concave utility function (see Stigler, 1950b). The utility function was motivated by
psychological satisfaction which depends on the amount of wealth a person owns.
Similarly, discounting future outcomes was first introduced by Rae (1834) with direct
reference to psychological motives like “the excitement of immediate consumption” and
“the propensity to exercise self-restraint” (see Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue,
2002). The influence of psychology prevailed also during the rise of neo-classical
reasoning and the foundation of indi erence curves. Economists like Edgeworth, Jovens
and Walras were inspired by the early experimental work of psychology (e.g. Fechner,
1860). Consequently, they motivated the concept of diminishing marginal returns
explicitly from empirical psychophysical regularities regarding the perception of physical
stimuli (see Bruni & Sugden, 2007; Stigler, 1950a).
5At the beginning of the 20th century, the theorizing of economists about utility and
its psychological underpinnings were discredited by Pareto (1906/ 1971). He claimed
that economic choices cannot lead to a cardinal measure of utility, but can only restrict
the space of utility functions on an ordinal scale. On an ordinal scale two options can
only be meaningfully compared with respect to which one gives more utility. In contrast,
utility di erences or rations cannot be interpreted. Therefore, it was concluded in that
time that the construct of utility is void and hence should be discarded (see Glimcher &
Fehr, 2013). As a consequence, (aggregated) choices and market behavior were seen as
scientific primitives in the new paradigm of rational decision theory. This means the
main goal of researchers was shifted towards explaining choice behavior directly rather
than understanding the processes and motives behind this behavior. In particular, this
paradigm shift denied the relevance of psychological insights into the area of economic
behavior. Hence, economists focused on developing purely mathematical theories that
were based on axioms of rational behavior. For one, they mathematically derived the
idea of diminishing marginal returns and convex indi erence curves for consumer
behavior under certainty without referring to psychological concepts (Hicks & Allen,
1934; Samuelson, 1938). Finally, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) re-established a
version of cardinal utility in the area of economic decision-making under risk based on
mathematical axioms that should be heeded by any rational person.
Within rational decision theory, risk-aversion (and risk-seeking) were incorporated
in a purely mathematical form as a non-linear deviation from the expected value
maximization of monetary amounts (Friedman & Savage, 1948). Also the previously
psychologically motivated preference for immediate outcomes was now transformed into
a mathematical temporal discounting function (Samuelson, 1937). Incorporating these
two transformation functions into the rational choice framework permitted to maintain
the prima-facie empirical plausibility of the idea of utility maximization in an economic
choice context. The axiomatic system is linked to two other ideas: First, the idea of
revealed preferences, that is, that there is no other ontology of preferences besides that
they can be revealed by actual choice (Samuelson, 1938). Second, as-if models, the idea
6that models of economic behavior do not need to have psychological or any other sort of
empirical realism, but are only judged with respect to the success of predicting behavior
(Friedman, 1953). These concepts were about to dominate economic science for the
following decades.
In the course of research after World War II, the rational framework was challenged
from empirical observations questioning its descriptive accuracy and its power to
predict economic behavior (Allais, 1953; Edwards, 1953; Ellsberg, 1961; Mosteller &
Nogee, 1951). Experiments and anecdotal observations showed that choice behavior is
not consistent in that the same choice option does not always elicit the same choice and
that some choice situations violate the axiom of independence. Take as one example the
fact that people act not in line with expected utility maximization when very high and
very low probabilities are involved: People mostly prefer $1M for certain over a lottery
that gives $1M with 89%, $5M with 10% and nothing with 1%. Yet, at the same time,
most people prefer a lottery with the possibility to win $5M with 10% or else nothing
over a lottery that gives $1M with 11% otherwise nothing. Since the lotteries from the
second pair can be transformed into those from the first pair by adding a 89% chance of
winning $1M to both lotteries, choice behavior according to the axiom of independence
should not change between the two situations (a “common consequence” e ect). This
means, a rational person should prefer either the risky lottery with the small probability
of winning $5M in both situations or the more risk-averse lottery in both situations.
Yet, since a switch in majority choice proportions has been experimentally observed,
these lottery combinations constitute the Allais paradox.
Notwithstanding this early work, only in the eighties of the 20th century
behavioral economics was firmly established as an alternative framework to the rational
decision theory. Behavioral economics can be characterized as being based on
experimental methods and using psychological theories to explain economic behavior
(Camerer, Loewenstein, & Rabin, 2011). As some of the earliest examples helping to
establish the new framework, researchers examined how people judge probabilities of
uncertain events (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), how they deviate from expected utility
7maximization in monetary lotteries (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), how they
discount monetary outcomes (Ainslie, 1975), and how they act strategically when
confronted with other agents (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). After these
studies, a plethora of empirical and theoretical work followed and at the moment, in
2017, behavioral economics is still a burgeoning field of research. It goes beyond the
scope of this text to given an overview of recent developments in the fields (for this see
e.g. Camerer et al., 2011). Instead, this thesis focuses on three aspects of behavioral
economics, namely the modeling of choice inconsistency, the relation between number
cognition and economic preferences, and the relation between social preferences and
outcome uncertainty. Each of these topics is dealt with in a separate manuscript, which
each comprises of psychological and cognitive theories and models to examine economic
behavior in laboratory experiments. More concretely, this means that throughout this
dissertation, economic choices are not treated as a scientific primitive, but instead as a
result of cognitive processes and psychological motives.
Cognitive Prerequisites to Economic Decision-Making
A core assumption of rational decision theory in economics is that people always
have perfect cognitive abilities to understand the consequences of all choice options.
This is implicitly assumed, since expected utility makes deterministic prediction, that is
one should always choose the option with higher (expected) utility. In a strict sense this
would mean, for example in the area of risky choice, that people can unambiguously
assign utility to monetary outcomes and calculate expected utilities without errors. But
even when expected utility maximization is understood as an as-if model, it requires
people at least to recognize choice options when they see them in di erent situations
without error. Only this would guarantee that people are consistent in their choices,
that is that they would choose the same option when presented with the same choice set
(see Edwards, 1961).
Empirically, however, it has been established that choice behavior is stochastic and
thus can be inconsistent (Hey, 1995; Rieskamp, Busemeyer, & Mellers, 2006). To
8incorporate this regularity within the framework of expected utility maximization,
choice predictions have to become probabilistic. From a mathematical point of view,
this can be achieved, for example, by mapping utility di erences to choice probabilities
(Luce, 1959; Thurstone, 1927) or by directly assuming a probability of choosing an
inferior option (Selten, 1975). That way it is also possible to quantitatively fit utility
models to empirical data by means of a maximum likelihood approach.
Whereas these models served their mathematical purpose, it is less clear what the
underlying cognitive process is that leads to the stochasticity. One way to explain the
stochasticity in economic choices is to argue that it derives from the imprecision of
preferences or utility attribution to choice options (Becker, DeGroot, & Marschak, 1963;
Train, 2003). In that sense utility is itself a random variable. In opposition to that, the
fixed utility school argues that utilities are deterministically linked to choice options,
but in comparing options or in executing a choice based on these utilities, randomness
enters the observed behavior (Selten, 1975). However, these di erent interpretations
still lack a concrete cognitive process explanations. This would mean to clarify how on
an algorithmic level information is processed and an assessment of di erent options is
done. Furthermore, the basic perception and integration of stimuli as examined in
psychophysics is not taken into account as a source of stochasiticity. This is remarkable
since the random utility models are built on early results of Thurstone (1927), who
originally developed his mathematical equations for psychophysical data. In addition,
Mosteller and Nogee (1951) also saw the parallels between their own study and the
measurement in the tradition of psychophysics. Yet, they did not discuss
psychophysical processes to explain stochasticity in economic choices.
In this dissertation, it is assumed as a working hypothesis that the stochasticity in
economic decision-making at least partly stems from basic perceptual and cognitive
processes. This means that people need attention and working memory to perceive and
understand choice options in an economic context. In this process, people occasionally
make perceptual errors and err when integrating information or comparing options. In
addition, to use working memory is computationally expensive and might thus be
9avoided if deemed not necessary (Shenhav et al., 2017). Together, these processes
contribute to the stochasticity of economic choices and it is thus important to examine
how economic choices are a ected when working memory is reduced. Experimental
psychology has a long history of manipulating working memory in areas such as
judgment, problem solving, and visual discrimination (e.g. Anobile, Cicchini, & Burr,
2012; Ho mann, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2013; Meiser, Klauer, & Naumer, 2001).
But also economists gained interest in that question. Yet, given the prevailing idea of
associating stochasticity only with utility and preferences, researchers naturally focused
on the e ect of reduced cognitive capacities on measures of preference (Deck & Jahedi,
2015; Halali, Bereby-Meyer, & Ockenfels, 2013; Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2003;
Schulz, Fischbacher, Thöni, & Utikal, 2014). The first manuscript in this dissertation
examines the e ect of reduced cognitive capacities, both on choice consistency and on
preferences. It thus builds a link between economic utility models and the basic
cognitive source of choice stochasticity.
Another method to explore the source of stochasticity in economic behavior is to
distinguish between the cognitive task of perceiving and integrating the value of a risky
option and making a preferential decision. Although economists do not commit
themselves to the hypothesis that people calculate expected utilities in their heads,
there must be some cognitive process by which people assess the value of risky gambles
against each other. Only recently, economic models have been developed that
incorporate perceptual or attentional processes into the explanation of economic
behavior (Bordalo, Gennaioli, & Shleifer, 2012; Khaw, Li, & Woodford, 2017; Krajbich,
Armel, & Rangel, 2010). The second manuscript in this dissertation examines the
hypothesis that the stochasticity of economic choices stems from systematic biases in
the calculation of the mean outcome of a risky gamble. This hypothesis is grounded in
recent findings about the imprecision of number perception (Brezis, Bronfman, &
Usher, 2015; Feigenson, Dehaene, & Spelke, 2004) and the fact that some stimuli
attract more attention than others (Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber, & Redelmeier,
1993; Madan, Ludvig, & Spetch, 2014). Assuming that the cognitive process of
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perceiving and integrating numerical values is a prerequisite for an economic choice, this
manuscript compares to what extent economic behavior can be explained by biases in
the cognitive process or by economic preferences for certain options.
Social Preferences in Economic Decision-Making
Another cornerstone of the rational decision theory is that utility depends only on
the subjective value of a person’s own monetary outcomes. However, experimental
paradigms showed that people choose as if they also take the monetary outcome of
other people into account. For example, people gave non-trivial amounts to others
instead of keeping them for themselves in so-called dictator games (Kahneman, Knetsch,
& Thaler, 1986). Also, in ultimatum games where responders can reject suggested
outcome distributions from another participant and as a result both participants receive
nothing, responders regularly forgo outcomes when proposed distributions are very
unequal (Güth et al., 1982). Later, these behavioral regularities have been supported
across many di erent experiments by meta-analyses (Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Engel,
2011). These empirical regularities eventually made economists modify utility functions.
An early economic model took reciprocity into account assuming that the utility of
choice options depends on how one was treated previously (Rabin, 1993). Two other
prominent models, called inequity-averse utility models, included the di erence or the
ratio of the own outcome compared to other relevant people into a utility function
(Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). That way, behavior that looks as if
people maximize not only their own monetary outcome, but also take other people’s
outcomes into account can be modeled. As a limitation, these utility specifications
cannot explain the source of this behavior and another working hypothesis in this
dissertation states that one reason to take the outcomes of others into account are
psychological motives concerning altruism, fairness, status, or others.
That people care about the outcome of others cannot only be observed in the
laboratory, but there is evidence for that also in real-world data. For example, archival
data show that happiness (as a proxy for utility) rises with relative or rank income
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(Brown, Gardner, Oswald, & Qian, 2008; Clark & Oswald, 1996). Again, in rational
decision theory, the utility of one’s income should depend on the bundle of consumer
goods you can buy with it and should be independent of other peoples’ incomes. When
the relative income with respect to peers or colleagues a ects utility, this indicates
again that psychological motives like status, fairness, or envy play a role in an economic
context. More concretely, another person’s outcome can increase one’s utility. This is
one way to explain pro-social or altruistic behavior, for example when we donate to
charity or share in a dictator game (Vesterlund, 2016). In contrast, another person’s
outcome could also decrease one’s own utility. This might explain why people’s utility
depends on the amount they earn in comparison to the income of their reference group
(e.g. Clark & Oswald, 1996). Manuscript 3 explores these motives in a novel laboratory
task where people make choices between outcome distributions for other participants.
As it turns out, introducing anti-social motives can help to better understand and
predict di erences in risk-taking for oneself and others. In addition, this manuscript
sheds light on the malleability of social motives due to changes in the environment.
Manuscript 1: Taxing Cognitive Capacities Reduces Choice Consistency
Rather than Preference: A Model-Based Test
Olschewski, S., Rieskamp, J., & Scheibehenne, B. (forthcoming). Taxing cognitive
capacities reduces choice consistency rather than preference: A model-based test.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General.
In this manuscript, we hypothesize that economic choices require working memory
to perceive, memorize, and integrate information about the choice options. For
example, in the case of choices between risky lotteries, options have to be valued and
compared with each other. In our daily live, we arguably make many economic choices
without devoting full attention and working memory to them. This can have practical
reasons, for example, when decisions have to be made quickly during grocery shopping
after a long work day, or motivational reasons, when one does not want to think about
accidents and illnesses when subscribing to an insurance plan. Consequently, it is an
12
important question how such choices are a ected by a reduction of cognitive resources
and this manuscript tested this in three experiments.
A common hypothesis that can be inferred from rational decision theory is the
following: If preferences are revealed from choices, then an observed change in choice
behavior must henceforth be due to a change in preferences (Samuelson, 1938). Indeed,
many recent laboratory studies claimed exactly that, namely that preferences changed
due to a reduction of cognitive capacities (Deck & Jahedi, 2015; Halali et al., 2013;
Hinson et al., 2003; Schulz et al., 2014). Yet, given the stochasticity of empirical
choices, an alternative hypothesis that has not been tested rigorously so far is that
inconsistencies increase due to a reduction of cognitive capacities, while the underlying
preferences stay relatively stable. The e ect on consistency and preference can be
mixed up, when assuming a deterministic utility framework.
For example, in the study of Hinson et al. (2003) people chose repeatedly between
an immediate outcome or a larger outcome that would be paid out in the future. People
made these choices once in a control condition and then while experimentally reducing
cognitive capacities by means of a simultaneous memory task. Choice proportions for
the immediate outcome were 26% in the control condition and 30% in the load
condition. From this one could infer that people became more impulsive, since they
chose the immediate option more often. Alternatively, just increasing the stochasticity
of decision-making would drag choice proportions closer to 50% in the case of binary
choices, and thus could also lead to an increase in immediate choice options. Such an
ambiguity exists in most of the studies that claim to have found evidence for a
preference shift due to a reduction of cognitive capacity. It basically always occurs when
binary choices are examined as dependent variable and choice proportions are not
exactly 50% in the control condition. To disentangle the e ect of a shift in preferences
from an increase in stochasticity or choice inconsistency, we developed a mathematical
modeling framework by combining deterministic utility functions with stochastic choice
rules and measured the e ect of a cognitive load manipulation on both a parameter that
governs the utility function and a parameter that governs choice consistency.
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To demonstrate the general applicability of our modeling approach and its results,
we conducted studies in three widely studied economic choice domains, namely,
risk-taking, temporal discounting, and inequity aversion in ultimatum games. In all
these domains, we specified three common utility functions (e.g., power utility in risky
choice) and combined them with either a probit or a trembling-hand choice rule. The
probit choice rule follows a random utility approach and distinguishes between a stable
and a random part of utility (Hey, 1995; Train, 2003). The variance of the random
utility part is then an estimate of choice consistency. In contrast, the trembling hand
choice model, as an example of a fixed utility approach, works by having a free
parameter that estimates the probability of choosing the inferior option with respect to
a preference ordering from a deterministic utility function (by choosing the wrong
option due to a trembling hand). The estimate of error probability is then a measure of
choice consistency (Harless & Camerer, 1994; Selten, 1975). Consequently, we can
generalize our results across di erent concepts of choice stochasticity, utility
specifications, and choice domains.
In all experiments, participants repeatedly made choices and the amount of
cognitive load was varied within-subjects. Participants either heard letters and had to
press a button whenever a target letter (e.g., “l”) was played, or participants had to
press a button whenever the current letter heard was the same as the third-most recent
letter (an n-back task). The former manipulation is assumed not to tax working
memory, whereas the latter manipulation does. By means of a hierarchical Bayesian
approach, we estimated at the individual and group levels the di erence between these
two conditions on both a preference and a choice consistency parameter. As a result, in
all three choice domains and across several model specifications, we conclude that the
cognitive-load manipulation predominantly a ected choice consistency, while
preferences remained similar both in the control and load condition.
Furthermore, we demonstrated by means of simulations and by re-analyzing the
data of Hinson et al. (2003) that refraining from modeling choice consistency or forcing
choice consistency to be stable across both conditions can lead to the conclusion that
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preferences change. Hence, we can explain why most previous studies claimed to have
found a preference e ect. This is basically the case, because as described above, when
choice proportions are biased away from 50% in the control condition, a shift towards
50% can be explained both by modeling a shift in preferences and a shift in consistency.
Thus, we conclude that only when testing both hypotheses, a shift in preferences and in
consistency simultaneously against each other, can one come to a robust conclusion
about the main e ect of a reduction in cognitive capacities. Our modeling framework is
able to provide such a test and in addition can be generally applied to all economic
domains where choices can be described by utility functions and to all manipulations of
cognitive capacities.
Manuscript 2: How Basic Cognition Influences Experience-Based Economic
Valuation
Olschewski, S., Newell, B., & Scheibehenne, B. (2017). How basic cognition
influences experience-based economic valuation. Manuscript.
As elaborated in the Introduction, the economic literature predominantly ignored
the process of basic perception and information integration in economic choices. The
utility function, as one example, was introduced by Bernoulli to explain the subjective
gain of monetary value depending on the person’s circumstances (primarily her or his
wealth). Later, utility functions and their maximization were established as normative
rules for a rational person (Schoemaker, 1982; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).
However, basic psychophysical or cognitive processes as a source of the shape of a utility
functions were rarely discussed (for exceptions see Sinn, 1985; Thurstone, 1931). This is
surprising, given that the concave shape of most utility functions has a close
resemblance to psychophysical functions mapping objective entities such as brightness,
length, and loudness to subjective sensations (Fechner, 1860; Stevens, 1957). More
recently, it has been found that numbers are also perceived following a concave
function, called the compressed mental number line (Dehaene, Izard, Spelke, & Pica,
2008; Feigenson et al., 2004). Given the ubiquitous use of lotteries involving numbers to
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characterize monetary outcomes in economic choice experiments, it is a plausible, yet so
far overlooked, hypothesis that at least parts of the concave utility function could be
explained by the perception of numbers.
As discussed above, the expected utility framework was challenged by empirical
results based on lotteries. For example, the Allais paradox showed that people
systematically violate the independence axiom. To describe choice behavior in such
situations was one reason for the introduction of rank-based utility models. These
models assume that the weights with which the outcomes are multiplied are distorted
compared to their objective probabilities. In particular, cumulative prospect theory
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), a prominent rank-dependent utility theory, can
incorporate that rare (and relatively high) outcomes receive more weight than their
actual probability. That way, behavior in the Allais paradox could be described within
a utility framework. Similar to the case of utility functions, the ontological status of
these weighting functions is unclear. They could describe an economic preference for
very high outcomes with low probability, as is the case in real-world lotteries. Yet, this
overweighting could be also based on cognitive regularities in the perception and
integration of numbers. For example, it might be a general cognitive regularity that
people pay more attention or are better able to memorize events that are very rare or
very extreme. Indeed, there is experimental evidence that people overestimate the
occurrence of extreme outcomes (Madan et al., 2014). Such a regularity has also been
found with sensory stimuli. There is, for example, evidence that people overweight the
peak of a pain sensation (Kahneman et al., 1993) and that people overestimate the
loudness of right-skewed distributions of noise sequences with single very loud noises
(Parducci, Thaler, & Anderson, 1968). Given this evidence, overweighting of certain
events could be an attentional or memory bias irrespective of an economic context, but
rather based on cognitive regularities that render certain stimuli more salient or easier to
retrieve. In that case, the basic cognition of number perception and integration could at
least partly account for the often-observed economic behavior in line with overweighting
of rare and extreme events (Ludvig & Spetch, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).
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To better understand the cognitive foundations of economic behavior, we
conducted two studies employing an experience-based task, where people could sample
from di erent distributions to learn about them. The distributions were continuous and
varied with respect to the mean, the variance, and the skewness. Sampling was free and
could be stopped at the discretion of the participant. After the sampling phase,
participants made one payo -relevant choice (see Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev,
2004). The task and the respective incentives di ered within-subjects: Either
participants gave a certainty equivalent, that is they claimed how much they required
for certain to withdraw their right to get a single draw from the distribution, or they
gave their estimate for the mean of the distribution. The certainty equivalent was
incentivized by means of an auction (for details see Becker, DeGroot, & Marschak,
1964), and the estimation task was incentivized by a scoring rule that provided higher
scores the closer the estimate was to the theoretical mean of the distribution.
Results showed that the behavioral pattern between the economic valuation and
the estimation task was very similar. In particular, in both tasks, participants
systematically gave answers below the respective theoretical means and they gave lower
answers for high compared to low variance distributions. Comparing the magnitudes of
the respective e ects in both tasks, we found that stronger deviations from the
theoretical means were observed in the valuation compared to the estimation task.
Since basic cognition is present in both tasks, whereas economic preferences should only
matter for economic valuations, the similarities in choice patterns between both tasks
can be attributed to basic cognitive processes. Calculating the ratio between deviations
from the theoretical mean between the estimation and the valuation task resulted in
roughly one third. This means that one third of the undervaluation of the certainty
equivalences can be attributed to basic cognition in the estimation task. Similarly,
about one fifth of the valuation e ect for high versus low variance distributions can be
accounted for by basic cognition. Finally, skewness had a significant e ect in that both
in the estimation and the valuation task, right-skewed distributions received higher
answers than non-skewed normal distributions and normal distributions received higher
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answers than left-skewed distributions. Again the e ect was larger in the valuation
compared to the estimation task and the skewness e ect in the estimation task was
more than half of the magnitude in the valuation task.
To sum up, a quarter of the e ect usually attributed to risk aversion could be
rooted in the basic processes of number perception and integration. A possible
explanation for this distortion in the estimation of sequences’ means could be the
compressed mental number line (Feigenson et al., 2004). In addition, we found that a
seeming preference for right-skewed over left-skewed outcome distributions could be
attributed mainly to a cognitive bias also present in the estimation task. This is not in
line with the idea of number compression. Yet, it is in line with the overweighting of
rare and extreme events, which has been found already in pain, outcome, and loudness
perception (Kahneman et al., 1993; Madan et al., 2014; Parducci et al., 1968).
Together, a compressed mental number line as a theory of number perception together
with attentional or memory-based distortions of rare and extreme events could help
explain economic decision-making in general and to better understand the role of basic
cognition in economic decision-making in particular.
Manuscript 3: Competitive Motives Explain Risk Aversion for Others in
Decisions from Experience
Olschewski, S, Dietsch, M., & Ludvig, E. A. (2017). Competitive motives explain
risk aversion for others in decisions from experience. Manuscript.
Rational decision theory assumes that people want to maximize their own payo .
Experiments that examine how people split money between themselves and others,
however, have questioned this view and showed that people act as if they also value
payo s for others in a laboratory setting (see Engel, 2011). As a limitation, these
(mostly) pro-social tendencies, have all been found in distributional tasks under
outcome certainty. This means the deciders knew with certainty which amount she or
he and another person gets in a given choice option.
To generalize the influence of social preferences to decision-making under risk,
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there are two primary methods in the economic literature. The first is to adapt a
dictator game so that participants distribute lottery tickets that will only pay o 
probabilistically instead of certain outcomes. As a result, people still show pro-social
behavior: they give on average a strictly positive amount of lottery tickets to the other
person. Yet, they share less than in the regular dictator game under certainty (Brock,
Lange, & Ozbay, 2013; Krawczyk & Le Lec, 2010). Another possibility is to make
people select risky options for another person. Here, there is no direct monetary
incentive for the decider involved and, in particular, it is not a zero-sum game, since the
decider does not lose what she or he assigns to the other participant. Note that rational
decision theory would predict that since no own outcomes are involved, choices for
others are random in such situations. In experimental studies, however, it has been
found that people show (to some extent) consistent behavior and in particular are
more-risk averse when making choices for another person than when they make the same
choices for themselves (Atanasov, 2015; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2010; Reynolds, Joseph, &
Sherwood, 2009). This di erence has been attributed to a sense of responsibility. This
is to say that due to a pro-social intention the decider wants to avoid high risks for
another person (Bolton, Ockenfels, & Stauf, 2015; Charness & Jackson, 2009).
Although plausible given the observed choices and the overall presence of pro-social
behavior in other economic games, direct evidence for the responsibility motive is
lacking. Due to the characteristics of choice options, though, there is a possibility to
distinguish between di erent social motives. More concretely, in most experiments, risk
measured as outcome variance and return measured as the expected value of an option
are positively correlated. That means, to earn a higher payo  on average, you have to
engage in more risky choices. In such an environment, choosing less riskily for the other
person actually has two results: First, you burden the other person with less risk, but
second, you also deprive the other person of the chance to gain a higher outcome. In
particular, if a person chooses risky for oneself and safe for the other person, this person
will on average receive a higher outcome relative to the other person. Thus, as an
alternative hypothesis this status gain could explain the empirical finding of less
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risk-taking for others. This hypothesis is supported by survey data indicating that
happiness depends on relative or rank income (Brown et al., 2008; Clark & Oswald,
1996). Consequently, this manuscript examines anti-social motivations, like spite, envy
or status considerations to explain more risk-averse choices for others.
To test the hypothesis that anti-social motives play an important role in
risk-taking for others, we conducted two pre-registered experiments. The goal of these
studies was two-fold: First, we wanted to examine whether more risk-averse behavior for
others also occurs in an experience-based design. So far, all studies that have examined
risk-taking for others were only based on described risky prospects where all outcomes
and probabilities were listed. In contrast, in the experience-based design, there is no
prior information given and people have to sample single outcomes from a distribution
to learn about the structure of this option. In risky choices for oneself, it has been found
that people di er in choice behavior depending on the format (Hertwig et al., 2004;
Madan et al., 2014). Thus, it is important to examine whether di erences in risk-taking
for others compared to self as found in description-based experiments generalize to
experience-based tasks. Second, we wanted to disentangle the motivation for a change
in behavior when deciding for oneself or someone else. By distinguishing between choice
situations with and without a risk-return trade-o  and by classifying people into
pro-social and anti-social, we can examine who in which choice situations deviate in
risk-taking depending on whether the outcomes are for themselves or for another person.
As a first result, we found that when giving people the chance to sample from
di erent outcome distributions and then making choices between two of such outcome
distributions, people chose on average more risk-aversely for others than for themselves.
This extends similar findings in choices made between gambles presented with summary
statistics (e.g. Charness & Jackson, 2009). As a first indication concerning the motives
for this di erence in risk-taking between self and other, we split trials into those where
only the variance di ers and the expected value is the same between the two choice
options and trials where higher variance is associated with higher expected value. Lower
rates of risk-taking for others than for oneself were only observed in trials with a
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trade-o  between variance and expected value and not in trials where only the variance
di ered. This suggests that people do not in general intend to prevent other people
from risk, but do so only when higher risk is associated with higher average rewards. To
further examine the motives behind this, we classified people into pro-social, selfish and
anti-social. To do that, we examined behavior in trials where one option dominates the
other in that the higher expected value option has similar or lower variance. Choosing
the superior option for others most of the time in these choice situations classifies as
pro-social, whereas choosing the dominated option most of the time classifies as
anti-social. Selfish people should be indi erent in choosing for the other person.
Applying this classification, we show that only people classified as anti-social chose
significantly di erently between themselves and others in those trials o ering a trade-o 
between variance and expected value, whereas people classified as pro-social did not.
These results were replicated with di erent trials and pre-registered classification
boundaries in the second study. Together, we can conclude that anti-social, rather than
pro-social motives explain reduced risk-taking for others.
So far, it is an open questions why anti-social motives are so prominent in these
experiments given the overall finding of pro-social behavior in the laboratory (Engel,
2011). To understand this, we additionally administered the social value orientation
slider (Murphy, Ackermann, & Handgraaf, 2011). This is an instrument based on
dictator games with di erent options to distribute money between oneself and another
person. It supposedly measures a stable construct of inter-individual di erences in
social motives. We find that almost nobody was classified as anti-social (or competitive
in the terminology of social value orientation) across both experiments with this
instrument. This is in line with other studies using the social value orientation slider
(Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009). Thus, we can rule out that there was an extreme set
of anti-social people in our sample. Rather, we propose that the hypothesis of a moral
wiggle room can explain more anti-social behavior in the experience-based task
compared to the social-value-orientation measure under certainty (Dana, Weber, &
Kuang, 2007; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). The moral wiggle room hypothesis states
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that when there is more ambiguity in the relation between one’s own behavior and the
result of that behavior, people are more willing to engage in lying or other anti-social
behavior. This is because due to the ambiguity in the causal relation between behavior
and outcome, it is more easy to justify one’s behavior post-hoc and thus maintain a
positive self-image. In the current case, indeed the relation between choosing a bad
option in the experience-based task and the outcome for the other person is uncertain.
Thus, people could justify choosing a bad option for the other person by claiming that
they did not realize which option was better or they could engage in wishful thinking
that although chosen a bad option, a (relatively) good outcome could still materialize
for the other person. In contrast, choosing in a dictator game leaves no room for such
post-hoc justifications. Given that uncertainty about outcomes is ubiquitous in the real
world, pro-social tendencies might be overestimated when only focusing on experimental
tasks under certainty.
Discussion
To sum up, this dissertation extends research in behavioral economics by using
experiments in the area of risky choice, temporal discounting, and social preferences. In
all these areas, we build on experimental work that became popular in the eighties of
the last century, but often had predecessors much earlier. In particular, we developed a
new modeling approach to better understand the e ect of a reduction in cognitive
capacities on economic behavior. Second, we introduced an experimental design to
distinguish basic cognitive distortions from economic preferences. Finally, we invoked
anti-social preferences to explain di erences in risk-taking for oneself compared to
risk-taking for another person. All three manuscripts had the aim to expand the
knowledge about cognitive and motivational processes that lead to economic behavior.
In contrast, studies in behavioral economics often focus on choice biases and seeming
irrational behavior, whereas the cognitive processes behind such biases are of minor
importance. Consequently, there is a lack of unifying theory and indeed, one of the
main criticisms of economics from other fields is that it is currently not possible to
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predict which biases will occur when people are placed in new economic situations
(Erev et al., 2010). This dissertation puts forward the idea of modeling basic cognitive
processes and psychological motivations in isolation as well as in a social context as a
way towards a more unified “behavioral economics theory”.
Manuscript 1 contributes to this endeavor by showing how working memory load
can a ect the consistency of economic choices rather than the preference ordering of
choice options. This manuscript advances methodology by demonstrating that a
quantitative model is able to distinguish between di erent cognitive mechanisms that
cannot be disentangled by the analysis of choice proportions alone. In particular, the
results were robust to di erent assumptions about the choice stochasticity, namely the
implementation of the probit and the trembling-hand choice rule. As a limitation, both
stochastic models seem to be convenient mathematical formulations, rather than
cognitive process models. Having a cognitively more plausible choice model could help
to better understand how a reduction in cognitive capacities decreases economic choice
consistency on an algorithmic level. Possible candidates for explaining stochasticity in
choices are the imprecision of number perception (Feigenson et al., 2004) or the
attentional switching between di erent attributes of choice options (Busemeyer &
Townsend, 1993). Moreover, distinguishing these di erent sources of stochasticity would
also help to more fundamentally link economic decision-making to stable personality
characteristics like working memory capacity, general intelligence, or numeracy
(Andersson, Holm, Tyran, & Wengström, 2016; Ashby, 2017).
In Manuscript 2, we distinguished between the basic cognition necessary to perceive
and integrate numbers in estimation tasks and the additional processes that lead to an
economic valuation. We found that both risk-aversion and skewness preferences in
experience-based valuations can be to some extent explained by biases in the basic
cognition used for estimation. Such a distinction between basic cognition and economic
preference leads to new predictions when thinking about a manipulation of cognitive
capacities similar to the dual task design in Manuscript 1. One could argue that a
reduction in cognitive capacities should only a ect the basic cognitive part, whereas the
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execution of a preference is automatic, and thus not a ected by a reduction of cognitive
capacities. Furthermore, the link between working memory capacity and numeracy as a
personal trait should only be expected for the basic cognition of number integration,
rather than for the execution of a preference. This would lead to the hypothesis, that
people low in numeracy might have a very consistent preference for low risk lotteries,
but have problems to reliably identify the low risk option out of a set of lotteries.
Another extension of the here presented research would be with respect to a
classification of choice biases. In our experiments, some seeming economic preferences
were shown to be mainly explained by basic cognitive regularities (e.g. preference for
right-skewed outcome distributions), whereas others were mainly attributed to economic
preferences (e.g. risk-aversion). Future research could similarly ask whether other biases
from behavioral economics are unique to an economic context or whether these biases
can be explained by more general cognitive processes. One example could be the
disposition e ect, that is the tendency to sell losing stocks too late and wining stocks
too early (Shefrin & Statman, 1985). Here, it could be that the economic context, that
is the stock market, encourages reasoning in line with the disposition e ect. In contrast,
it could also be that a general cognitive tendency to ignore or avoid thinking about
losses can explain the disposition e ect and also behavior in other contexts. Recently,
the approach to unify behavioral e ects through modeling the cognitive architecture
resonated both with economists who tried to incorporate basic cognition into utility
models (Bordalo et al., 2012; Khaw et al., 2017) and with psychologists who asked for a
better cognitive foundation of psychological theories of decision-making (Busemeyer &
Townsend, 1993; Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006).
With a slightly di erent focus, in the third manuscript, social motives were
examined to explain why people choose less riskily for others than for themselves. We
showed that assuming people maximize only their own outcome could not explain how
people systematically change behavior when other people’s outcomes are at stake.
Therefore, we postulated social preferences, that is the idea that people also take the
outcome of another relevant person into account. In our study, we showed that people
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chose more risk-aversely for others and that this di erence in choices for self versus
other can be attributed to anti-social motives, that is a decrease in utility with higher
outcomes for another person. Furthermore, we propose that anti-social motives interact
with the ambiguity between choices and resulting outcomes. Given these findings, more
cognitive modeling might be warranted to better explain choices in the domain of social
decision-making. As was shown in the first manuscript, a reduction of cognitive
capacities for responders in the ultimatum game led to more choice inconsistency rather
than to a change in social preferences. This underpins that also the process of executing
social preferences follow basic cognitive processes of number perception and integration.
In social situations in particular, the comparison between own and other peoples’
outcomes seems to play a crucial role: Responders in the ultimatum game, for example,
have to compare their own outcome with that of the proposer. Likewise, in the
experimental design of the third manuscript, participants compared their own choice
options with those for the other participants for which they made a choice. Thus,
stochastic choice models in a social context could focus on modeling imprecision based
on the cognitive process of attribute comparison.
There are also other ways in which cognitive processes are a ected by a social
context. For instance, people use di erent search strategies in a situation where risk
exists due to unknown behavior of another person compared to a situation where risk
stems from a game against nature (Fleischhut, Artinger, Olschweski, Volz, & Hertwig,
2014). Also, it might be that people allocate their cognitive resources in order to pay
more attention to their own risky prospects compared to those of another person (Güth,
Levati, & Ploner, 2008). This would lead to the prediction that own choice options are
perceived with more accuracy than another person’s options. Consequently, It would be
interesting in future research to distinguish between motivational and basic cognitive
distortions in social interactions. This resembles the distinction between basic cognitive
distortions and risk preference explored for risky choices in the second manuscript. As
mentioned already, one way to understand the results of Manuscript 3 is by invoking
the moral wiggle room hypothesis (Mazar et al., 2008). This is a motivational theory in
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that it assumes that when people overestimate the attractiveness of a low risk option for
another participant, this fulfills the goal to justify why they give (on average) less to
others. In comparison, the cognitive distortions examined in Manuscript 1 and 2 are
supposedly not a ected by higher level goals. Thus, as an alternative explanation, basic
cognitive distortions could a ect choices in the social domain in ways that produce
behavior in line with the assumption of certain social motivations.
The last 40 years have seen a steady progress in the integration of psychology and
economics. This thesis builds on experimental research in this area and contributes to it
by examining the cognitive and psychological foundations of economic decision-making.
To that end, this thesis showed how incorporating cognitive capacity manipulations,
biases in the estimation of numbers and anti-social preferences all can help to construct
better process models of how economic choices are formed. A process account does not
only add more (psychological) realism to economic models, it furthermore allows to
unify existing choice biases by exploring underlying cognitive mechanisms. Moreover,
knowing about the process behind a choice can help to predict behavior outside of
laboratory situations. Finally, we might have achieved a stage of economic science where
“di erent principles” than those used by the rational decision theory are important to
make progress. As can be expected from a truly classical text, such a development was
already envisioned by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) when they wrote:
There are many social scientists who object to the drawing of such parallels
on various grounds, among which is generally found the assertion that
economics theory cannot be modeled after physics since it is a science of
social, of human phenomena, has to take psychology into account etc. Such
statements are at least premature. It is without doubt reasonable to discover
what has led to progress in other sciences, and to investigate whether the
application of the same principles may not lead to progress in economics
also. Should the need for the application of di erent principles arise, it could
be revealed only in the course of the actual development of economic theory.
26
References
Ainslie, G. (1975). Specious reward: A behavioral theory of impulsiveness and impulse
control. Psychological bulletin, 82 (4), 463.
Allais, M. (1953). L’extension des théories de l’équilibre économique général et du
rendement social au cas du risque. Econometrica, Journal of the Econometric
Society, 269–290.
Andersson, O., Holm, H. J., Tyran, J.-R., & Wengström, E. (2016). Risk aversion
relates to cognitive ability: Preferences or noise? Journal of the European
Economic Association, 14 (5), 1129–1154.
Anobile, G., Cicchini, G. M., & Burr, D. C. (2012). Linear mapping of numbers onto
space requires attention. Cognition, 122 (3), 454–459.
Ashby, N. J. (2017). Numeracy predicts preference consistency: Deliberative search
heuristics increase choice consistency for choices from description and experience.
Judgment and Decision Making, 12 (2), 128.
Atanasov, P. D. (2015). Risk preferences in choices for self and others: Meta analysis
and research directions.
Balliet, D., Parks, C., & Joireman, J. (2009). Social value orientation and cooperation
in social dilemmas: A meta-analysis. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations,
12 (4), 533–547.
Becker, G. M., DeGroot, M. H., & Marschak, J. (1963). Stochastic models of choice
behavior. Behavioral science, 8 (1), 41–55.
Becker, G. M., DeGroot, M. H., & Marschak, J. (1964). Measuring utility by a
single-response sequential method. Behavioral science, 9 (3), 226–232.
27
Bernoulli, D. (1738/ 1954). Exposition of a new theory on the measurement of risk.
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 23–36.
Bolton, G. & Ockenfels, A. (2000). Erc: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and
competition. American economic review, 166–193.
Bolton, G. & Ockenfels, A. (2010). Risk taking and social comparison. a comment on
‘betrayal aversion: Evidence from brazil, china, oman, switzerland, turkey, and the
united states’. American Economic Review, 100 (1), 628–633.
Bolton, G., Ockenfels, A., & Stauf, J. (2015). Social responsibility promotes
conservative risk behavior. European Economic Review, 74, 109–127.
Bordalo, P., Gennaioli, N., & Shleifer, A. (2012). Salience theory of choice under risk.
The Quarterly journal of economics, 127 (3), 1243–1285.
Brezis, N., Bronfman, Z. Z., & Usher, M. (2015). Adaptive spontaneous transitions
between two mechanisms of numerical averaging. Scientific reports, 5.
Brock, J., Lange, A., & Ozbay, E. (2013). Dictating the risks–experimental evidence on
norms of giving in risky environments. American Economic Review, 103, 415–4337.
Brown, G. D., Gardner, J., Oswald, A. J., & Qian, J. (2008). Does wage rank a ect
employees’ well-being? Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society,
47 (3), 355–389.
Bruni, L. & Sugden, R. (2007). The road not taken: How psychology was removed from
economics, and how it might be brought back. The Economic Journal, 117 (516),
146–173.
Busemeyer, J. R. & Townsend, J. T. (1993). Decision field theory: A dynamic-cognitive
approach to decision making in an uncertain environment. Psychological review,
100 (3), 432.
28
Camerer, C. F., Loewenstein, G., & Rabin, M. (2011). Advances in behavioral
economics. Princeton University Press.
Camerer, C. F. & Thaler, R. H. (1995). Anomalies: Ultimatums, dictators and manners.
The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9 (2), 209–219.
Charness, G. & Jackson, M. O. (2009). The role of responsibility in strategic
risk-taking. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 69 (3), 241–247.
Clark, A. E. & Oswald, A. J. (1996). Satisfaction and comparison income. Journal of
public economics, 61 (3), 359–381.
Dana, J., Weber, R. A., & Kuang, J. X. (2007). Exploiting moral wiggle room:
Experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness. Economic Theory,
33 (1), 67–80.
Deck, C. & Jahedi, S. (2015). The e ect of cognitive load on economic decision making:
A survey and new experiments. European Economic Review, 78, 97–119.
Dehaene, S., Izard, V., Spelke, E., & Pica, P. (2008). Log or linear? distinct intuitions of
the number scale in western and amazonian indigene cultures. Science, 320 (5880),
1217–1220.
Edwards, W. (1953). Probability preferences in gambling. American journal of
psychology, 66, 349–364.
Edwards, W. (1961). Behavioral decision theory. Annual review of psychology, 12 (1),
473–498.
Ellsberg, D. (1961). Risk, ambiguity, and the savage axioms. The quarterly journal of
economics, 643–669.
Engel, C. (2011). Dictator games: A meta study. Experimental Economics, 14 (4),
583–610.
29
Erev, I., Ert, E., Roth, A. E., Haruvy, E., Herzog, S. M., Hau, R., . . . Lebiere, C.
(2010). A choice prediction competition: Choices from experience and from
description. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 23 (1), 15–47.
Fechner, G. T. (1860). Elemente der psychophysik. Breitkopf and Härtel.
Fehr, E. & Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation.
Quarterly journal of Economics, 817–868.
Feigenson, L., Dehaene, S., & Spelke, E. (2004). Core systems of number. Trends in
cognitive sciences, 8 (7), 307–314.
Fleischhut, N., Artinger, F., Olschweski, S., Volz, K. G., & Hertwig, R. (2014). Sampling
of social information: Decisions from experience in bargaining. In 36th annual
meeting of the cognitive science society (pp. 1048–1053). Cognitive Science Society.
Frederick, S., Loewenstein, G., & O’Donoghue, T. (2002). Time discounting and time
preference: A critical review. Journal of economic literature, 40 (2), 351–401.
Friedman, M. (1953). The methodology of positive economics.
Friedman, M. & Savage, L. J. (1948). The utility analysis of choices involving risk.
Journal of political Economy, 56 (4), 279–304.
Glimcher, P. W. & Fehr, E. (2013). Neuroeconomics: Decision making and the brain.
Academic Press.
Güth, W., Levati, M. V., & Ploner, M. (2008). On the social dimension of time and risk
preferences: An experimental study. Economic Inquiry, 46 (2), 261–272.
Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982). An experimental analysis of
ultimatum bargaining. Journal of economic behavior & organization, 3 (4),
367–388.
30
Halali, E., Bereby-Meyer, Y., & Ockenfels, A. (2013). Is it all about the self? the e ect
of self-control depletion on ultimatum game proposers. Frontiers in human
neuroscience, 7.
Harless, D. W. & Camerer, C. F. (1994). The predictive utility of generalized expected
utility theories. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1251–1289.
Hertwig, R., Barron, G., Weber, E. U., & Erev, I. (2004). Decisions from experience and
the e ect of rare events in risky choice. Psychological science, 15 (8), 534–539.
Hey, J. D. (1995). Experimental investigations of errors in decision making under risk.
European Economic Review, 39 (3), 633–640.
Hicks, J. R. & Allen, R. G. (1934). A reconsideration of the theory of value. part i.
Economica, 1 (1), 52–76.
Hinson, J. M., Jameson, T. L., & Whitney, P. (2003). Impulsive decision making and
working memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 29 (2), 298.
Ho mann, J. A., von Helversen, B., & Rieskamp, J. (2013). Deliberation’s blindsight:
How cognitive load can improve judgments. Psychological science, 24 (6), 869–879.
Kahneman, D., Fredrickson, B. L., Schreiber, C. A., & Redelmeier, D. A. (1993). When
more pain is preferred to less: Adding a better end. Psychological science, 4 (6),
401–405.
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. (1986). Fairness as a constraint on profit
seeking: Entitlements in the market. The American economic review, 728–741.
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under
risk. Econometrica: Journal of the econometric society, 263–291.
31
Khaw, M. W., Li, Z., & Woodford, M. (2017). Risk aversion as a perceptual bias.
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Krajbich, I., Armel, C., & Rangel, A. (2010). Visual fixations and the computation and
comparison of value in simple choice. Nature neuroscience, 13 (10), 1292–1298.
Krawczyk, M. & Le Lec, F. (2010). ‘give me a chance!’an experiment in social decision
under risk. Experimental economics, 13 (4), 500–511.
Luce, D. R. (1959). Individual choice behavior.
Ludvig, E. A. & Spetch, M. L. (2011). Of black swans and tossed coins: Is the
description-experience gap in risky choice limited to rare events? PloS one, 6 (6),
e20262.
Madan, C. R., Ludvig, E. A., & Spetch, M. L. (2014). Remembering the best and worst
of times: Memories for extreme outcomes bias risky decisions. Psychonomic
bulletin & review, 21 (3), 629–636.
Mazar, N., Amir, O., & Ariely, D. (2008). The dishonesty of honest people: A theory of
self-concept maintenance. Journal of marketing research, 45 (6), 633–644.
Meiser, T., Klauer, K. C., & Naumer, B. (2001). Propositional reasoning and working
memory: The role of prior training and pragmatic content. Acta Psychologica,
106 (3), 303–327.
Mosteller, F. & Nogee, P. (1951). An experimental measurement of utility. Journal of
Political Economy, 59.
Murphy, R. O., Ackermann, K. A., & Handgraaf, M. (2011). Measuring social value
orientation.
Parducci, A., Thaler, H., & Anderson, N. H. (1968). Stimulus averaging and the context
for judgment. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 3 (2), 145–155.
32
Pareto, V. (1906/ 1971). Manual of political economy. Macmillan.
Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. The
American economic review, 1281–1302.
Rae, J. (1834). Statement of some new principles on the subject of political economy.
Hillard, Gray, and co.
Reynolds, D. B., Joseph, J., & Sherwood, R. (2009). Risky shift versus cautious shift:
Determining di erences in risk taking between private and public management
decision-making. Journal of Business and Economics Research, 7 (1), 63–77.
Rieskamp, J., Busemeyer, J. R., & Mellers, B. A. (2006). Extending the bounds of
rationality: Evidence and theories of preferential choice. Journal of Economic
Literature, 44 (3), 631–661.
Samuelson, P. A. (1937). A note on measurement of utility. The Review of Economic
Studies, 4 (2), 155–161.
Samuelson, P. A. (1938). A note on the pure theory of consumer’s behaviour.
Economica, 5 (17), 61–71.
Schoemaker, P. J. (1982). The expected utility model: Its variants, purposes, evidence
and limitations. Journal of economic literature, 529–563.
Schulz, J. F., Fischbacher, U., Thöni, C., & Utikal, V. (2014). A ect and fairness:
Dictator games under cognitive load. Journal of Economic Psychology, 41, 77–87.
Selten, R. (1975). Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in
extensive games. International journal of game theory, 4 (1), 25–55.
Shefrin, H. & Statman, M. (1985). The disposition to sell winners too early and ride
losers too long: Theory and evidence. The Journal of finance, 40 (3), 777–790.
33
Shenhav, A., Musslick, S., Lieder, F., Kool, W., Gri ths, T. L., Cohen, J. D., &
Botvinick, M. M. (2017). Toward a rational and mechanistic account of mental
e ort. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 40 (1), 99–124.
Sinn, H.-W. (1985). Psychophysical laws in risk theory. Journal of Economic
Psychology, 6 (2), 185–206.
Smith, A. (1759/ 2010). The theory of moral sentiments. Penguin.
Stevens, S. S. (1957). On the psychophysical law. Psychological review, 64 (3), 153.
Stewart, N., Chater, N., & Brown, G. D. (2006). Decision by sampling. Cognitive
psychology, 53 (1), 1–26.
Stigler, G. J. (1950a). The development of utility theory. i. The Journal of Political
Economy, 307–327.
Stigler, G. J. (1950b). The development of utility theory. ii. The Journal of Political
Economy, 373–396.
Thurstone, L. L. (1927). A law of comparative judgment. Psychological review, 34 (4),
273.
Thurstone, L. L. (1931). The indi erence function. The Journal of Social Psychology,
2 (2), 139–167.
Train, K. (2003). Discrete choice with simulation. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and
biases. science, 185 (4157), 1124–1131.
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative
representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and uncertainty, 5 (4), 297–323.
34
Vesterlund, L. (2016). Using experimental methods to understand why and how we give
to charity. Handbook of Experimental Economics, 2, 91–151.
von Neumann, J. & Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of games and economic behavior.
Princeton university press.
Running head: SHIFT IN CHOICE CONSISTENCY OR PREFERENCE 1
Taxing Cognitive Capacities Reduces Choice Consistency Rather than Preference: A
Model-Based Test
Sebastian Olschewskiú, Jörg Rieskampú, & Benjamin Scheibehenne+
ú University of Basel
+ University of Geneva
Author Note
Sebastian Olschewski and Jörg Rieskamp, Center for Economic Psychology,
Department of Psychology, University of Basel, Switzerland; Benjamin Scheibehenne,
School of Economics and Management (GSEM), University of Geneva, Switzerland.
This research was supported by a grant from the SNF: 100014_149846 to the
second and third authors. All mathematical models and data analyses of the article are
available in the online supplementary material. Raw data and model code are available
on the open science framework: osf.io/vfmt8. Parts of the data were presented at the
SPUDM 2015, SJDM 2015, and the Thurgau experimental economic meeting 2016.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Sebastian
Olschewski, Center for Economic Psychology, Department of Psychology, University of
Basel, Missionsstrasse 62a, 4055 Basel, Switzerland. E-mail:
sebastian.olschewski@unibas.ch
SHIFT IN CHOICE CONSISTENCY OR PREFERENCE 2
Abstract
How do people make preferential choices in situations where their cognitive capacities
are limited? Many studies link the manipulation of cognitive resources to qualitative
changes in preferences. However, there is a widely overlooked alternative hypothesis,
namely, that a reduction in cognitive capacities leads to an increase in choice
inconsistency. We developed a mathematical model and followed a hierarchical Bayesian
estimation approach to test to what extent a reduction in cognitive capacities leads to a
shift in preference or an increase in choice inconsistency. Using a within-subject n-back
task to manipulate cognitive load, we conducted three experiments across di erent
choice domains: risky choice, temporal discounting, and strategic interaction. Across all
three domains results show that a reduction in cognitive capacities predominantly
a ected participants’ level of choice consistency rather than their respective preference.
These results hold on an individual and a group level. In sum, our approach and the
mathematical model we used provide a rigorous and general test of how reduced
cognitive capacities a ect people’s decision-making.
Keywords: choice consistency, preferential choice, stochastic choice, cognitive load,
economic choice
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Taxing Cognitive Capacities Reduces Choice Consistency Rather than Preference: A
Model-Based Test
Introduction
In many situations people are distracted, stressed, tired or occupied with several
things at the same time. These characteristics are often not matched in laboratory
studies in which participants are able to direct all their attention to the task given by
the experimenter. Therefore, researchers in psychology and economics have recently
tried to better understand if and how a reduction in cognitive capacities a ects
behavior across a wide range of tasks. Prominent examples include research on risky
(economic) choices (Benjamin, Brown, & Shapiro, 2013; Deck & Jahedi, 2015; Freeman
& Muraven, 2010), trade-o s between short-term and long-term rewards (Deck &
Jahedi, 2015; Ebert, 2001; Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2003; Joireman, Balliet,
Sprott, Spangenberg, & Schultz, 2008), and strategic interaction games (Cappelletti,
Güth, & Ploner, 2011; Halali, Bereby-Meyer, & Meiran, 2014; Schulz, Fischbacher,
Thöni, & Utikal, 2014). The present work examines how a reduction in cognitive
capacities a ects decision making across these three major preferential choice domains.
Although the three domains are grounded in di erent theories and build on di erent
hypotheses about which cognitive resources are required to solve a given task, there is a
striking similarity in the basic assumption that reduced cognitive resources can lead to
systematic changes in people’s preferences regarding risk, time, or fairness.
There is, however, a plausible alternative hypothesis to a systematic preference
shift: A reduction in cognitive capacities might lead to an increase in choice
inconsistencies, for example, because people pay less attention to the stimuli, they are
less precise in integrating the stimulus information, or they make more random choices
when implementing their decisions. An increase in inconsistency can easily be mistaken
for a systematic preference shift. For example, when diminished cognitive resources lead
to a higher probability of choosing an (unhealthy) cheesecake over a (more healthy)
fruit salad (Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999), it might be due to a genuine change in preference
for the immediate (unhealthy) reward but it might also be due to an increase in
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inconsistency: For a person who usually chooses the healthy fruit, higher rates of
inconsistency will inevitably lead to a higher probability of choosing the inferior
alternative (i.e., the unhealthy food).
An increase in choice inconsistency is a plausible alternative hypothesis when
taking into account two closely related lines of research. The first is the e ect of
cognitive load in the domain of reasoning and problem solving in general (De Neys,
2006; Law, Logie, & Pearson, 2006; Meiser, Klauer, & Naumer, 2001; Phillips, Gilhooly,
Logie, Della Sala, & Wynn, 2003). In these studies, participants had to solve math or
logic problems while cognitive capacities were taxed with a secondary task. Performing
a secondary task increased the number of errors committed or reduced the number of
problems solved compared to a baseline condition. Just as a reduction in cognitive
capacities can impair participants’ abilities to solve problems, it could also impair
participants’ performance in preferential choices. The second line of research has
explored the link between intelligence or general cognitive abilities and preferential
choices in correlative studies. Here a similar debate exists on whether general cognitive
abilities are linked to preferences such as risk aversion or temporal discounting (Burks,
Carpenter, Goette, & Rustichini, 2009; Dohmen, Falk, Hu man, & Sunde, 2010;
Shamosh et al., 2008). Andersson, Tyran, Wengström, and Holm (2013) used a
sophisticated experimental design to show that higher cognitive abilities can lead to
both more or less risk taking. Thus, the authors concluded that cognitive abilities are
related to choice consistency rather than to systematic di erences in risk preference.
These and other correlative findings make use of interindividual di erences and usually
use a mixture of cognitive skill measures. Although this does not provide a causal link
between cognitive capacities and choice consistency, it further motivates the
examination of cognitive load as a state manipulation of choice consistency.
Assessing choice inconsistencies in a preferential choice task requires assumptions
about the choice process. Using a deterministic utility function to model preferential
choices leaves no room for inconsistencies: People should always choose the option that
maximizes (expected) utility. However, for a long time, researchers in decision making
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have emphasized that choices are not deterministic and that decision makers violate
deterministic utility models on a regular basis (Mosteller & Nogee, 1951). One common
solution in the risk literature is the application of a stochastic link function (Birnbaum
& Bahra, 2012; Hey, 1995; Rieskamp, 2008; Wilcox, 2015).
A stochastic link function builds a bridge between deterministic utility models and
the stochastic empirical nature of preferential choices. A trembling hand error, as an
example of the fixed utility class, adds a certain probability of committing a choice
error that means not choosing the option with the highest subjective utility (Harless &
Camerer, 1994). Alternatively, random utility models, such as the probit choice models
(Hey & Orme, 1994; Thurstone, 1927), assume that the utility of a choice option is not
fixed but varies following a specific distribution. When making a choice, people will
always choose the option with the momentarily larger utility; however, due to the
variability of the utility, choice inconsistencies across many choices can result. The
predicted choice probability of a random utility model is a function of the average
utility di erence of the considered choice options. Both fixed utility and random utility
models predict that choices will vary across nearly identical choice situations (cf.
Rieskamp, 2008). Therefore, for simplicity throughout this paper, we will use the term
choice inconsistency without preferring either of the two utility frameworks. In a
preferential choice task, choice inconsistencies depend on the assumption of a given
utility specification. Thus, in the context at hand, the consistency hypothesis states
that reduced cognitive capacities increase the chance of choosing an inferior option, that
is, an option with lower (average) utility as defined by the utility function.
We claim that refraining from a stochastic choice model—as is often done in
studies of reduced cognitive capacities—can lead to unjustified conclusions. To avoid
ambiguity and to determine whether the e ect of a cognitive capacity reduction can be
attributed to a shift in preference, an increase in inconsistencies, or both, we propose a
general mathematical model framework. This framework maps onto di erent domains
as well as di erent utility specifications. In each of the three domains we investigate,
namely, risky choice, temporal discounting, and the ultimatum game, we use di erent
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utility functions to capture preferences in the respective domains and stochastic choice
models to capture choice consistency. In this way, we demonstrate that our conclusions
are generalizable across di erent domains, utility functions, and utility frameworks. We
continue with a closer examination of decision-making research and cognitive capacity
reduction manipulations in the respective areas.
Risky Choice
Risk-taking behavior has been assessed in a wide range of everyday behavior as
well as experimental tasks (Charness, Gneezy, & Imas, 2013; Dohmen et al., 2011). A
well-established way to measure risk preferences is to present choices between risky
gambles that di er with respect to outcomes and outcome probabilities. For example, a
choice could be between a sure option of receiving $10 or a risky option of receiving $15
with a probability of 75% and nothing otherwise. People commonly like high expected
values of outcomes (i.e., returns) but do not like high variance of outcomes (i.e., risk;
e.g., Pratt, 1964). By providing multiple pairs of gambles with di erent expected values
and variances, the decision maker has to make repeated trade-o s between expected
values and variances, which allows an estimation of individual utility functions, thereby
characterizing people’s risk attitudes. In general, the more concave the utility
curvature, the more risk averse a person is.
One way to model a concave utility function is with a power function:
U(x) = x , (1)
where x is the objective outcome and   the subjective risk preference parameter.  
values below 1 lead to a concave utility function representing risk aversion and   values
above 1 lead to a convex utility function and hence risk-seeking behavior. The power
utility function has been rejected on empirical grounds many times, which led to the
development of rank-dependent utility models, of which arguably the most prominent is
prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Prospect theory also makes use of a
power utility function, but it adds an editing phase to distinguish gains from losses as
well as the assumption of loss aversion and probability weighting. Using only gambles in
SHIFT IN CHOICE CONSISTENCY OR PREFERENCE 7
the gain domain, cumulative prospect theory as originally stated in Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) has just one more parameter than the power utility function. This
parameter governs the weighting function that transforms probabilities into subjective
decision weights as follows:
W (p) = p
 
(p  + (1≠ p) )(1/ ) . (2)
Finally, a di erent way to model risk preferences is to assume a linear utility function
but to introduce a bias term (Stewart, Reimers, & Harris, 2014). The core of this idea
can be traced back to mean-variance models in the financial literature that were shown
to approximate concave utility functions under certain assumptions (Levy & Markowitz,
1979). Here we further simplified the model by assuming equal variance di erences
between gambles (for details see the Method section). This leads to an expected value
model with one free parameter that captures a choice bias for the riskier or safer of two
options,
EVriskier ≠ EVsafer +  . (3)
Typical studies in the domain of reduced cognitive capacities in risky choice,
however, rarely estimate utility functions (e.g., Benjamin et al., 2013; Deck & Jahedi,
2015; Freeman & Muraven, 2010). For example, in the study by Deck and Jahedi
(2015), participants repeatedly chose between risky gambles and safe outcomes. The
risky gamble was a 50–50 chance to win either a high or a low amount of money and the
alternative safe outcome had an expected value in between these two outcomes. Similar
decisions were also made in the loss domain. The authors manipulated cognitive
capacity with a dual-task design, in which participants had to remember either a 1-digit
(low cognitive load) or an 8-digit (high cognitive load) number during each choice. The
observed data indicated that on average across all participants in the gain domain,
cognitive load significantly decreased the choice share of the risky gamble over the safe
option from 59.5% to 52.7% (in the gain domain). Here, as in other studies mentioned
above, our observation about the ambiguity of the reported e ect applies: In line with
the interpretation of the studies’ authors, the data can be explained as a genuine shift
SHIFT IN CHOICE CONSISTENCY OR PREFERENCE 8
in risk preferences, but alternatively an increase in choice inconsistencies can account
for observed choice proportions closer to a random choice level of 50%. To resolve this
ambiguity, both preference and choice consistency have to be assessed conjointly, which
can be done by applying the quantitative model we present below.
Temporal Discounting
In general, people prefer immediate over delayed gratification, as can be seen by
measured (implicit) discount rates (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002).
From an economic perspective, it makes sense to discount future outcomes (Fisher,
1930), and the discount rate can be partly reflected in a market’s interest rate.
However, it has been experimentally shown that people sometimes act as if they were
discounting future outcomes more strongly than the market interest rate would suggest.
Such preferences for immediate rewards are often explained by impulsive behavior or
self-control problems (O’Donoghue & Rabin, 2000). To elicit people’s time preferences,
it is common to let people choose between di erent monetary amounts that are received
at di erent time points in the future. Here, people have to trade o  between sooner
smaller amounts and later larger amounts of money. In this paradigm, the (implicit)
discounting rate is inferred by setting up a discounting function that is consistent with
most choices. Likewise, it is possible to ask people directly for the present value of a
certain amount that is received at a specific time point in the future. From the stated
present value, a discounting rate can be determined that characterizes a person’s time
preference.
When dealing with monetary amounts that occur at di erent time points,
economic theory prescribes an exponential discounting function as the normative
standard (Samuelson, 1937),
outcome
exp( · delay) , (4)
where the discounting factor  represents the discounting of future outcomes, with
larger values for  implying stronger discounting and giving more weight to immediate
outcomes. In contrast, other functions have been suggested to describe people’s
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observed time preferences, with the one-parameter hyperbolic discounting (Ainslie,
1975) function as a prominent example:
outcome
1 +  · delay , (5)
where  has a similar interpretation as before. Psychologically, a larger  in hyperbolic
discounting is often interpreted as more impulsive behavior. In general, hyperbolic
discounting often describes empirical time preferences better than exponential
discounting (Frederick et al., 2002). More recently, several di erent and more complex
discounting functions have been discussed on empirical, theoretical, or neuroscientific
grounds (Ebert & Prelec, 2007; McClure, Ericson, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen,
2007; Peters, Miedl, & Büchel, 2012). Here, as one representative of this class of
models, we examined an alternative two-parameter hyperbolic discounting function
from Green and Myerson (2004):
outcome
(1 +  · delay)  , (6)
where  again captures discounting and   is a parameter that captures nonlinear scaling
of the denominator. If the scaling parameter is smaller than 1, this implies weaker
discounting compared to the one-parameter hyperbolic model.
Typically, studies examining time preferences under reduced cognitive capacities
used repeated binary choices between immediate and delayed rewards (Deck & Jahedi,
2015; Ebert, 2001; Hinson et al., 2003; Joireman et al., 2008). In Hinson et al. (2003),
participants made choices while under high cognitive load (i.e., remembering letters) or
low cognitive load (i.e., pressing letters after each decision). The authors found that
participants’ hyperbolic discounting factors were larger under high compared to low
cognitive load. Hence, the authors concluded that cognitive load leads to a shift in time
preferences. However, again, it could also be that cognitive load increases choice
inconsistency. This idea has been tested by Franco-Watkins, Pashler, and Rickard
(2006), who reanalyzed the data of Hinson et al. (2003) and argued that there was no
shift in time preference, but only an increase in inconsistencies that drag choice
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proportion closer to 50% (from 25% to 30%). This finding was further corroborated by
an additional experiment of the same authors (Franco-Watkins, Rickard, & Pashler,
2010). To resolve this debate, it is necessary to rigorously test the preference-shift
hypothesis against the choice-consistency hypothesis. This is possible with the
mathematical model presented below.
Fairness Preference
Preference for fairness develops early in life, exists in human beings as well as in
animals, and is claimed to have an important impact on the development of cooperation
(Brosnan & de Waal, 2014; Knafo, Zahn-Waxler, Van Hulle, Robinson, & Rhee, 2008).
Fairness preferences in economics and psychology are often studied in the domain of
strategic interaction games. Typical examples are the ultimatum game (Güth,
Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982) and the dictator game (Kahneman, Knetsch, &
Thaler, 1986). In the ultimatum game, one person, the proposer, decides how to
distribute a given outcome and the other person, the responder, can decide to accept or
to reject the distribution. If the responder accepts, then both players get an outcome
according to the proposed distribution, but if the responder rejects, both players get
nothing. In the dictator game, again, one participant decides how to distribute a given
amount of money between him- or herself and another person. However, the other
person has no choice and only passively receives the distributed amount. Typically in
these games dictators choose to give a nontrivial share to the receiver, and most
responders in the ultimatum game reject distributions that give less than 20% of the
original outcome (Camerer & Thaler, 1995).
This unselfish behavior has often been explained by fairness preferences, according
to which people do not care only about their personal monetary outcomes but are also
concerned about the monetary outcomes for others. One way to model social
preferences is to define a utility function that captures the personal monetary outcome
but also the outcome for another person. This idea has been formalized by Fehr and
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Schmidt (1999) in their inequity aversion utility function, defined as
U(x, y) = x≠ ↵ · max(0, y ≠ x)≠   · max(0, x≠ y), (7)
where the utility U for a person is the sum of that person’s own outcome, x, and the
di erence between that outcome and the outcome of another person, y. There are two
free parameters: ↵, a measure of aversion to inequity disadvantageous to oneself or
first-order inequity aversion, and  , a measure of aversion to inequity that favors
oneself, or second-order inequity aversion. The authors claim that both types of
inequity matter, but that second-order inequity aversion has less weight than first-order
inequity aversion.
A slightly di erent specification of the same idea has been proposed by Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000). Instead of the di erence between a person’s own and another
person’s outcome, they used the ratio. This specification allows for diminishing or
increasing marginal disutility from unfair distributions:
U(x, y) = x≠ ↵ · max
Qa0,A x
x+ y ≠
1
2
B2Rb . (8)
Many studies examining fairness preferences under reduced cognitive capacities
used either dictator or ultimatum games (Cappelletti et al., 2011; Halali et al., 2014;
Schulz et al., 2014). Schulz et al. (2014), for example, used 20 mini-dictator games,
where participants had to choose between two di erent distributions. To manipulate
cognitive load, the authors used a 0- or a 2-back task: Participants heard a sequence of
letters and in the 0-back task had to press a button whenever a target letter was heard
(control condition) whereas in the 2-back task they had to press a button when the
currently heard letter was the same as the letter presented two places back (load
condition). The authors found that the choice of the fair allocation increased from
30.9% to 43.3% from the control to the load condition. In line with other studies cited
above, the authors concluded that under high cognitive load, participants’ preferences
shifted toward more fairness. Interestingly, Schulz et al. (2014) also reported that
participants reacted more sensitively to the allocation alternatives in the control
condition: In each trial, participants had to decide between an almost fair and an unfair
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allocation and the degree of unfairness was varied from a share of 60% up to 100% for
the dictator. It was observed that dictators chose the fair allocation more often when
the alternative allocation was very unfair, compared to cases where the unfair allocation
was closer to the fair allocation. This e ect was less pronounced for participants in the
high load condition. In line with our reasoning, this finding could also be interpreted as
a decrease in sensitivity or an increase in inconsistency under cognitive load. As in the
previous domains, to rigorously test these two competing hypotheses, preference shifts
and choice errors have to be assessed conjointly in a mathematical model.
Stochastic Choice Models
To account for the probabilistic character of preferential choices (see also
Rieskamp, 2008) we add choice rules that lead to probabilistic choice predictions to the
respective utility functions. We used two di erent choice models, namely, probit and
trembling hand, to generalize over specific mathematical implementations and also
di erent stochastic utility frameworks. According to random utility models the utility
of an option varies. The probability of choosing an option is determined by the
probability that one option has a higher utility than the other option. The probit
random utility model assumes normally distributed utilities and can be decomposed
into a stable and a random component:
Ustochastic = U(x) + ✏, (9)
with ✏ being normally distributed with mean 0 and variance ✓ and where U(x) is the
constant utility of the option. In the case of valuations, answers are modeled as
stemming from a normal distribution with the mean according to the respective utility
function and the variability of the answers as ✓. In case of choices, the probit
transformation converts the preference order of di erent options into a probability of
choosing the respective option. In case of valuations, answers are modeled as stemming
from the respective normal distribution. The ✓ specifies the variability of the normally
distributed utility around the stable utility prediction from a deterministic utility
function. In general, the larger ✓, the higher the observed choice inconsistencies and the
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more often an option with a lower mean utility is chosen.
The trembling hand model (Harless & Camerer, 1994) assumes that people have a
fixed utility for each choice option, but when choosing between the two options they
will perform an error with a constant probability and choose the inferior option.
Assuming option y has higher utility to the decider than option x this means
prob(y) = step(U(y)≠ U(x)) · (1≠ ✓) + step(U(x)≠ U(y)) · ✓, (10)
where the step function takes a value of 1 if U(y)≠ U(x) is positive and 0 otherwise. In
our example the probability of choosing y would be determined by the first term of the
equation, that is, 1 minus the trembling hand error ◊, whereas the second term would
become 0. In the case of a valuation, a trembling hand error is modeled by drawing the
valuation from two di erent distributions: from a normal distribution with the mean
determined by a given utility model, or from a uniform distribution across the whole
answer scale space. The first distribution corresponds to a valuation according to the
utility model, whereas the second distribution represents a random valuation. The
probability with which valuations are explained by a draw from the uniform
distribution equals the trembling hand error as defined previously. Finally, the higher
the trembling hand error, the higher the choice inconsistency.
Overview of Experiments
In sum, in very di erent domains of decision making, such as risk taking,
intertemporal choice, and social interactions, researchers claim that reduced cognitive
capacities lead to systematic shifts in people’s preferences. To test the hypothesis of a
change of preferences against the alternative hypothesis of an increase in choice
inconsistency, we made use of the following methodological advancements: First, we
used a within-subject design. This allows observation of the impact of reduced cognitive
capacities on an individual level and thus a richer analysis than the usual comparisons
of group di erences. Second, we used mathematical models that explicitly incorporate a
utility model and an stochastic choice theory, thus allowing for rigorous testing of the
competing hypotheses. Third, we used choice and valuation tasks to generalize our
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findings across di erent response modes. Finally, by exploring three widely studied
domains of decision making with a comparable mathematical modeling approach, we
have corroborated the generalizability of our findings and have tried to unify
methodology in studying preferential choices under reduced cognitive capacities.
We performed a model-recovery study to demonstrate that our modeling
framework is able to identify and to distinguish between a shift in preferences and a
shift in choice consistency and we refer to Appendix A for the details. Here, su ce to
say that manipulating a preference parameter as well as manipulating choice
consistency can be recovered with high power given a realistic set of parameter values
and choice data. In addition, the discriminability is also very high, meaning that only
rarely is a preference shift mis-specified as a shift in choice consistency and vice versa,
given our modeling framework.
The idea of reduced cognitive capacities has been implemented in psychological
experiments, for example, by inducing sleep deprivation or stress (e.g., Anderson &
Dickinson, 2010; Morgado, Sousa, & Cerqueira, 2015). However, these designs are
di cult to standardize and the duration and e ect size of these manipulations over
repeated choice situations might be questioned. Other researchers adopted sequential
designs where participants were given a strenuous task prior to the task of interest (e.g.,
Freeman & Muraven, 2010). However, recently there have been doubts about whether
this manipulation triggers a sensible e ect size (Carter & McCullough, 2014). Taking
these limitations into account, we used a simultaneous task design where people have a
secondary task to perform while making preferential choices (cognitive load
manipulation). More concretely, we induced cognitive load by means of an n-back
task—a strong, reliable, and well-established manipulation (Cohen et al., 1994; Gevins
& Cutillo, 1993; Kane, Conway, Miura, & Colflesh, 2007; Pashler, 1994).
In the following section we describe our first experiment in the domain of risky
choice, starting with our mathematical model, and explain how the model captures
preference shifts and changes in choice consistency. The second and third experiments
on temporal discounting and strategic interactions follow. At the end, we discuss the
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converging evidence across all three experiments.
Experiment 1: Risk Taking
Method
Experimental Design and Mathematical Model. In Experiment 1 we
explored the e ect of cognitive load on risky choices. Participants repeatedly chose
between 160 binary two-outcome gambles presented on a computer screen. Each
participant made half of the choices under cognitive load. In the load condition,
participants performed an audio version of the n-back task in parallel with the main
gamble task. In the control condition, a simplified version of the n-back task was
presented (see below for details). The order of the manipulation was counterbalanced
between participants. Because of the within-subject design, we analyzed the di erences
between the two conditions following a hierarchical Bayesian framework that captures
individual- as well as group-level e ects. In our main model, the subjective utility of a
gamble is captured with a power function with the exponent — as a free parameter,
U· = ⌃2i pi · x +  ·condi . (11)
The utility di erence between two gambles feeds into a probit choice function with one
free parameter ◊ that measures the variability of the utility:
prisky =  
3
Urisky ≠ Usafe
✓+  ✓ · cond
4
, (12)
where the di erence between the control and load conditions within each participant is
captured by a   parameter introduced for both   and ✓, governed by a dummy variable
cond coded as -1 for the load condition and +1 for the control condition. Thus, the
parameter values for the control and load conditions are calculated as adding or
subtracting the respective   from each average parameter value. This results in a
composite measure for risk preference in the control,  control, and the load,  load,
condition as well as a composite measure of error variance in the control, ✓control, and
the load, ✓load, condition. Implemented this way, a di erence in either preference or
consistency between the control and the load condition will be reflected by the
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respective   parameters. In particular, cognitive load could lead to a credible shift in
preference,   , to a credible shift in error variance,  ✓, to a credible shift in both, or to
no di erence at all. The choice-consistency hypothesis states that cognitive load
increases the inconsistency ✓ but leaves the risk preference   unchanged. Similarly, we
instantiated the other models comprising of di erent utility functions and the
trembling-hand choice rule as described in the introduction.
In all three experiments of the present work, we follow a two-step approach for
inference: First, we tested the general existence of an e ect of the cognitive load
manipulation by model comparisons. We estimate WAICs for the full model and
compare it with models that assume no e ect of cognitive load ( s fixed to zero) and
with models assuming just one single e ect of either of the parameters. WAICs are
established Bayesian model comparison tools and especially suited to hierarchical
Bayesian modeling because they punish model complexity more accurately than
comparable measures that just rely on the number of parameters (Vehtari, Gelman, &
Gabry, 2016a, 2016b). In a second step, after testing the e ect of the cognitive load
manipulation, we followed an estimated approach for the parameters of the models to
quantify and characterize the e ects for the potential shifts in preferences and choice
inconsistencies. Therefore, we examine the 95% highest density interval (HDI) of the
posterior distribution of the di erences in parameters between experimental conditions,
 . Di erences where the HDI includes zero are not credibly di erent from zero, whereas
di erences that exclude the HDI are regarded as being credibly di erent from zero and
thus it is concluded that such a parameter credibly di ered due to the cognitive load
manipulation (Kruschke, 2014).
We constructed a hierarchical Bayesian model along the lines proposed by
Kruschke (2014). On an individual level we estimated four parameters for each
participant ( i, ✓i,   ,i, and  ✓,i). These parameters were drawn from a normal
distribution with mean and standard deviation equal to the respective group-level
parameters. Before being entered in the model, the parameters were further transformed
as follows: For the parameters capturing preferences,    was added to or subtracted
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from   depending on the experimental condition, and the sum was transformed into a
uniform distribution between 0 and 3 by means of an inverse probit transformation that
was scaled by the factor 3. Similarly, for the error variance,  ✓ was added to or
subtracted from ✓ and the sum was transformed into a uniform distribution from 0 to 5.
These transformed priors were chosen to be distributed in a broad range of plausible
parameter estimates from previous estimation approaches in the literature or derived
from theoretical considerations of the respective models. For all parameters, we made
sure that the posterior estimates were not very close to the endpoints of a given range.
These transformations were done to facilitate the creation of intuitive and
noninformative prior distributions on the group-level parameters. Means of all
parameters were drawn from a normal distribution with a prior mean of 0 and a variance
of 0.5. The variances of the group parameters were drawn from uniform distributions
between 0 and 0.5. Given the sum of two parameters that are inverse probit
transformed, a variance of 0.5 for each parameter guarantees that the transformed
parameter combinations are truly uniform across the specified range. The priors for the
alternative model specifications were constructed along the same principles.
This and all following data analyses were conducted with the JAGS package
(Plummer et al., 2003) in RStudio (R Core Team, 2016; RStudio Team, 2015). WAICs
were calculated from the likelihoods with the loo package (Vehtari et al., 2016a). All
presented posterior estimates had an e ective number of samples of at least 10,000 and
were numerically approximated with three chains that mixed and converged, as
indicated by the Gelman–Rubin statistic Rˆ < 1.02 for all reported group posteriors
(Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin, 2014). The source code of the models and the
Bayesian analyses can be found at the Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/vfmt8/.
Gamble Stimuli. The gambles in the choice task were presented adaptively (80
in each condition) to increase the e ciency of the experimental design. As a basis for
the adaptive design, 400 pairs of risky two-outcome gambles were randomly created
according to the following rules: Expected values were in the range of 40 to 100; the
standard deviation of each gamble (i.e., its riskiness) ranged from 1 to 50; the pairs
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were equally distributed across 10 bins that varied in the expected value di erences
between the riskier and safer gamble (in ascending order). That is, in the first bin the
expected value of the safer gamble was much higher than the expected value of the
riskier gamble whereas it was the other way around in the 10th bin. Within each bin,
the range of di erences in standard deviation between the two gambles was similar so
that the di erence in standard deviation and in expected value were independent. The
adaptive choice task itself consisted of several steps. In the first step, participants made
20 initial choices, based on two randomly selected gamble pairs from each bin. This was
to guarantee that each participant made choices along the whole range of expected
value di erences. In a second step, an adaptive algorithm was implemented: First, each
participant saw a pair of gambles from the fourth bin. Thereafter, when the riskier of
the two gambles was chosen, the next pair of gambles was selected from a lower bin and
vice versa whenever the safer of the two options was chosen.
The gambles in the second half of the experiment (i.e., either the load or the
control condition) consisted of the same 80 gambles and were presented in the same
order to make sure that the stimuli in the two conditions were comparable. Gambles
were randomized with respect to their occurrence on the left or right side of the screen.
Choices were self-paced and were made with the keys "D" for the left option and "L" for
the right option. Figure 1 displays a screenshot of the experimental task. The software
for this and the other experiments were programmed in PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007).
N -Back Task. In parallel to the gamble task, participants also heard a
continuous sequence of letters at 3-s intervals over earphones. Participants had to press
the space bar on the keyboard whenever a target occurred. The definition of a target
depended on the condition: In the load condition, a target occurred whenever the
currently heard letter corresponded to the third latest letter in the sequence (hence, a
3-back task). In the control condition, every letter "L" represented a target. The control
task did not require memory and thus should have put a significantly lower tax on
cognitive capacities (Cohen et al., 1994; Miller, Price, Okun, Montijo, & Bowers, 2009).
Participants had to press the button within 2,700 msec after the onset of the stimulus.
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In total there were eight di erent letters (D, F, H, L, K, N, P, R) and the sequences
were randomly created with the constraint that 25% of a bundle of 40 consecutive
letters contained a target. Feedback (right or wrong) was provided when the bar was
pressed or when a target was missed. For every correct press of the space bar as well as
for no reaction to nontargets, participants earned one point. To calculate the final
score, the number of points was divided by the total number of letters heard.
Participants, Incentives, and Procedure. Forty psychology students (Mage
= 24.23 years, SD = 5.47, 7 male, 33 female) participated for course credit and a
choice-dependent monetary bonus. Since we aimed for the analysis of our hierarchical
Bayesian model framework, a traditional power analysis did not apply. Therefore, we
opted for a convenient sample size of 40. The whole experiment lasted 60–90 min and
participants earned on average 6.46 CHF (about 6.50 USD) with a range of 2.00 to
13.80 CHF between participants. The experiment was approved by the institutional
review board (IRB) of the psychology department of the University of Basel.
Participants were welcomed at the laboratory, received written instructions, and gave
informed consent. After the instructions, there were test questions to check whether
they understood the decision task and the n-back task. It was guaranteed that only
participants who answered all questions correctly started the experiment. If
participants answered incorrectly, which happened only rarely, the instructor would
reread the instructions and help the participant understand and produce the correct
answer. The experiment was done in two blocks with one block containing the control
task and one block the n-back task as secondary task. The order of the conditions was
alternated between participants. As described, there were 80 self-paced gamble
decisions in each block and there was a break of 10 min between the two blocks.
Both the decision task and the n-back task were incentivized. The decision task
was incentivized by randomly selecting one of the gamble trials at the end of the
experiment to play out. The outcome of the selected trial was then multiplied by the
score from the n-back task. During the experiment all outcomes were shown in
experimental currency units (ECUs), which were exchanged into Swiss francs (10 ECU
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= 1 CHF) at the end of the experiment. At the end of the experiment, the participants
performed a nonincentivized, automated version of the operation span (Ospan) task
(Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005). In this task, participants sat at the
computer and solved math problems while having to remember up to seven letters,
which they had to type in after a series of math problems. After this task participants
were debriefed and paid.
Results
Descriptive results. Overall, participants chose the risky option 51.1% of the
time in the control and 52.2% of the time in the load condition, Wilcoxon test:
W (n = 40) = 361.5, p = .886. Hence, the adaptive design managed to bring individual
participants close to their respective indi erence points. Yet, these percentages are hard
to combine across participants, since everyone saw di erent gambles. Therefore, in
Figure 2 we plot the percentage of risky choices across all participants separately for the
control and load conditions and for di erent quantiles of expected value di erences
(calculated as the expected value of the riskier option minus the expected value of the
safer option). The figure shows that the percentage of risky choices increased from the
1st to the 5th quantile, indicating that participants’ choices were a ected by the
gambles’ expected value. The figure further shows a visible di erence between the
control and load conditions: In the control condition, the increase in the percentage of
risky choices is steeper than in the load condition. This is a first indication that choice
consistency in the load condition was diminished. Reaction times were on average 5.8 s
in the control and 6.6 s in the load condition. A t test across the individual log reaction
time means showed no significant di erence, t(39) = ≠0.95, p = .347.
Model results. Here we present the results for the full model as introduced in
the Method section. The full model has a WAIC of 8160. This is lower than the WAIC
of a model fixing both  s to zero (8253). In addition, it is also smaller than both models
with one   fixed to zero (either preference with 8191 or error with 8179, respectively).
This demonstrates that the full model, which assumes a shift in preferences and a shift
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in choice consistencies as a result of the cognitive load manipulation is best to describe
the data.
Now, the e ect of cognitive load with respect to the di erent parameters is
assessed and the estimates of risk preference   for the two conditions are presented in
Figure 3. The estimated mean for the group-level posterior of the utility curvature
parameter was  control = ≠1.23 (SD = 0.15, 95% HDI [≠1.53,≠0.94]) in the control
condition and  load = ≠1.12 (SD = 0.21, 95% HDI [≠1.54,≠0.71]) in the load
condition. Retransforming these values to the original scale, this corresponds to an
average utility curvature parameter across both conditions of around 0.36. This means
that the participants were overall quite risk averse. The group posterior for the
di erence in risk preference between the control and load conditions showed a mean of
   = ≠0.05 (SD = 0.12). Because the posterior distribution overlaps 0
(95% HDI [≠0.28, 0.19]), there is no credible di erence between people’s risk preferences
in the two experimental conditions. Concerning the individual parameter estimates, it
can be seen in Figure 3 that most participants scatter closely around the 45-degree line.
There is also no trend of a majority of participants’ risk preference parameter estimates
increasing or decreasing, as can be seen by a binomial test (19 of 40 with    > 0,
binomial test: p = .875). This means similar individual risk preferences between the
control and load conditions, thus corroborating the group-level conclusion.
Figure 4 shows the posterior distribution of the utility variance on the group level
✓, with an expected ✓control = ≠2.04 (SD = 0.07, 95% HDI [≠2.18,≠1.91]) in the
control condition and an expected ✓load = ≠1.69 (SD = 0.10, 95% HDI [≠1.87,≠1.50])
in the load condition. To put the absolute numbers into perspective, for an increase in
terms of expected utility of 0.1 (outcomes were standardized to values between 0 and 1)
at the switching point of the probit function, the percentage of choices for the riskier
option increased from 50% to 83% on average in the control condition, but to only 67%
in the load condition according to our choice model. This illustrates that participants
under load were less sensitive to changes in expected value than in the control
condition. The di erence in the error variance parameter between the control and load
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conditions on the group level was  ✓ = ≠0.17 (SD = 0.05). This di erence is credibly
negative (95% HDI [≠0.26,≠0.09]). Thus, the utility variance was lower in the control
compared to the load condition. This result is also corroborated on an individual level
because all individual parameter estimates are above the 45-degree line shown in Figure
4 (or 40 of 40 participants had a  ✓ < 0).
Behavioral measures and robustness. In the n-back task, participants
scored on average 84.46% correct, with a range from 69.5% to 92.9%. Since on average
25% of the stimuli were signals, never pressing a button would result in a score of 75%.
Five participants earned below that score. To measure working memory capacity, we
administered the automated Ospan task and report the total number of recalled letters:
On average, participants achieved a score of 59.6 (range 34–75). Although we expected
the individual di erences in working memory capacity to explain some of the variance
in the model parameters, there were no significant correlations between participants’
Ospan scores and their estimated model parameters. There was also no significant
correlation between the n-back score and the model parameters. Table B1 in the
Appendix shows all correlations.
Finally, as mentioned above, we administered two alternative utility models: A
linear utility model and cumulative prospect theory (see Equations 2 and 3). As is
shown in Table 1, the two alternative models yield similar results. In both cases, choice
inconsistency increased in the load compared to the control condition, whereas
preferences remained unaltered. This is true in particular for cumulative prospect
theory, showing that neither risk preference nor the probability weighting function is
credibly influenced by the cognitive load manipulation. Using a di erent error model,
namely, the trembling hand error (see Equation 10), leads to similar conclusions: Higher
cognitive load increases the tremble error compared to the control condition for all
tested utility models. From the WAIC scores, we conclude that the probit choice
models describe our data on average better than the trembling hand error models.
Although the prospect theory implementation did not show any di erences in
parameters between the two conditions other than the choice consistency parameter, it
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showed the best fits. To sum up, in line with the choice-consistency hypothesis,
cognitive load led to an increase in choice consistency rather than a shift in risk
preferences. This holds on an individual and on a group level. Furthermore, the results
are consistent across three alternative utility models that are commonly used in the
domain of risky choice and two di erent stochastic choice models.
Experiment 2: Temporal Discounting
Method
Experimental Design and Mathematical Model. Experiment 2 tested how
cognitive load a ects temporal discounting of monetary outcomes. Participants were
presented with di erent outcomes at di erent points in time (either one or two
outcomes per trial) and had to state for how much money they were willing to sell their
future outcome(s), otherwise known as their willingness to accept (WTA). Cognitive
load was manipulated as a within-subject factor with an audio version of the 3-back
task that was identical to the manipulation in Experiment 1.
To analyze the data we used a hierarchical Bayesian regression on the stated
WTA prices. As our main model, we implemented the one-parameter hyperbolic
discounting model with the discounting parameter Ÿ specified as follows:
µdout =
outcome
(1 + +   · cond+  number · number +  stake · stake) · delay . (13)
Here for a given trial, outcome stands for the monetary value in the experimental
currency (see below) and delay is the amount of delay of the respective outcome in
months. To present enough discounting trials to estimate the model parameters, we had
to vary the stimulus characteristics with respect to the number of outcomes (either one
or two delayed outcomes) and the stake (either low or high). To account for di erences
in discounting due to these factors, we included two additional dummies that were +1
for one-outcome trials or -1 for two-outcome trials, and +1 for high-stakes-outcome
trials and -1 for low-stakes-outcome trials, respectively. The   parameters capture the
corresponding e ects.
SHIFT IN CHOICE CONSISTENCY OR PREFERENCE 24
To implement the probit choice model, the discounting function is fed into a
Bayesian regression (Equation 14). This regression assumes a normal distribution
around the discounted outcome, with a variance that equals the choice variability. The
larger the variance, the broader the range of WTA prices for similar discounted
amounts and the less sensitive the valuation with respect to the best fitting discounting
parameter Ÿ.
WTA ≥ dnorm(µdout, ✓+  ✓ · cond). (14)
Di erences in parameter values between the two experimental conditions are captured
by the   terms as in Experiment 1. Again the choice-consistency hypothesis states that
cognitive load will change choice consistency but will leave time preference unaltered.
The hierarchical Bayesian estimation was performed as in Experiment 1. The composite
parameters, consisting of the main e ect and the di erence between the two
experimental conditions, control, load, ✓control, and ✓load, were set up uniformly from 0
to 1. We calculated ✓control and ✓load on the precision scale, which transforms into the
standard deviation scale as follows: precision = 1/SD2. The exponential and the
two-parameter hyperbolic discounting functions as well as the trembling hand choice
rule were implemented accordingly and results are presented at the end of the
Experiment 2 Results section.
Temporal Discounting Stimuli. As stated above, there were two classes of
stimuli to increase both the variety of the task and the number of informative trials:
Some trials had only one delayed outcome and some trials had two outcomes that were
paid out at di erent points in the future. All stimuli were created by defining 10 points
in time ranging from 1 week to 1 year (0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.5, 2, 3, 6, 9, 12 months).
Then two ranges of outcomes were defined: low and high stakes. The low stakes ranged
from 41 to 75 and the high stakes from 76 to 100 ECU either for one outcome or
distributed over two outcomes. Finally, outcomes were randomly matched with the
delay times. Forty stimuli each for one- and two-outcome trials were randomly selected
and were identical for all participants. The task for the participants was to indicate
their WTA, that is, their minimum selling price for each stimulus. They indicated their
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WTA with a slider that ranged from 0 to the undiscounted amount or the sum of
undiscounted amounts (for the two-outcome trials) in that trial. Participants could
move the slider until they were satisfied with its position and then confirmed their
choice by clicking on the label with their current stated WTA price (see Figure 5).
Participants, Incentives, and Procedure. Forty-six psychology students (
Mage = 22.2 years, SD = 5.1, 7 male, 39 female) participated for course credit and a
monetary bonus. The sample size was increase compared to the first study because
participants had only half of the trials in this experiment. The whole experiment lasted
60 to 75 min and participants earned on average 5.8 CHF (about 5.8 USD; range
1.7–8.8 CHF). The experiment was approved by the IRB of the psychology department
at the University of Basel.
Participants were welcomed at the laboratory, received written instructions, and
gave informed consent. Only participants who correctly answered all questions
concerning the experimental procedure could start the experiment (similar to the
procedure for the first experiment). The experimental task was implemented on a
computer in two blocks with a break of 10 min in between. In each of the two blocks,
participants got 20 one-outcome and 20 two-outcome self-paced trials in randomized
order. Whether participants started with the load or control block was alternated
between participants.
Both the decision task and the n-back task were incentivized. At the end of the
experiment, one of the trials was chosen at random and a Becker–DeGroot–Marschak
auction was exercised (Becker, DeGroot, & Marschak, 1964): A random number
between 0 and the maximum of the answer scale was drawn and compared to the
participant’s stated WTA for the given trial. If the random number was larger than or
equal to the WTA, the participant’s option for gaining the future reward was sold for
an immediate outcome proportional to the random draw. If the random draw was
smaller, the participant’s option was not sold and the participant kept the future
outcome(s). The immediate or future outcome was then multiplied by the score of
correct reactions to the n-back task (for calculation of the n-back score see Experiment
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1). All shown outcomes were exchanged into Swiss francs (5 ECU = 1 CHF).
Immediate outcomes were paid in cash and delayed outcomes were wire-transferred at
the respective times to the participant’s private bank account. In the experiment, 12
participants received a random o er above their minimum selling price and thus
received an immediate outcome. At the end of the two blocks, there was an
unincentivized, computerized version of the Ospan task (Unsworth et al., 2005) (see
Method section of Experiment 1). After this task, participants were debriefed and paid.
Results
Descriptive results. Overall, participants selected an amount of 49.56 ECUs in
the control and 49.22 ECUs in the load condition, which corresponds to an average
discounting rate over all time intervals of 31.13% and 31.43% respectively, Wilcoxon
test: W (n = 46) = 554, p = .889. A descriptive summary of the data shows the
percentage of discounting indicated by the WTA prices across all participants separately
for the control and load conditions and for di erent quantiles of delay (Figure 6). The
delay of the future outcome increased from the 1st to the 5th quantile and was in the
case of two-outcome trials the average of the two delays. As expected, there was an
overall trend of discounting increasing from the 1st to the 5th quantile. This shows that
participants’ WTA prices were a ected by the (average) delay of the outcome(s).
However, the increase in discounting for longer delayed outcomes was not very large,
mainly due to the two-outcome trials where the average delay was less important in
determining WTA prices. Reaction times were on average 11.28 s in the control and
13.46 s in the load condition. A t test based on the individual log reaction time means
did not show significant di erences between the two conditions, t(45) = ≠1.45, p = .154.
Model results. Here we present the results for the full hierarchical Bayesian
regression with hyperbolic discounting as introduced in Equation 14. The full model has
a WAIC of 27747. This is lower than the WAIC of a model fixing both  s to zero
(27969). In addition, it is also smaller than both models with one   fixed to zero (either
preference with 27855 or error with 27874, respectively). This demonstrates that the
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full model, which assumes a shift in preferences and a shift in choice consistencies as a
result of the cognitive load manipulation is best to describe the data.
To assess the magnitude of the e ect on the preference and choice consistency
parameters, Figure 7 first shows group and individual posterior estimates for the
discounting parameter  of the hyperbolic discounting model for the control and load
conditions. Overall, the group posterior of the discounting parameter had a mean of
control = ≠1.06 (SD = 0.08, 95% HDI [≠1.21,≠0.91]) in the control condition and
load = ≠1.03 (SD = 0.08, 95% HDI [≠1.17,≠0.87]) in the load condition.
Retransforming the average parameter estimates across both conditions results in a
discounting rate of 0.15 for 1 month; hence, people showed considerable discounting
behavior. As an example, $100 in 1 year is worth only $36.50 today, assuming
hyperbolic discounting with the here-estimated discount rate. As the e ect of our
experimental manipulation on time preference, we estimated   = ≠0.02 (SD = 0.03,
95% HDI [≠0.07, 0.04]). Because 0 is included in the group-level distribution, we can
conclude that there is no credible e ect of the cognitive load manipulation on the
discounting parameter. This is further corroborated by the estimates of individual
parameters varying unsystematically between the control and load condition (21 of 46
participants with steeper discounting in the load condition   < 0, binomial test:
p = .659).
The group posterior of the parameter capturing an e ect of two-outcome trials
compared to one-outcome trials had a mean of  number = ≠0.39 (SD = 0.05) and the
95% HPD interval excludes 0 95% HDI [≠0.50,≠0.29]. This means that two-outcome
stimuli were more strongly discounted than one-outcome stimuli. This may be due to
the discomfort of two di erent points of payment. Moreover, discounting was weaker in
trials with high-stakes outcomes than in trials with low-stakes outcomes: The parameter
capturing the e ect of high- compared to low-stakes trials had a significant influence on
discounting behavior ( stake = ≠0.04, SD = 0.02, 95% HDI [≠0.07,≠0.01]).
The group-level posterior of consistency of WTA prices was measured with the
precision ✓ (= 1/variance) of the normal distribution in Equation 14. Estimates are on
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a probit scale and results are shown in Figure 8. Neither the number of outcomes nor
the amount at stake credibly influenced precision and thus no additional dummies were
included. Estimation of the precision gives a group mean ✓control = ≠2.20 (SD = 0.06,
95% HDI [≠2.35,≠2.13]) in the control condition and ✓load = ≠2.35 (SD = 0.06,
95% HDI [≠2.50,≠2.25]) in the load condition. Retransformation of these values results
in standard deviations of the WTA prices of 8.96 and 10.37, respectively. This shows
that in the load condition, participants’ WTA prices were more inconsistent with
respect to the hyperbolic discounting model than in the control condition. In line with
this, the results indicate a credible di erence in the precision in the load compared to
the control condition: The corresponding group-level posterior of the condition
parameter had a mean of  ✓ = 0.07 (SD = 0.02) and the 95% HPD interval excludes 0
(95% HDI [0.02, 0.12]). This is corroborated on an individual level, as can be seen in
Figure 8, where most participants’ parameter estimates fall below the 45-degree line (35
of 46 participants  ✓ > 0, binomial test: p = .001).
Behavioral measures and robustness. In the n-back task, participants
scored on average 84.62% correct, with a range from 74.40% to 94.29%. One
participant’s score was below the score that results if the button was never pressed. In
the automated Ospan task, participants achieved an average score of 55.71, with a score
range from 31 to 72. As in Experiment 1, there was no significant correlation between
the Ospan measure or the n-back score and the model parameters (see Table B2 in the
Appendix).
As a robustness check, we also implemented two alternative discounting models
(see Equations 5 and 6): exponential discounting and a two-parameter hyperbolic
discounting function proposed by Green and Myerson (2004). As shown in Table 2, for
exponential discounting the choice inconsistency also increased in the load compared to
the control condition. These results are robust to the use of a trembling hand error for
the exponential as well as the one-parameter hyperbolic discounting model. For the
two-parameter hyperbolic discounting function, two e ects of the cognitive load
manipulation were found: Both the discounting parameter and the choice consistency
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parameter di ered credibly between the control and load conditions. Thus, this model
specification cannot distinguish between an e ect of preference or choice consistency.
One reason might be that the two parameters a ecting discounting of outcomes in this
model (discounting and scaling) have been shown to be highly correlated (Peters et al.,
2012). Consequently, although this model seems best in explaining the data taking the
WAIC criterion, the additional mathematical complexity might make it more di cult to
identify the source of the cognitive load e ect.
In summary, these results indicate that cognitive load a ected choice consistency
rather than time preference, both for exponential and hyperbolic discounting and for
two di erent choice rules. With a two-parameter hyperbolic discounting model,
cognitive load seems to a ect both preference and consistency. Overall, these findings
accord with the results of the first experiment.
Experiment 3: Fairness Preferences
Method
Experimental Design and Mathematical Model. In Experiment 3 we
examined the influence of cognitive load on fairness preferences in social interactions.
Participants in the experiment took the role of the responder in a sequence of one-shot
mini ultimatum games (Bolton & Zwick, 1995). As in the regular ultimatum game, the
proposer distributes money between her- or himself and the responder. The responder
can reject o ers, in which case both participants get nothing. In mini ultimatum games,
the proposer can only decide between two given distributions, so we created di erent
choice situations that allowed for repeated, nontrivial trials. Cognitive load was
manipulated as a within-subject factor with an audio version of the n-back task as in
the previous experiments.
Our main model describes responders’ rejection rates with a simplified version of
the inequity aversion model from Fehr and Schmidt (1999) that takes only first-order
inequity aversion into account. According to this model, we define the utility for a
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responder as
Udist = resp≠ (↵+  ↵ · cond) · max(0, prop≠ resp). (15)
Here the rejection rates of responders depend on the amount the responder gets,
resp, and the inequity against the responder is calculated as the di erence between
proposer and responder outcome or 0 if the responder gets more than the proposer. The
parameter ↵ estimates how important inequity is in determining the rejection rate and
thus measures inequity aversion or fairness preference. We also estimated the inequity
aversion utility function as specified in Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and the full
inequity aversion from Fehr and Schmidt (1999) including second-order inequity
aversion (see the Robustness section below).
To account for choice consistency, our main model uses the probit formula with
choice variability ✓, similar to in the previous two experiments. In the context at hand,
the probability of rejecting a given o er was specified as follows:
p(reject) =  
3 0≠ Udist
✓+  ✓ · cond
4
. (16)
As an example of how the model works, if the utility from the proposed distribution is
negative (this happens given a certain ↵ and if the proposer outcome is su ciently
larger than the responder outcome), the probability of rejecting the distribution is
larger than 50%. This is similar when implementing a trembling hand error, where a
free parameter captures just the probability of rejecting an o er with a positive utility
and accepting an o er with a negative utility. Di erences between the load and the
control conditions are again captured by the   terms for ↵ and ✓, respectively. As
before, the choice-consistency hypothesis states that cognitive load changes the
sensitivity parameter ✓ of the responder, but not the responder’s inequity aversion ↵.
The hierarchical Bayesian estimation is similar to in the previous experiments. The
composite parameters capturing inequity aversion, ↵control and ↵load, are set up
uniformly between -5 and 0 and the parameters capturing error variance, ✓control and
✓load, are set up uniformly in the range of 0 to 100. The additional model specifications
are set up in the same way.
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Mini Ultimatum Game Stimuli. In total we created 40 mini ultimatum
games. Responder outcomes ranged from 0 to 90 and proposer outcomes from 15 to 120
ECU. The sum of responder and proposer outcomes in each of the possible distributions
was not necessarily equal. This means there were trade-o s between the overall
outcome (i.e. social welfare) and the respective outcome distributions. All mini
ultimatum games were pretested to make sure that they provided nontrivial distribution
options for the proposer and that they entailed nonnegligible rejection rates on the part
of the responder (Fleischhut, Artinger, Olschweski, Volz, & Hertwig, 2014).
All participants saw the same 40 mini ultimatum games, but in di erent
conditions (control or load) and in a randomized order. Incentivized choices from five
proposers were collected before the main experiment started. Proposer choices were
only important for incentivizing responders and are therefore not reported here.
Responder choices were collected with the strategy method. This means responders had
to state their acceptance or rejection for each of the two alternative distributions in
each mini ultimatum game before they knew which distribution was chosen. This
allowed us to elicit a larger amount of responder data. In each trial, participants saw
the currently o ered distribution in the middle of the screen and had to state whether
to accept or reject with the letters "D" and "L". In the upper right corner of the screen
they also saw the alternative distribution that the proposer could have chosen. Figure 9
shows a screenshot of the task.
Participants, Incentives, and Procedure. Fifty-seven psychology students
(Mage = 25.07 years, SD = 8.06 , 14 male, 43 female) participated for course credit and
a choice-dependent monetary bonus. A higher sample size than in the first experiment
was chosen because of the reduced number of trials for each participant. One participant
was excluded because she always selected the same option, but including her in the
analysis would not have changed any of the conclusions. The whole experiment lasted
between 45 and 60 min and participants earned on average 7.60 CHF (about 7.60 USD)
aggregated over responder choices and the n-back task. The payments varied from 3.70
to 11.29 CHF across participants. The variation in payment mainly occurred because
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for 15 participants a trial was chosen for payment where they rejected an ultimatum
o er, thus these participants earned nothing from the ultimatum game. The experiment
was approved by the IRB of the psychology department at the University of Basel.
Participants were welcomed at the laboratory, received written instructions, and
gave informed consent. Only those participants who answered all questions concerning
the experimental procedure correctly started the computerized experiment. The
experiment consisted of two blocks with a 10-min break between the blocks.
Participants got 40 self-paced choices (20 mini ultimatum games) where they could
accept or reject distributions that were randomized in each block. The two di erent
distributions of one mini ultimatum game did not necessarily follow each other, but
they always appeared in the same block. Whether participants started with the load or
the control block was alternated across participants.
Both the decision task and the n-back task were incentivized. One of the decision
trials was chosen at random and matched with one of the five proposers. For the
payment, only the responder choice for the distribution actually chosen by the matched
proposer mattered. If at this distribution the responder accepted, then she or he would
earn a payout proportional to the responder outcome in that distribution. If the
responder rejected this distribution, he or she would get nothing. The five proposers
were matched equally often to responders and at the end of all experiments for each
proposer one responder was randomly chosen to be payo  relevant. The proposers got
their money after the experiment ended via personal collection or bank transfer. In
contrast to the previous experiments, the performance in the n-back task was
incentivized by multiplying the obtained score by 5 CHF. The resulting amount was
then added to the payment from the mini ultimatum game (for calculation of the
n-back score see Experiment 2). This was done to guarantee that participants who
rejected many distributions also had an incentive to achieve a good n-back score. All
shown outcomes were transferred into Swiss francs (10 ECU = 1 CHF). At the end of
the two blocks, there was an unincentivized, computerized version of the Ospan task
(Unsworth et al., 2005) as in the previous experiments. After this task, participants
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were debriefed and paid.
Results
Descriptive results. In the following we analyze only responder choices: On
average participants rejected 37% of all o ers, 36% in the control and 38% in the load
condition, respectively, Wilcoxon test: W (n = 57) = 460, p = .130. Figure 10 shows the
average rejection rates for di erent levels of inequality separately for the control and
load conditions. As expected, the rejection rate increased with the inequality of the
distribution. At first glance, there is no visible di erence between the control and load
conditions. Participants took on average 2.82 s in the control condition and 4.81 s in
the load condition to accept or reject an o er. Taking the means of all participants and
calculating a paired t test, the di erence in logarithmic reaction time between
conditions is significant, t(56) = ≠4.98, p < .001.
Model results. Here, we present the results for the full model as introduced in
Equation 16. The full model has a WAIC of 2815. This is lower than the WAIC of a
model fixing both  s to zero (2989). In addition, it is also smaller than both models
with one   fixed to zero (either preference with 2885 or error with 2913, respectively).
This demonstrates that the full model, which assumes a shift in preferences and a shift
in choice consistencies as a result of the cognitive load manipulation is best to describe
the data.
In the following the respective magnitudes of the e ects of cognitive load on
preference and choice consistency are assessed. Group-level posteriors of inequity
aversion for both conditions as well as individual parameter estimates are depicted in
Figure 11. Overall, inequity aversion ↵ had a credible influence on choices
(↵control = ≠1.10, SD = 0.10, 95% HDI [≠1.30,≠0.89]; ↵load = ≠1.03, SD = 0.11,
95% HDI [≠1.23,≠0.82]). Transformed on the original scale, overall inequity aversion
equals 0.72. This reflects that higher inequity between proposer and responder
outcomes leads to higher rejection rates. For example, an o er of 25 for the responder
while keeping 75 for oneself will be rejected most of the time according to the estimated
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inequity aversion. The di erence between the control and load conditions is captured by
 ↵. The group-level posterior distribution of  ↵ is not credibly di erent from 0
( ↵ = ≠0.03, SD = 0.04, 95% HDI [≠0.11, 0.05]. Thus, inequity aversion did not di er
between the control and load conditions on a group level. In Figure 11, points below the
45-degree line signify lower values in the load compared to the control condition
(inequity is more important) and vice versa for individuals. Here most points are very
close to the 45-degree line, indicating that the cognitive load manipulation had no
systematic e ect on inequity aversion on the individual level. For 36 of 57 participants,
inequality aversion was stronger in the load compared to the control condition (or
 ↵ > 0, binomial test: p = .063).
Looking at the choice variability ✓, the group-level posterior means for both
conditions are ✓control = ≠0.78 (SD = 0.11, 95% HDI [≠0.99,≠0.58]) and ✓load = ≠0.52
(SD = 0.11, 95% HDI [≠0.73,≠0.31]). To put these values into perspective, we
retransformed the parameters to the variance scale, which results in 21.77 in the control
and 30.15 in the load condition. Given the outcomes presented, this would mean that
an increase in utility from 0 to 10 decreases the likelihood of rejection from 50% to 32%
in the control condition and to only 37% in the load condition. The di erence in the
error variance between the control and load conditions was captured by  ✓ = ≠0.13
(SD = 0.06, 95% HDI [≠0.24,≠0.02]). Because the 95% HPD interval excludes 0, the
choice inconsistency is credibly higher in the load compared to the control condition.
Figure 12 shows the group-level posteriors for ✓ as well as the individual ✓s separately
for the control and load conditions. Points above the 45-degree line mean higher
inconsistencies in the load compared to the control condition for individuals. As can be
seen, a majority of participants are above the 45-degree line, or for 39 of 57
participants, choice error was higher in the load compared to the control condition (i.e.,
 ◊ < 0, binomial test: p = .008).
Behavioral measures and robustness. In the n-back task, participants
scored on average 83.85%, with a range from 68.35% to 95%. Five participants had
scores below the guessing rate of 75%. In the automated Ospan task, participants
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achieved an average score of 55.98 (range 13–75). As in Experiments 1 and 2, there was
no significant correlation between the Ospan measure or the n-back score and the model
parameters (see Table B3 in the Appendix).
To check for robustness of our results, we administered two alternative
other-regarding utility functions: the inequity aversion utility function proposed by
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and the full Fehr and Schmidt (1999) utility model with an
additional parameter for second-order inequity aversion (see Equations 7 & 8). Table 3
shows that for both alternative utility models, choice inconsistency increased in the load
compared to the control condition, thus confirming the previous results. When using a
trembling hand choice rule, the results also point in the same direction (i.e., less choice
error in the control compared to the load condition), but the parameter di erences are
no longer significant. For the trembling hand error, there is also no e ect of cognitive
load on the inequity preference parameters in any of the three utility models. WAICs
show consistently a worse fit of the trembling hand compared to the probit models.
This indicates that the e ect of cognitive load on responder behavior in the mini
ultimatum game is better captured by a choice model taking numerical utility
di erences into account than by a choice model that discards this information.
To conclude, we found that cognitive load a ected choice consistency rather than
fairness preference in the mini ultimatum game on both an individual and a group level.
This e ect is robust to di erent other-regarding utility functions, but fails to show
significant di erences when using a trembling hand error model.
General Discussion
To test if a reduction in cognitive capacities leads to qualitative preference shifts,
systematic increases in choice consistency, or both, we conducted three experiments
across di erent domains of preferential decision making, including risky choice,
temporal discounting, and strategic interaction. Across all three experiments, cognitive
capacity was manipulated within subjects by means of a dual-task paradigm where
participants completed an auditive 3-back task while making choices. A comparison of
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the hierarchical Bayesian models based on WAICs showed that the current choice data
was described best when assuming changes in both, choice consistency and preference.
A more thorough analysis based on estimating and comparing the models’ parameters
revealed that a reduction of cognitive capacities predominantly led to more choice
inconsistencies rather than qualitative preference changes. These results hold on the
group and individual level alike and are robust to the alternative model specifications
that we tested. Furthermore, the results hold both for binary choices (Experiments 1
and 3) and economic valuations (Experiment 2). Thus, an increase in choice
inconsistency as a result of a reduction in cognitive capacities seems to be so far an
underappreciated e ect in preferential choice.
Our results provide a possible alternative explanation for recent studies claiming
that a reduction in cognitive capacities can lead to preference changes. We argue that
such a reduction, above all, increases choice inconsistency and that ignoring this e ect
can lead to a biased conclusion that could look like changes in preferences. Yet, unlike
the studies cited in the Introduction, the current studies did not find di erences in
choice proportions or valuation between the control and load conditions. This di erence
might be explained by the stimulus environment. The choice proportions, for example,
in the risky choice experiment were very close to 50% for the safer and the riskier option
in the control condition. In such an environment, an increase in choice error changes
choice proportions symmetrically, whereas if choice proportions are lower or higher, an
increase in choice error can drag choice proportions closer to 50% in a nonsymmetrical
way. Moreover, a valuation task, as was used in the temporal discounting task, might
not, in general, be prone to the problem of confusing choice consistency with preference
shifts, since choice inconsistencies in the valuation task are arguably symmetrical
(except for valuations at the margins). In sum, an observed group di erence between
control and load conditions might be mainly due to biased choice stimuli in the control
group, and a modeling approach can help show the underlying e ect of cognitive load
on economic choices and valuations regardless of the stimulus environment.
Evidence for this view comes from the parameter recovery study (see Appendix
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A). Here, we manipulated choice proportions either as being at 50% (as in the risky
choice experiment) or as deviating from 50%. In line with our reasoning above,
di erences in choice proportions due to a shift in choice consistency were only observed
frequently when choice proportions in control deviated from 50%. Yet, even when a
significant shift in choice proportions occur, our modeling framework can still
distinguish between a shift in preferences and a shift in choice consistency.
To corroborate this simulation-based result, we also applied our model to a
previously published data set that manipulated cognitive load and found a di erence in
choice proportion (Hinson et al., 2003). As described in the section about temporal
discounting, Franco-Watkins et al. (2006) have previously re-analyzed the data and
found evidence for an increase in choice inconsistencies. Using our modeling framework
with hyperbolic discounting as the original authors, but — unlike them — adding a
probit choice function to it and estimating the parameters in a hierarchical Bayesian
approach, we conclude that the di erence between the discounting parameters in the
two conditions is not credibly di erent from 0 (”Ÿ = ≠0.06 [≠0.15; 0.02]), whereas the
di erence in choice consistency di ers from 0 (”◊ = ≠0.10 [≠0.17;≠0.02]). Thus, unlike
the authors of the original article but in line with the analysis of Franco-Watkins et al.
(2006) our modeling approach shows that the observed e ect is predominantly due to a
shift in choice inconsistency and not a shift in preferences. This shows that the
presented modeling approach can distinguish between shifts in choice inconsistencies
and shifts in preferences even when the observed choice proportions di er between the
control and the load condition. Thus, especially when choice proportions in the control
condition deviate from 50%, merely analyzing di erences in choice proportions or
modeling the data without accounting for choice inconsistencies is not su cient to
detect genuine preference shifts.
Changing Preferences
Why should preferences change due to a reduction in cognitive capacities, as
claimed by many recent studies described in the Introduction? One possibility is that
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people become more impulsive or less self-controlled following a reduction in cognitive
capacities. This idea is especially popular in food choice and temporal discounting
studies (Hinson et al., 2003; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). Here, it is argued that the
a ective or impulsive choice di ers from the rational one (e.g., money now vs.
tomorrow or cake vs. fruit). However, in other domains it is less obvious what an
impulsive or rational choice could be: It appears plausible that more impulsive behavior
in risky decision making corresponds to more choices of the riskier option. Likewise,
impulsive behavior might also imply higher rates of rejection of unfair o ers in strategic
interactions. However, these conjectures appear less credible and opposite predictions
are conceivable.
A more general explanation of why preferences might change is that cognitive load
leads to qualitative changes in the underlying decision strategy. From the perspective of
adaptive decision making (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993), people could apply an
expected utility maximization strategy under full cognitive capacities, whereas with
reduced cognitive capacities they might switch to simpler and cognitively less
demanding choice strategies or heuristics. By ignoring some information and using less
integrative steps, such a switch in strategies could systematically change choice
behavior and thus parameters capturing preferences.
How general are our findings given the specific manipulation of cognitive load we
used? The manipulation of cognitive capacities using an auditive 3-back task is thought
to exert a high cognitive load (for a 2-back task as high cognitive load, cf. Perlstein,
Dixit, Carter, Noll, & Cohen, 2003). Yet, weaker or even stronger manipulation of
cognitive capacities could be used (e.g., a 2- or a 4-back task). Could a weaker or
stronger manipulation lead to preference changes that we did not observe in our
studies? A very mild manipulation would most likely fail to restrict at least some
people’s working memory, such that some people would not change their behavior at all.
In contrast, when using an extremely strong manipulation it appears likely that people
would have a hard time expressing any valid preference. In the most extreme case,
choice consistency would be at a minimum and response behavior would be completely
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random. In between these extremes, however, there might be levels of cognitive load
that lead to strategy switches. One could imagine that a steady increase of working
memory load would increase choice inconsistency with a given strategy to the point
where performance is so bad that people switch to a less demanding strategy that
reduces inconsistencies compared to the more complex strategy (for the adaptivity of
such a switch under time pressure, see the simulation in Payne, Bettman, & Johnson,
1988). On the other hand, Worthy, Otto, and Maddox (2012) showed that people
changed their learning strategies in a dynamic decision-making task when under
cognitive load, yet not in an adaptive way. This means strategies were di erent in a
control compared to a load condition, regardless of the reward structure in the
environment.
Such strategy-shift analyses need to identify plausible strategy shifts before the
experiment in order to design stimuli that distinguish between strategies. Given the
plethora of heuristics and strategies in the three preferential choice domains examined
here, it is beyond the scope of our analysis to examine strategy shifts exhaustively. Yet,
we deem it a very interesting question to examine in further studies whether there can
be strategy shifts due to cognitive load, whether there are similarities in these shifts
across di erent domains, and whether these shifts are adaptive. In the current study, we
used a widely accepted manipulation to reduce cognitive capacities and a variety of
standard utility-based choice models in di erent domains to conclude that changes in
behavior could be better explained by an increase in inconsistencies than a shift in
preferences. However, in principle this increase in inconsistency could also be explained
by a qualitative strategy shift.
Cognitive Capacity Reductions More Broadly
Although we used a simultaneous task design, the current findings might also be
relevant for situations where cognitive capacity is reduced through di erent means, for
example, in a sequential task design: In a study by Freeman and Muraven (2010),
participants watched a mute video and had to rate the actress’ facial expression (cf.
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Experiment 2). At the same time they saw common English words on the screen, which
they explicitly had to ignore in the load condition (referred to as the "depletion"
condition by the authors). In a second step of the experiments, all participants had to
pump a (digital) balloon to earn money, facing an increasing risk of the balloon
bursting and themselves receiving nothing (BART task). Analyzing the choice pattern,
the authors concluded that the depletion task led to an increase in risk-seeking
behavior. A common explanation for this e ect is to assume a reduction in self-control
due to performing the preceding task (the strength model or ego depletion, e.g.,
Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007).
Our results with simultaneous task manipulations o er a new hypothesis to
consider: Rather than a systematic loss of self-control and hence a qualitative shift in
preferences toward more risky choices, the observed behavior could also be (partly) due
to an increase in choice inconsistency. This alternative explanation might also be
interesting in light of the recent debate about the e ectiveness of sequential task
manipulations: Although a meta-analysis by Hagger, Wood, Sti , and Chatzisarantis
(2010) found an overall significant e ect size, in a reanalysis Carter and McCullough
(2014) came to the conclusion that the e ect size cannot be distinguished from 0.
Looking more closely at the dependent task in the sphere of choices, we see that some
studies measured preferences (e.g., Freeman & Muraven, 2010; Joireman et al., 2008)
whereas others measured, for example, susceptibility to the attraction e ect (Masicampo
& Baumeister, 2008). Taking our results into account, we would expect an e ect of the
manipulation on a choice consistency parameter (which could in general a ect
susceptibility to context e ects), rather than on a preference parameter. Distinguishing
these fundamentally di erent dependent measures in a mathematical model might lead
to a better understanding of the e ect of the sequential task manipulation on choices.
Finally, a more general approach could examine how decision errors and
preference shifts are related to di erent classes of manipulations, such as sequential or
simultaneous approaches. When considering that the two manipulations follow di erent
theoretical constructs (working memory capacity vs. self-control), a systematic
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examination seems worthwhile. In addition, also time pressure, stress, and sleep
deprivation arguably reduce cognitive capacities. For this more general perspective, our
results make an important contribution to the study of reduced cognitive capacities in
decision making as they o er a parsimonious explanation of e ects reported in di erent
areas (cf. Johnson, 2008).
Testing Stochastic Choice Rules
Whereas many axiomatic choice theories have neglected the stochastic element of
choice (e.g., Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), at the same time psychology and
economics have a long tradition in the development of stochastic choice models (e.g.,
Luce, 1959; Train, 2003). Choice rules are important because empirical research has
shown that choice behavior is probabilistic in that people do not always make the same
choice even in nearly identical choice situations (Hey, 2001; Mosteller & Nogee, 1951).
When explicitly modeling this variability, researchers have to make an assumption on
where the random component a ects the decision process: Loomes, Mo att, and
Sugden (2002) distinguished randomness in assigning utility to options, randomness in
comparing di erent options with each other, and randomness in the implementation of
a decision. The first approach is best characterized by random utility models (e.g.,
Becker, DeGroot, & Marschak, 1963; Train, 2003). In these models, utility itself is a
random variable. This can be motivated by the assumption that people estimate
utilities with respect to di erent aspects of an option. The second approach assumes
fixed utility but a choice function that introduces randomness in the comparison stage
(e.g., Becker et al., 1963; Bridle, 1990; Luce, 1959). Finally, a trembling hand
error—adding the probability of choosing the inferior of two options independent of the
di erence in expected utilities of the options—is an example of randomness in choice
implementation (Harless & Camerer, 1994; Selten, 1975).
Which decision process model is most accurate is an empirical question and the
subject of active debate. Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2010), for example, examined
di erent stochastic choice models and concluded that a Fechner model with
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heteroscedastic and truncated random errors fit data better than a Fechner model with
homoscedastic error components. Using a probit or a trembling hand model is definitely
limiting as, for example, they fail to account for context e ects (Wilcox, 2015). Context
e ects occur if choice behavior depends on the choice set presented, and Rieskamp,
Busemeyer, and Mellers (2006) summarized empirical evidence for it. Our approach
here, however, was not meant to find the theory that describes the data best. Rather,
we used two relatively simple stochastic choice models (probit and trembling hand) to
measure the relative influence of systematic changes in preference and choice
consistency, respectively. Yet, the examination of the e ect of a reduction in cognitive
capacities on more complex choice models might also be warranted.
Reduced Cognitive Capacities in the Real World
In general, the dual-task design implemented in our work is meant to capture a
ubiquitous phenomenon in our daily life, namely, decision making under reduced
cognitive capacities. Cognitive capacities can be limited for many reasons, such as
multitasking, stress, sleep deprivation, alcohol consumption, or a lack of motivation
(e.g., Anderson & Dickinson, 2010; Morgado et al., 2015). Because people have to make
decisions under such circumstances quite frequently, it is an important question how
behavior might di er compared to behavior in situations with full cognitive capacities.
What would one expect to happen when making decisions under reduced cognitive
capacities in real life? One prominent answer comes from the nudge program (Thaler &
Sunstein, 2008), which suggests that people do not always make decisions in line with
their (long-term) goals and sometimes need assistance to improve or "de-bias" their
decisions. Taking our results into account, however, there is no indication of a need for
de-biasing preferential shifts under reduced cognitive capacities because deviations from
true preference can equally likely go in either direction (e.g., more or less risk taking).
Rather, one would expect participants to be less predictable in their choice behavior
under reduced cognitive capacities. This might be bad when people make a decision
once and most likely stick to this decision for a long time as, for example, in retirement
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savings decisions. As a result, many people do not save according to their true
preferences for future consumption (Skinner, 2007). On the other hand, looking at
repeated small decisions such as in grocery shopping, deviations from true preferences
might cancel out after many bargains. In addition, deviating from a previous choice
might be advantageous in that it boosts learning in changing environments. Hence, our
results explain why people sometimes make inconsistent decisions and we predict seeing
these inconsistencies more often when cognitive capacities are reduced.
The present study was designed to unify research on decision making in
preferential and economic choice with recent work on the e ect of cognitive capacity
limitations. The mathematical modeling approach that we used can be applied, in
principle, to all domains of preferential choice as long as preferences can be
mathematically specified. Furthermore, the models allow exploration of the cognitive
similarities and di erences between manipulations such as cognitive load, ego depletion,
time pressure, and sleep deprivation, among others. Thus, research in the field of
reduced cognitive capacities can profit from the mathematical approach presented here,
that is, an explicit formulation of both the underlying preferential choice model and the
stochastic choice rule.
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Table 1
Experiment 1 Risky Gambles: Mean Group Posterior Estimates of the E ect of
Cognitive Load and WAICs for all Model Specifications
Error Model
Linear utility Power utility Prospect theory
Risk aversion Error WAIC Risk aversion Error WAIC Risk aversion Weighting Error WAIC
Trembling hand
-0.07 -0.20* 8338 -0.14 -0.19* 8806 0.01 -0.04 -0.26* 7962
[-0.22, 0.08] [-0.30, -0.10] [45] [-0.36, 0.06] [-0.29, -0.09] [77] [-0.17, 0.19] [-0.18, 0.09] [-0.42, -0.09] [57]
Probit
-0.08 -0.15* 8194 -0.05 -0.17* 8160 0.02 -0.04 -0.14* 7978
[-0.28, 0.12] [-0.24, -0.07] [49] [-0.28, 0.19] [-0.26, -0.09] [49] [-0.17, 0.20] [-0.19, 0.09] [-0.24, -0.04] [56]
Note. For model specifications see Introduction and the Method section of Experiment
1. First rows show Mean Group Posterior Estimates and WAIC and second rows show
95% Highest Density Intervals (HDI) or standard deviation of the WAIC in brackets.
* significant di erences between control and load condition according to the 95% HDI.
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Table 2
Experiment 2 Temporal Discounting: Mean Group Posterior Estimates of the E ect of
Cognitive Load and WAICs for all Model Specifications
Error Model
Exponential Hyperbolic 1 Hyperbolic 2
Discounting Error WAIC Discounting Error WAIC Discounting Scaling Error WAIC
Trembling hand
0.00 -0.30* 27698 -0.02 -0.34* 27261 -0.17* 0.03 -0.30* 26525
[-0.04, 0.03] [-0.52, -0.07] [98] [-0.07, 0.03] [-0.59, -0.11] [101] [-0.30, -0.04] [-0.02, 0.08] [-0.53, -0.07] [106]
Probit
-0.01 0.05* 28436 -0.02 0.07* 27747 -0.16* 0.03 0.06* 26890
[-0.04, 0.03] [0.01, 0.08] [113] [-0.07, 0.04] [0.02, 0.12] [115] [-0.28, -0.03] [-0.02, 0.08] [0.02, 0.10] [120]
Note. For model specifications see Introduction and Method section of Experiment 2.
First rows show Mean Group Posterior Estimates and WAIC and second rows show
95% Highest Density Intervals (HDI) or standard deviation of the WAIC in brackets.
* significant di erences between control and load condition according to the 95% HDI.
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Table 3
Experiment 3 Ultimatum Game: Mean Group Posterior Estimates of the E ect of
Cognitive Load and WAICs for all Model Specifications
Error Model
Fehr & Schmidt Bolton & Ockenfels Fehr & Schmidt Full
Inequity aversion I Error WAIC Inequity aversion I Error WAIC Inequity aversion I Inequity aversion II Error WAIC
Trembling hand
-0.04 -0.06 3030 -0.62 -0.06 3113 -0.04 -0.01 -0.06 3034
[-0.12, 0.03] [-0.15, 0.02] [85] [-1.82, 0.44] [-0.15, 0.03] [84] [-0.11, 0.04] [-1.39,1.37] [-0.15, 0.02] [85]
Probit
-0.03 -0.13* 2815 -0.13 -0.14* 2945 -0.03 -0.06 -0.11* 2758
[-0.11, 0.05] [-0.24, -0.03] [79] [-1.11, 0.88] [-0.25, -0.02] [80] [-0.11, 0.05] [-0.56, 0.45] [-0.20,-0.01] [77]
Note. I refers to first-order inequity aversion and II refers to second-order inequity
aversion as defined in the Method section of Experiment 3. For further model
specifications see Introduction and the Method section of Experiment 1. First rows
show Mean Group Posterior Estimates and WAIC and second rows show 95% Highest
Density Intervals (HDI) or standard deviation of the WAIC in brackets.
* significant di erences between control and load condition according to the 95% HDI.
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Figure 1 . Screenshot for one trial in the risky choice task. Participants chose one of the
two gambles with the keyboard and heard letters over earphones; feedback on the
auditive task was given in the blank rectangle below. ECU = Experimental currency
unit; these were exchanged into Swiss francs (10 ECU = 1 CHF).
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Figure 2 . Experiment 1 risky gambles: Descriptive statistic for choice proportions for
di erent quantiles of expected value (EV) di erences between the riskier and the safer
gamble with higher quantiles meaning higher EVs for the riskier gamble. Small dots and
squares are individual choices in the control and load conditions, respectively. The
larger dots and squares are group means, and error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 3 . Experiment 1 risky gambles: Parameter estimates of risk preference — (on
transformed scale): The x axis shows individual risk preference parameter estimates in
the control condition and the y axis shows them in the load condition. Above and to
the right of the plot are the group posterior distributions of — in the respective
conditions including the mean and the 95% highest posterior density interval.
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Figure 4 . Experiment 1 risky gambles: Parameter estimates of choice sensitivity ◊ (on
transformed scale): The x axis shows individual choice sensitivity parameter estimates
in the control condition and the y axis shows them in the load condition. Above and to
the right of the plot are the group posterior distributions of ◊ in the respective
conditions including the mean and the 95% highest posterior density interval.
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Figure 5 . Screenshot for one trial in the temporal discounting task. Participants
dragged the blue triangle to their preferred value. The value chosen appeared in the
gray rectangle below the scale. A choice was confirmed by clicking on the gray rectangle.
Simultaneously, participants heard letters over earphones; feedback on the auditive task
was given in the blank rectangle below. ECU = Experimental currency unit.
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Figure 6 . Experiment 2 temporal discounting: Stated willingness-to-accept prices are
transferred into discounting percentages from the outcome or sum of outcomes in each
trial. Discounting percentages are plotted for di erent quantiles of delay with higher
quantiles meaning longer delays. Small dots and squares are individual choices in the
control and load conditions, respectively. The larger dots and squares are group means
and error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 7 . Experiment 2 temporal discounting: Parameter estimates of time preference
Ÿ (on transformed scale): The x axis shows individual time preference parameter
estimates in the control condition and the y axis shows them in the load condition.
Above and to the right of the plot are the group posterior distributions of Ÿ in the
respective conditions including the mean and the 95% highest posterior density interval.
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Figure 8 . Experiment 2 temporal discounting: Parameter estimates of choice sensitivity
◊ (on transformed scale): The x axis shows individual choice sensitivity parameter
estimates in the control condition and the y axis shows them in the load condition.
Above and to the right of the plot are the group posterior distributions of ◊ in the
respective conditions including the mean and the 95% highest posterior density interval.
SHIFT IN CHOICE CONSISTENCY OR PREFERENCE 63
Figure 9 . Screenshot for one trial in the mini ultimatum game. Participants chose
whether to accept or reject an o er with the keyboard. A bit smaller on the upper right
side of the screen, the distribution of the mini ultimatum game that was not chosen was
depicted. Simultaneously, participants heard letters over earphones; feedback on the
auditive task was given in the blank rectangle below. ECU = Experimental currency
unit.
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Figure 10 . Experiment 3 mini ultimatum game: Descriptive statistics of responder
choices in the mini ultimatum game. The rejection rates are plotted for di erent
quantiles of inequality against the responder (outcome proposer minus outcome
responder) with higher quantiles meaning higher inequity. Small dots and squares are
individual choices in the control and load conditions, respectively. The larger dots and
squares are group means, and error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 11 . Experiment 3 ultimatum game: Parameter estimates of inequity aversion ↵:
The x axis shows individual inequity aversion parameter estimates in the control
condition and the y axis shows them in the load condition. Above and to the right of
the plot are the group posterior distributions of ↵ in the respective conditions, including
the mean and the 95% highest posterior density interval.
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Figure 12 . Experiment 3 ultimatum game: Parameter estimates of choice sensitivity ✓
(on transformed scale): The x axis shows individual choice sensitivity parameter
estimates in the control condition and the y axis shows them in the load condition.
Above and to the right of the plot are the group posterior distributions of ✓ in the
respective conditions, including the mean and the 95% highest posterior density interval.
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Appendix A
Model Recovery to Distinguish Choice Inconsistency from Preference
We conducted a simulation to show the general ability of our model to distinguish
between shifts in preferences and shifts in choice inconsistencies. Therefore, we used the
400 trials we created for the first experiment and extracted the average parameter
values for risk preference (MPref = ≠0.05) and choice error (MError = ≠1.68) from the
experimental data assuming a linear utility and a probit choice model as explained in
the main text. With these data we created 2 times 80 choices for 40 synthetic
participants in two conditions. In the control condition we created choices based on the
average parameter values. For the load condition we changed either the preference or
the choice inconsistency parameter in the magnitude of one standard deviation
(SDPref = 0.08, SDError = 0.28) to simulated shifts in preferences or choice
inconsistencies. The standard deviations were taken from the empirical distributions of
individual parameter estimates of the first experiment.
To fit the simulated data we used the hierarchical Bayesian model as described in
the Method section of Experiment 1, using a linear utility and a probit choice function.
In total we ran the simulation and the following model recovery analysis 100 times. We
implemented two types of choice sets with the aim of demonstrating the robustness of
the approach under conditions both where the choice proportions under control were
around 50% and where they were biased away from 50%. For the first choice set, we
implemented a set of choices across the whole spectrum of expected value (EV)
di erences between the safer and the riskier option (see Experiment 1 Methods). The
upper row in Table A1 shows the results. First, we checked whether choice proportions
were di erent in the control compared to the load condition by means of a paired t-test.
Choice proportions di ered in only 11 out of 100 simulations when choice consistency
was manipulated, but did so in all cases when risk preferences were changed. The 11
significant choice proportion di erences with simulated error shifts resulted from
unlikely choice proportions relatively far away from 50% in the control condition, which
were then dragged towards 50% due to a higher simulated noise in the load condition.
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For the parameter recovery, we applied the 95%≠HDI approach and classified a
recovered parameter shift whenever the 0 were excluded from this interval in the
posterior distribution of parameter di erences. We conclude that the di erence in the
true parameter can be recovered perfectly and that in less then 5% of the cases the
unchanged parameter was estimated to be di erent.
In a second step, we created a choice set where choice proportions were di erent
from 50% in the control condition by using choice situations where the riskier of the two
options had a much lower expected value than the safer option. This resulted in a low
choice proportion of the risky option of 36%. Here, we observed that both a shift in
choice inconsistency as well as a shift in preferences change choice proportions in a
systematic way. Significant di erences in choice proportions were always a shift from
below 50% (mean control 36%) towards 50%. The mean choice proportion in the load
condition was 42% for a simulated increase in choice inconsistency and 49% for a
simulated shift in risk preference. This is the case because more inconsistencies result in
a choice proportion in the control condition closer to a chance level of 50%. Also with
this choice set, the true source of di erence can be distinguished almost perfectly. The
risk of concluding from our modeling framework that the actually unchanged parameter
shows a significant di erence is small (below 10%).
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Table A1
Simulation Risky Gambles: Choice Proportion Di erences and Recovered Parameter
Di erences in 100 Simulations
Simulate Error Shift Simulate Preference Shift
Stimuli Di erence
Choice Prop.
Recovered
Risk Shift
Recovered
Error Shift
Di erence
Choice Prop.
Recovered
Risk Shift
Recovered
Error Shift
Unbiased (50% in control) 11% 3% 100% 100% 100% 2%
Biased (36% in control) 94% 1% 99% 100% 100% 7%
Note. Data were simulated and recovered by a model with linear utility and a probit
choice error function. For additional model specifications see Introduction and the
Method section of Experiment 1. Significant di erences in choice proportions were
assessed with a paired t-test at the 1% significance level. Significant di erences in
model parameters between control and load condition were infered according to the
95%≠HDI criterion.
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Appendix B
Correlations Between Behavioral Measures and Model Parameters
Table B1
Experiment 1 Risky Gambles: Correlations of Model Parameters with Behavioral
Measures
N -back Ospan RTload ≠RTcontrol Preference  preference Error  error
N -back -
Ospan .19 -
RTload ≠RTcontrol -.17 .08 -
Preference .20 .23 .09 -
 preference .12 .03 .12 .06 -
Error -.07 -.21 -.43** -.05 .09 -
 error -.14 .15 .06 .21 -.43** .00 -
Note. Model parameters are taken from a power utility with probit error model as
described in the main text.
** p < .01.
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Table B2
Experiment 2 Temporal Discounting: Correlation of Model Parameters with Behavioral
Measures
N -back Ospan RTload ≠RTcontrol Preference  preference Error  error
N -back -
Ospan -.07 -
RTload ≠RTcontrol -.73*** .03 -
Preference .26 .14 -.25 -
 preference -.20 .07 .13 .07 -
Error -.29 -.21 .31* -.63*** -.02 -
 error .05 -.09 .08 .06 -.52*** .03 -
Note. Model parameters are taken from a one-parameter hyperbolic discounting
function and a normally distributed error around the discounted outcome as outlined in
the main text.
*** p < .001
Table B3
Experiment 3 Mini Ultimatum Game: Correlation of Model Parameters with Behavioral
Measures
N -back Ospan RTload ≠RTcontrol Preference  preference Error  error
N -back -
Ospan .01 -
RTload ≠RTcontrol -.37** .02 -
Preference .10 -.02 -.14 -
 preference .11 -.22 .12 -.01 -
Error .00 -.15 -.08 .30* .06 -
 error -.13 -.15 -.05 -.09 -.13 .12 -
Note. The model parameters are taken from the first-order inequity aversion model of
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) combined with a probit error model as described in the main
text.
* p < .05, ** p < .01.
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Abstract
Economic choices are often explained by referring to subjective preferences. Yet, basic
cognition necessary to perceive and integrate information is a prerequisite for these
choices that is usually not part of economic theory. Especially in experience-based
choices, where decision makers have to learn about the outcomes of available options
sequentially, information perception and integration presumably play a major role. To
better understand these influences, this article presents two experimental studies that
examined the estimation and valuation of continuous outcome distributions. Results
show that participants valued random outcome distributions below their respective
arithmetic mean and valued a distribution lower when its outcome variance increased,
indicating risk-aversion. However, a similar though less pronounced pattern was found
in a matched estimation task where accuracy was incentivized and preferences play no
role. Accordingly, part of the seeming risk-aversion can be attributed to basic cognitive
processes. In addition, participants seeming economic preference for right-skewed
outcome distributions could be mainly attributed to estimation biases. Together, these
results can help disentangle genuine preferences from basic cognitive regularities and
hence lead to a better understanding of decision-making in an economic context.
Keywords: decision from experience, bdm auction, risk preference, continuous
outcome distributions, estimation bias
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How Basic Cognition Influences Experience-Based Economic Valuation
Introduction
When we think about determinants of real world investment behavior, we usually
think about economic preferences like risk, delay, loss, or uncertainty aversion. Yet,
subjective valuations of investment options are potentially also influenced by
fundamental cognitive processes such as perceptual biases, memory e ects, or selective
attention (Kahneman, 2003; Khaw, Li, & Woodford, 2017; Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel,
2010; Trueblood, Brown, Heathcote, & Busemeyer, 2013; Tsetsos, Chater, & Usher,
2012). For example, when people think about investing in stocks, they might research
the history of returns at the stock market. To perceive and integrate a sequence of
single returns or to make sense of whole return distributions is a complex cognitive task
that requires perception, attention, and working memory. The aim of the current paper
is to examine the role that such fundamental cognitive processes play in economic
preference tasks. In particular, we examine to what extent behavior that is usually
explained by preferences (e.g. risk-aversion) might be (partly) due to regularities in the
way we perceive and integrate numerical information.
One experimental design to distinguish between cognitive processes and economic
preferences is to give participants identical numerical information, while varying the
task: An estimation task asking about the mean as an objective characteristic of a
random number should not involve economic preferences. In contrast, eliciting certainty
equivalences for a random outcome distribution requires both, assessing the average
outcome and incorporating one’s own subjective economic valuation. The current paper
makes use of this di erence between estimation and valuation to disentangle the relative
influence of economic preferences and fundamental cognitive processes in an economic
context: If valuations are driven by economic preferences, they should di er from
estimations. Yet, to the extent that economic valuations are based on the perception
and integration of numbers, behavioral patterns in the valuation and estimation task
should be similar.
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Economic Preferences
A central concept in economic decision-making is risk-aversion, which
parsimoniously captures two important empirical findings: First, people in general
prefer a sure outcome over a lottery with the same expected value (EV). Second, in the
case of two (or more) risky prospects, people prefer lower variance over higher variance
lotteries given the same expected value. Risk-aversion is often mathematically described
in terms of a concave utility function, such that high values are relatively more
compressed than small values (Pratt, 1964, Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1971, but see: Weber,
Shafir, & Blais, 2004). From this it follows that a certain outcome will be preferred over
a risky lottery with identical expected value.
The ontological status of a concave utility function has been debated for over a
century. It could be either a parsimonious way to mathematically summarize and
describe economic behavior, a so called as-if model (Friedman, 1953). Yet, it could also
depict a more fundamental basic cognitive regularity of human (and non-human)
perception. Indeed, concave functions and the resulting compression are an ubiquitous
modeling approach in psychophysics and experimental psychology and have been found
to describe the perception and discrimination of entities and stimuli such as weights,
length, or brightness (e.g. Fechner, 1860; Stevens, 1957). The same functional form has
also been found to accurately describe the perception of numbers, where it was termed
the mental number line (Feigenson, Dehaene, & Spelke, 2004). Thus, the compression of
outcomes in economic choice tasks could also describe a cognitive regularity of number
perception (Schoemaker, 1982). In line with this reasoning, prospect theory as an
extension of expected utility models, explicitly motivates its functional forms with
perceptual research (Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Whereas risk-aversion has been invoked to explain economic preferences with
respect to outcome variance, empirical evidence also suggests that higher moments of
an outcome distribution a ect economic preferences. One example is the third moment,
namely skewness (Åstebro, Mata, & Santos-Pinto, 2015; Kraus & Litzenberger, 1976;
Spiliopoulos & Hertwig, 2015). To illustrate, Figure 1 shows distributions that are
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right-skewed (high outcomes occur with small probability and most samples are below
the mean) and left-skewed (small outcomes occur with low probability and most
samples are above the mean) respectively. A preference for right-skewed distributions is
one way to explain buying of lotteries and insurances at the same time (Golec &
Tamarkin, 1998; Spiliopoulos & Hertwig, 2015). In line with that reasoning, the
mean-variance model of Markowitz (1952) was extended for skewness preferences with
an additional parameter (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1976). Likewise, prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) can incorporate skewness preferences with the shape of
the probability weighting function and this additional flexibility over a power utility
function might be one reason for its descriptive success. Resembling the two di erent
theoretical perspectives on utility functions, there are two ways to interpret such a
weighting function: Either it can be understood as an economic preference for rare
outcomes, or it can be explained by perceptual, attentional, or memory processes that
lead to the overweighting of such outcomes. Such an overweighting as a basic cognitive
regularity could occur if high outcomes of a right-skewed distribution are remembered
better than outcomes close to the median (cf. Madan, Ludvig, & Spetch, 2014).
Estimation of Number Sequences
The cognitive foundation of economic preferences is particularly relevant in
decision-from-experience (dfe) (Barron & Erev, 2003; Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev,
2004; Weber et al., 2004). In a dfe experiment, participants typically sample single
outcomes from a distribution before making a choice. This paradigm can have higher
external validity and arguably is cognitively more demanding compared to a situation
where all possible outcomes and probabilities are in a descriptive format. Consequently,
the dfe paradigm has been used to test possible influences of cognitive biases such as
miss-perceptions of objective probabilities (i.e. the underweighting of rare events) on
economic choices (e.g. Barron & Ursino, 2013; Ungemach, Chater, & Stewart, 2009).
Yet, these studies were confined to specific cognitive phenomena such as underweighting
and specifically focused on choice situations between a certain outcome and a lottery
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with only one non-zero outcome. When these analyses were extended to incorporate
lotteries with two non-zero outcomes, empirical results were mixed (Abdellaoui,
L’Haridon, & Paraschiv, 2011; Glöckner, Hilbig, Henninger, & Fiedler, 2016).
To the extent that economic choices depend on how people perceive and integrate
numerical information, research in psychophysics and cognitive science should be
integrated into theories about economic choices. In particular, there is evidence that
people have an inherently imprecise and non-verbal notion of numbers (Gallistel &
Gelman, 2000; Whalen, Gallistel, & Gelman, 1999). Given that economic behavior is
stochastic (Hey, 1995; Mosteller & Nogee, 1951; Rieskamp, 2008), imprecise mental
representations could be a source of this stochasticity (Khaw et al., 2017). Furthermore,
research by Dehaene and colleagues (Dehaene, 2011; Feigenson et al., 2004) indicate
that the internal representation of numerals can be described as a compressed mental
number line. This implies that people underestimate the mean of a number sequence.
In an economic context, such a perceptual bias would resemble apparent risk-averse
behavior.
Empirical evidence regarding the influence of a compressed mental number line in
dfe experiments is mixed though. Whereas some studies report that people have a
tendency to underestimate the mean or the sum of a number sequence (Brezis,
Bronfman, & Usher, 2015; Scheibehenne, 2017), others do not find evidence for
underestimation (Lindskog & Winman, 2014). Also in contrast to the prediction from
the compressed mental number line, a recent study found that high variance number
sequences were estimated to have higher means relative to low variance number
sequences with the same theoretical expected value (Tsetsos et al., 2012). Consequently,
it is an open question if and under what circumstances biased number representations
will occur in an economic context. One prediction directly following from the Weber
law (Dehaene, Izard, Spelke, & Pica, 2008; Longo & Lourenco, 2007) is that imprecision
is higher with high numbers compared to small numbers (e.g. 1-10). Given a
compressed mental number line, this could also lead to more underestimation for higher
numbers in an economic context. More closely related to the dfe experiments is the
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hypothesis that as people have to keep track of more incidences or symbolic numbers,
this leads to more imprecise representations of summary statistics of that number
sequence (Brezis et al., 2015; Whalen et al., 1999). Whether such an increase in
imprecision due to more samples also lead to stronger biases is yet an open questions.
The compressed mental number line assumes perfect attention and memory for all
sequentially sampled numbers and therefore, might not fully describe the mental
integration process. Instead, especially when numbers follow a skewed distribution,
attention might be distributed unequally. In the domain of consumer research,
experiments showed that people are more likely to choose an option at which they
looked longer and presumably paid more attention to (Krajbich et al., 2010). Similarly,
in the integration of sequential numbers, paying more attention to a number compared
to another might increase its weight in assigning a summary value to that choice option.
If the distribution of attention over numbers is not random, but depends on some
stimuli characteristics, unequal attention can explain certain economic behavior. For
example, in a recent economic model, choice behavior in the Allais paradox has been
explained by paying more attention to extreme outcomes (Bordalo, Gennaioli, &
Shleifer, 2012). Empirical evidence for this view comes from studies showing that
people overestimated the frequency of extreme events in a sequence of numbers (Madan
et al., 2014, 2016). In addition, psychophysics research using sound stimuli found that
right-skewed distributions leads to higher mean estimates compared to left-skewed
distributions (Parducci, Thaler, & Anderson, 1968) and overall pain sensation has been
found to strongly depend on the maximum (i.e. extreme) pain endured (Kahneman,
Fredrickson, Schreiber, & Redelmeier, 1993). Assuming such a process of distorted
attention, estimations for the mean of right-skewed distributions will be higher than left
skewed distributions (assuming equal mean). As a consequence, this would resemble a
preference for right-skewed over left-skewed outcome distributions in an economic
context.
Given the reviewed findings, it is worthwhile to systematically assess how basic
cognitive mechanisms, like compressed number perception and unequally paid attention
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to numbers, a ect economic behavior. Both these cognitive distortions make clear
predictions in the context of experience-based economic choices, namely a compressed
mental number line leads to risk-averse behavior, whereas distorted attention with
respect to extreme numbers, leads to a preference of right-skewed over left-skewed
distributions. To assess the importance of these cognitive processes for economic choices
and in particular to distinguish them from economic preferences, we conducted two
experiments. In these experiments participants repeatedly sampled numbers from
di erent payo  distributions and then either estimated the mean of the observed
number sequence or provided an economic valuation. In contrast to economic
valuations, estimations of objective criterion values like the mean should not be
influenced by economic preferences. Hence, comparing the answers in both tasks allows
disentangling both influences and bridges the literature on economic preferences with
the literature on perception and number integration.
Methods Experiment 1
The Tasks
The experimental task is based on the decision-from-experience paradigm, where
people can sample from number distributions and make one consequential choice when
they think they have learn enough about the option. To assess economic valuation,
participants in the experiment reported their certainty equivalents for several outcome
distributions. The certainty equivalents were incentive compatible by asking for
minimum selling prices (willingness-to-accept, WTA). It was explained to participants
that the minimum selling price is the minimum price they would demand for forgoing
the outcome stemming from a draw from the distribution. To assess the basic cognition
of compressed perception and distorted attention of numbers, in a second task, people
gave estimates for the mean of the outcome distribution. Here, accuracy with respect to
the theoretical mean was incentivized.
For both tasks, a single trial consisted of a large box drawn on the computer
screen representing a distribution to draw from and a small grey box displayed below
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indicating where participants could type in their answers (see Figure 2 for a schematic).
Participants could sample freely from the given distribution by pressing <space>,
which was followed by a number presentation for 250 msec. in the middle of the large
box. After 250 msec. the number disappeared. When the box was empty again, an
additional sample could be drawn. Each presented number was generated as a random
draw from the respective underlying distributions, rounded to its nearest integer. After
the first sample and after any additional sample, people could enter their answer into
the grey box by typing up to three digit numbers. Sampling was also possible after
entering a number and the number could be revised. To end a trial, a number had to be
typed in and had to be confirmed with <enter>.
Outcome Distributions
We constructed 24 continuous number distributions by combining di erent means
(80, 100, 130, 160), standard deviations (5, 10) and shapes (normally distributed,
left-skewed, and right-skewed). Skewed distributions were constructed from scaled
gamma distributions with a shape parameter of 1 (absolute skewness = 2) and were
truncated at the first (left-skewed) or last (right-skewed) percentile to avoid extreme
outliers. The mean was varied in 4 levels mainly to increase the number of trials and
keep participants engaged in the task due to noticeable di erent sequences’ means. The
di erent distributions were presented in randomized order and were the same in both
the valuation and the estimation task.
Procedure & Incentives
The experiment was implemented on a computer with PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007)
and conducted in individual sessions within separate rooms at the University of New
South Wales School of Psychology. All instructions were presented on the computer
screen and could be read at participant’s own pace. Each participant completed two
blocks consisting of 24 trials each. In one block they had to estimate the mean of the
number sequences and in one block they had to report their certainty equivalent. Block
order was counterbalanced between participants.
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Payment was determined by randomly selecting one answer across both blocks. If
the trial was in the WTA block, a BDM procedure was implemented (Becker, DeGroot,
& Marschak, 1964): A random number was uniformly drawn between 0 and the mean of
a given distribution. When the random number was below the participant’s answer for
this trial, then the participant received a draw from the distribution, otherwise the
participant received the points from the random number for certain. If the selected trial
was in the estimation block, the absolute di erence of the estimate and the true mean
was subtracted from the true mean and the resulting points were given to the
participant. In a final step, obtained points were exchanged into Australian Dollars
with a 20:1 ratio and paid out in cash.
Methods Experiment 2
Study 2 was a direct, pre-registered replication of the first study
(https://osf.io/ehkuz/). The only di erence to the first experiment was a change in
participants’ instructions. Anecdotal interviews of participants in the first study
indicated some di culties in comprehending the incentive scheme (particularly the
BDM auction). Hence, in the second study we simply instructed participants to answer
thoroughly and that their accuracy influenced their final payo . We further informed
participants that details of the actual payment mechanism was available upon clicking
on an extra button on the screen. About one third of participants made used of this
option in each block.
Participants and Data Analysis Experiment 1 & 2
Both experiments used the same stimuli and procedure, thus we included a study
dummy variable across all statistical analyses. It never came out significant and hence
we pooled both data sets to increase statistical power. Furthermore, there were no
di erences between participants having read the incentive schemes and those who have
not in the second experiment.
We tested 53 participants in the first and 58 participants in the second
experiment. Sample size was chosen based on the availability of a convenience sample
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prior to data inspection. Participants were undergraduates from the University’s
subject pool, recruited via online advertisement. Participants received course credits
and a choice-dependent bonus from 1.50 to 8.93 AUD (Mpay = 5.43). Participants age
and sex was not assessed, yet in the subject pool the mean age is Mage = 19 and
approximately 70% are women.
Prior to analyzing the data we excluded answers further away than 5 standard
deviations from the distribution’s mean (21 trials in the first and 33 trials in the second
experiment out of 5232 total trials across both experiments). Further, two participants
from the first experiment were excluded for not complying with the task: One
participant only sampled once in each trial (the minimum to continue) and another
participant gave only two answers within 5 standard deviations from the true mean.
This leaves us with 109 participants.
We analyzed the sample size and the answers by means of a participant mixed
e ects regression analysis in R (R Core Team, 2016; RStudio Team, 2015) using the
lme4 package (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) and the lmerTest package
(Kuznetsova, Bruun Brockho , & Haubo Bojesen Christensen, 2016). All regression
results are presented using the theoretical characteristics of a distribution as
independent variables. Variance and skewness were dummy coded and the mean was
treated approximately as a continuous predictor. As the dependent variables we defined
the logarithm of sample size and participants’ accuracy, quantified as the deviation of
their answers proportional to the distributions’ true mean. The last measure is similar
to the (exponential) signed order of magnitude error that is sometimes reported in the
literature (Brown & Siegler, 1992). Regression results with the characteristics of
experienced samples as independent variables led to same results in all analyses
presented. All exclusion criteria and the statistical regression analyses were
pre-registered for the second experiment.
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Results Experiment 1 & 2
On average, participants drew M = 28.81 samples from each distribution
(Median = 21, SD = 31.25). There was no di erence in sample size between task types
(estimation: M = 28.51, Median = 21, SD = 28.79, valuation: M = 29.12,
Median = 21, SD = 33.54, t(108) = 0.20, p > .250). Table 1 shows the regression
results with the logarithm of sample size as dependent variable together for both task
types. Only Variance had an e ect on sample size: The higher the variance, the more
participants sampled. This is in line with previous findings in the literature (Ashby,
2017; Lindskog, Winman, & Juslin, 2013). It is adaptive in this task in the sense that
more samples mitigate higher uncertainty.
Valuation Task
Figure 3 to the left plots the proportional deviation of participants’ answers in the
valuation task from true means across the di erent experimental conditions.
Participants give lower certainty equivalents than the theoretical means with an average
deviation from the true mean of M = ≠4.78 (Median = ≠3.13, SD = 16.45). This is
corroborated by a t-test showing that certainty equivalents were significantly lower than
the theoretical means (t(108) = ≠4.65, p < .001)
Higher variance led to lower certainty equivalents compared to lower variance
sequences (M = ≠4.68, Median = ≠3.13, SD = 19.18). The left column of Table 2
shows the regression results for the valuation task. In particular, the parameter for
variance is negative (≠4.73, SE = 1.20), that is higher variance led to significantly
lower valuations. Together with the result of overall undervaluation of the mean, these
two results are consistent with risk-aversion.
Skewness also has a significant e ect on economic valuations. Participants give
lower values to left- compared to right-skewed distributions with a mean di erences
between these two distributional forms of M = ≠5.40 (Median = ≠1.52, SD = 18.41).
The regression (Table 2 shows significant e ects indicating that left-skewed distributed
outcomes are valued lower than normally distributed ones (≠2.36, SE = 0.63) and that
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right-skewed outcome distributions are valued higher than normally distributed ones
(3.02, SE = 0.60). This result is in line with the idea that participants overweight rare
outcomes.
Finally, the mean, mainly introduced as a nuisance parameter (see Methods) had
a significant positive e ect (0.03, SE = 0.01). This means the proportional deviation
from the theoretical mean gets smaller as the theoretical mean increases from 80 to 160.
Supposedly, this is because the variability relative to the mean is lower in trials with a
mean of 160 than with a mean of 80. This is a direct consequence from the design
choice to hold the absolute variance constant across di erent mean levels.
Estimation Task
The mean estimates within each condition are depicted in Figure 3 (right panel).
Across all conditions, people underestimated the theoretical mean of the number
sequences (M = ≠1.39, Median = 0, SD = 9.57). This underestimation is significant
by means of a t-test (t(108) = ≠3.00, p = .003).
Underestimation was more pronounced for sequences with high variance as
compared to those with low variance (M = ≠0.83, Median = 0, SD = 12.27). Table 2
(right column) shows regression results for the estimation task. In particular, there is a
significant e ect of variance on estimation deviation in the direction descriptively
observed (≠1.33 ,SE = 0.59). Together with the e ect of overall underestimation, both
e ects are in accordance with a compressed mental number line.
Furthermore, mean estimates for left-skewed distributions are lower than for
right-skewed distributions (M = ≠2.91, Median = ≠1, SD = 12.20). Based on the
regression results, mean estimates of right-skewed distributions are significantly higher
(1.79, SE = 0.47) and mean estimates of left-skewed distributions are significantly lower
(≠1.18, SE = 0.47) than mean estimates of normally distributed sequences. This is
consistent with the idea that rare and extreme outcomes get overweighted, but it is not
consistent with a compressed mental number line.
Finally, the proportional deviation from the theoretical mean gets smaller with
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higher means (0.01, SE = 0.01). As in the valuation task, this e ect might be due to a
decrease in relative variability as the mean increases.
Comparing Estimation and Valuation
To answer the question what role basic cognition plays in economic valuations,
choice patterns in the estimation are compared with those in the valuation task. As
described above, we found qualitatively similar e ects of variance, skewness, and mean
for both, the estimation and the valuation task. Yet quantitatively, the e ects were
smaller for the estimation as compared to the valuation task. To specify the magnitude
of this di erence, we calculated the ratio of underestimation to undervaluation for the
distributional characteristics of interest. This ratio can be interpreted as the relative
influence of cognitive biases on valuation.
The overall ratio of underestimation to undervaluation is 0.29. Taking the
di erence between low and high variance trials separately for both tasks and calculating
the ratio of these two di erences results in 0.18. Together, both choice patterns in the
valuation task are associated with risk-aversion, but can be partly attributed to
fundamental cognitive biases taking the estimation results into account. Finally, taking
the di erence between left- and right-skewed trials separately for both tasks and
calculating the ratio of these di erences gives 0.54. This suggests that the main factor
for giving higher certainty equivalents for right-skewed distributions in the valuation
task is rooted in fundamental cognitive processes rather than economic preferences.
Discussion
In two experiments, participants sampled number sequences and either gave their
estimates of the mean or their economic valuations for drawing an uncertain outcome
from this number sequence. Results indicate qualitatively similar answers, both in
valuation and estimation tasks, but also show crucial quantitative di erences indicating
that economic preferences can be partly explained by cognitive biases in perceiving and
integrating numeric information.
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Overall, participants underestimated the mean of a sequence of numbers, thus
indicating a systematic bias in the perception and integration of numbers. A direct
comparison to economic valuations, where people gave certainty equivalents below the
distributions’ means, showed that about one third of this e ect can be attributed to a
bias when aggregating numbers. Furthermore, we found stronger underestimation and
undervaluation of higher compared to lower variance sequences. Here about one fifth of
the undervaluation could be attributed to an underestimation bias. Finally, both
estimation and valuation was higher for right-skewed than left-skewed distributions.
Here, the e ect of skewness in the estimation task was more than half the size compared
to the valuation task.
The cognitive process of economic valuation
There are di erent theoretical explanations for biased estimations of number
sequences. One is the idea of an intuitive (non-verbal) number sense that guides the
perception and integration of numbers (Brezis et al., 2015; Feigenson et al., 2004;
Gallistel & Gelman, 2000). Indeed, the compression of the numeric scale and thus a
concave psychophysical mapping of objective numbers to subjective numerosity can
explain the overall underestimation and the stronger underestimation of high variance
sequences in our experiments. A di erent explanation for the observed answer pattern
is the unequal weighting of numbers. For example, there is evidence that attentional
di erences exists in the processing of numbers signifying losses compared to those
signifying gains (Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007; Yechiam & Hochman, 2013).
Consequently, lower estimates for high compared to low variance sequences are
compatible with the assumption that lower numbers receive more attentional weight in
the overall assessment of a number sequence. However, low numbers in our experiment
are no actual losses and it is unclear whether the research about losses applies in such a
context. In addition, in another experience-based experiment, an opposite pattern,
namely that people estimated the mean of high variance distributions higher than the
mean of low variance ones, was found (Tsetsos et al., 2012). The authors explained
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these findings with the overweighting of high outcomes. These conflicting results might
be due to the answer format: Whereas our analysis is based on certainty equivalences,
participants in the study of Tsetsos et al. (2012) repeatedly chose between one certain
and one risky option.
Estimating higher means for right- compared to left-skewed distributions is not
compatible with the predictions of the compressed number line. Yet, it is in line with
overweighting of rare and extreme outcomes. Such an overweighting pattern due to
attention and memory e ects that render rare or extreme outcomes easier to memorize
and to retrieve has been proposed in several domains in the literature (Kahneman et al.,
1993; Madan et al., 2014; Parducci et al., 1968). Our empirical evidence supports such a
weighting and identified it as an important source of seeming skewness preference in an
economic context. This skewness preference is also in accordance with recent findings
demonstrating seeming overweighting of rare events in decision-from-experience tasks
using discrete outcome distributions (Glöckner et al., 2016; Kellen, Pachur, & Hertwig,
2016). Yet, the preference for right-skewed distributions in our experiment is not
identical to overweighting of small probabilities in discrete outcome distributions
(Åstebro et al., 2015). In particular, in discrete two-outcome distributions skewness is
confounded with outcome probabilities (Edwards, 1962). In that sense, the findings of
our experiments expand earlier findings (cf. Weber et al., 2004) to the continuous case.
These results might appear at odds with the more typical underweighting of rare events
reported in the dfe literature (Wul , Mergenthaler, & Hertwig, 2017). However, this
pattern is most commonly observed when defining rarity in terms of discrete option
gambles where one outcome occurs less than 20% of the time. In contrast, here we
generalized the idea of rare events to skewed continuous distributions.
Consequently, the empirical results of the behavior in the estimation task can be
mainly accounted for by a combination of two established theories: First, numbers are
internally mapped onto a compressed number scale and second, rare and extreme
outcomes are overweighted. These cognitive processes are also present in an economic
context. This means that economic preferences can be predicted to some extent given
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the elicitation format. For example, we predict to see more risk-aversion when
numerical information is hard to perceive and integrate. Also, skewness preferences
should depend on the saliency of rare and extreme events. Incorporating these cognitive
processes advances the predictive power of economic models that usually do not make
predictions about concrete parameter values for utility and probability weighting
functions depending on the format. Given this framework, future studies could examine
how the number perception and integration in an economic context depends on the
stimulus presentation, the number of samples, and the number magnitudes. Yet,
cognitive processes are not making economic preferences superfluous. To the contrary,
the e ects described in our studies were significantly increased in magnitude through
the economic context. Here, future studies should clarify whether basic cognitive and
preference formation processes are additive in that existing economic choice biases are
just increased through the economic context or whether this relation is a more complex
one. That could be the case, for instance, when not only basic cognitive processes, but
also economic preferences depend on the presentation format.
Di erences in the Presentation Format and the Description-Experience Gap
A widely studied format dependency in economic choice is the di erence in
behavior in experience-based compared to description-based formats, where in the latter
the outcome distribution is fully described (DE-gap). In comparing choices from both
formats, researcher found systematic di erences in the weighting of rare and extreme
events (Hertwig et al., 2004; Madan et al., 2014). Proposed reasons for these di erences
were a sampling bias that leads to undersampling of rare events or a recency bias that
gives more weight to later samples (Wul  et al., 2017). Yet, recency has not been found
consistently and the sampling bias is limited to certain outcome distributions. For
example, a sampling bias cannot explain the format di erences when choosing between
fifty-fifty lotteries (Madan et al., 2014). Another way to better understand the source of
this format dependency could be to fit functional forms to the respective choice
patterns. Yet, studies fitting cumulative prospect theory to both descriptive and
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experience-based choice data came to inconclusive results with respect to di erences in
the utility and probability weighting parameters (Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Glöckner
et al., 2016).
Our results suggest another perspective on format dependencies: Presumably, the
influence of basic cognition is greater in experience-based tasks than in
description-based tasks. That is, since in the experience-based format often large
amount of single samples (> 10) have to be processed and integrated sequentially. To
the extent that the cognitive complexity of information integration di ers between the
two paradigms, biases in basic cognition are a plausible candidate to explain at least
parts of the behavioral di erences between described and experienced lotteries. For
example, given that skewness valuations in our experiment highly depend on estimation
bias, we would expect that skewness preferences will be less pronounced in choices from
description where estimation errors presumably are smaller. In line with this reasoning,
the e ect of skewness on preferences in description-based choices is indeed mixed
(Åstebro et al., 2015; Lichtenstein, 1965; Spiliopoulos & Hertwig, 2015; Taleb, 2004).
Consequently, when modeling economic behavior, researchers should consider both,
basic cognitive and genuine preferential components. This distinction is particularly
important when measuring preferences or comparing utility and probability weighting
parameters across di erent task designs (cf. Tversky & Fox, 1995).
Practical Implications
From an applied perspective, our results suggests that eocnomic decision-making
can be improved by improving peoples’ mean estimates of outcome distributions. This
could be done for example by presenting a list of all sampled outcomes in
experience-based information acquisition (Kopsacheilis, 2017). If biases in the
estimation of a sequence’s mean account for one third of the undervaluation, we would
also expect that people are more risk-averse in experience-based tasks than in
description based tasks, where people arguably have a less biased representation of the
distributions’ characteristics (but see Khaw et al., 2017). In the empirical finance
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literature, it has been found that people invest in more risky, but also more profitable
assets when combining descriptive information with simulated experience of return
sequences compared to a mere description condition (Bradbury, Hens, & Zeisberger,
2014; Kaufmann, Weber, & Haisley, 2013). This suggests that when correcting for
estimation biases, repeatedly experiencing outcome samples could even benefit
decision-making by changing the representation of risk and (average) return.
Additionally, there is evidence that long-run return expectations of a company new to
the market (i.e. after an IPO) are positively skewed and that this skewness can predict
overbuying of stocks on the first day (Green & Hwang, 2012). This overbuying can lead
to average losses for investors in the long run. Given our finding of higher estimates for
right- compared to left-skewed distributions, one could train decision makers to give less
weight to rare or extreme outcomes and be thus less susceptible to overbuy stocks after
an IPO.
To conclude, the results of our experiments indicate that part of what is often
framed as an economic preference is due to basic cognitive processes. Thus, researchers
and practitioners alike would benefit from considering possible influences of number
perception and integration on economic choices. This can help to assess preferences
more reliably. Furthermore, it partly allows to predict preferences in an economic
context due to di erences in the presentation of information.
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Table 1
Sample Size in Valuation and Estimation
Estimates
(Intercept)
2.95***
(0.08)
Mean
-0.0005*
(0.0002)
Variance
0.11***
(0.02)
Right Skewed
-0.01
(0.02)
Left Skewed
-0.01
(0.02)
Valuation
0.01
(0.01)
Note. E ects of theoretical mean, variance, skewness, and tasktype on sample size.
Mixed-e ects regression with subject random intercepts and slops (for variance and
skewness). Sample size as dependent variable was transformed on a log scale. Standard
errors in parenthesis.
< .05, ** < .01, *** < .001.
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Table 2
Valuation and Estimation: Regression Results
Valuation Estimation
(Intercept)
-6.47*** -2.48***
(1.04) (0.72)
Mean
0.03*** 0.01*
(0.01) (0.01)
Variance
-4.73*** -1.33*
(1.20) (0.59)
Right Skewed
3.02*** 1.70***
(0.60) (0.47)
Left Skewed
-2.36*** -1.18***
(0.63) (0.47)
Note. E ects of theoretical mean, variance, and skewness on percentage deviation of
answers from theoretical mean in economic valuation (second column) and estimation
(third column). All models with subject random intercepts and slops (for variance and
skewness). Standard errors in parenthesis.
< .05, ** < .01, *** < .001.
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Figure 1 . Right- and Left-Skewed distributions as used in the experiment with mean
and median as vertical lines (in this example the mean is 100).
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Figure 2 . Screenshot for one trial in the valuation task (Text in the estimation task:
Your estimate for the mean of this uncertain box).
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Figure 3 . Experiment 1 and 2 Answers: The y-axis shows percentage deviation of
participants’ answers from the distributions’ means for di erent stimuli conditions.
Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
TAKING	RISKS	FOR	OTHERS	 	 1		
 
 
 
 
Competitive Motives Explain Risk Aversion for Others in Decisions from 
Experience 
 
 
 
Sebastian Olschewski+, Marius Dietsch*†, & Elliot A. Ludvig* 
 
+ Center for Economic Psychology, University of Basel, Switzerland 
* Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, UK †	Behavioural	Insights	Team,	London,	UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Author Note 
 
The authors would like to thank the Behavioural Science GRP at the University of Warwick 
for funding. Correspondence concerning this article should be sent to Sebastian Olschewski, 
Center for Economic Psychology, University of Basel, Missionsstrasse 62A, 4056 Basel, 
Switzerland.  
TAKING	RISKS	FOR	OTHERS	 	 2		
Abstract 
When people take risks for others and the odds and outcomes are described, people are often 
more risk averse for others than for themselves. In two pre-registered experiments, we extend 
this finding to situations where people learn about outcomes by experiencing them through 
sampling. In both experiments, on average, people were more risk averse for others than for 
themselves, but only when the risky option had a lower expected value. To better understand 
the motives behind this effect, we classified people as prosocial or competitive, based on a 
separate set of choices. Only those individuals classified as competitive were more risk 
averse, whereas those classified as prosocial chose similarly for themselves and others. 
Without uncertainty, however, all individuals exhibited very little competitive behaviour. 
Together, these results suggest that competitive motives drive the limited risk-taking for 
others and that outcome uncertainty facilitates the expression of competitive motives. 
 
Keywords: decisions from experience, uncertainty, risk taking for others, social interaction, 
competitive behavior 
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Competitive Motives Explain Risk Aversion for Others in Decisions from Experience 
Introduction 
Many risky decisions that people make affect other people, which can effectively 
spread, share, or even offload the risk. Some situations are more obviously social, such as 
when a financial advisor invests a portfolio for a client, but others are less so, such as when 
people make career decisions that affect themselves, their families, and their friends. Though 
most studies of risky choice are devoid of an explicit social context (e.g., Gneezy & Potters, 
1997; Holt & Laury, 2002), a few studies have found that people tend to be more risk averse 
for others than themselves (e.g., Bolton & Ockenfels, 2010). This increased risk aversion has 
typically been attributed to a sense of social responsibility. This sense of responsibility, 
however, lies somewhat in conflict with the finding that people also have a strong competitive 
streak, such as when people are happier when their income exceeds those around them (e.g., 
Clark & Oswald, 1996). This competitiveness in social comparison suggests an alternate 
explanation for the observed risk aversion for others: Perhaps people are more risk averse for 
others so that the expected return for the other person is actually worse than their own, when 
more risk is associated with higher expected gains. Here, in two pre-registered experiments, 
we disentangle these possible causes for the additional risk aversion for others. 
Several explanations have been explored as to why people tend to be more risk averse 
when others are affected by a risky decision (e.g., Bolton & Ockenfels, 2010; Charness & 
Jackson, 2009; Reynold, Joseph, & Sherwood, 2009; but see Stone & Allgaier, 2008; for a 
meta-analysis see Atanasov, 2015). One possibility is that people feel responsible for others 
that are affected by decisions and thus decrease risk taking (e.g., Charness & Jackson, 2009). 
Alternatively, people may want to avoid being blamed for a possible bad outcome following a 
risky choice (Selten, 2001). Here, we introduce an alternative hypothesis for this risk 
aversion: that in environments where, as is typical, lower risk is associated with lower 
expected returns, competitive behavior produces the additional risk aversion for others.  
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People have strong social preferences about how to equitably distribute outcomes to 
others (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), which might also affect their risk taking for others. These 
social preferences, however, have mostly been tested under certainty. For example, in the 
dictator game, where one participant decides how to distribute money between themselves 
and a second person, usually non-zero outcomes for others are selected (Kahneman, Knetch, 
& Thaler, 1986; Engel, 2011). To disentangle the different potential motives in these social 
games, a collection of dictator games with a fixed choice set has been developed into the 
social value orientation (SVO) scale. According to this measure, around 12% of people 
express competitive behavior (Au & Kwong, 2004; Liebrand, 1984; Murphy, Ackerman, & 
Handgraaf, 2011). These behavioral results have led to models of social preference that have 
pro-social inequity aversion as a core feature (e.g., Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999).  
Whereas laboratory studies often find prosocial tendencies and inequity aversion, field 
studies find that happiness increases with an increase in relative income rank compared to 
others in one’s respective peer group (e.g., Brown, Gardner, Oswald, & Qian, 2008; Clark & 
Oswald, 1996; Tideman, Frijters, & Shields, 2008). This contrast highlights the inherent 
tension between people’s pro-social and competitive tendencies. One apparent difference 
between the laboratory experiments and real-world surveys is the degree of uncertainty, 
which is typically absent in the former, but present in the later. Introducing uncertainty into 
the dictator game provides evidence that uncertainty affects social preferences: People do still 
share chance outcomes with others, but to a lesser extent (Brock, Lange, & Ozbay, 2013; 
Krawczyk & Le Lec, 2010). Moreover, across individuals, there is no correlation between 
social preferences under certainty and risk (Bolton, Ockenfels, & Stauf, 2015; Bradler, 2009), 
highlighting a fundamental difference between social preferences under certainty and 
uncertainty.  
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 Previous studies examining risky choice for others have used decisions from 
description, where the odds and outcomes are explicitly presented (e.g., Bolton & Ockenfels, 
2010; Charness & Jackson, 2009; Raynold et al., 2009). In this study, we developed a 
decisions-from-experience (DfE) design where people have no prior knowledge of the odds or 
outcomes, but can only learn by sampling from the different options. This procedure makes 
outcomes more ambiguous and thus might allow for the expression of competitive motives in 
choices for others. In decision-making without a social context, the same odds and outcomes 
can lead to different behavior when presented either in a described or experience-based 
format (Hertwig, Weber, Barron, & Erev, 2004). For example, rare events are weighted 
differently in experience compared to description (Wulff, Canseco, & Hertwig, in press; but 
see Glöckner, Hilbig, Henninger, & Fiedler, 2016) and extreme outcomes gain more 
importance in experience (Ludvig & Spetch, 2011; Madan, Ludvig, & Spetch, 2014, Madan, 
Ludvig & Spetch, 2017). Given these dissimilarities in individual risky choice, how social 
preferences under certainty and risk will generalize to an experience-based protocol is not 
clear. 
 In this paper, we present two experiments that examine how social preferences 
interact with uncertainty, using a DfE design. The first experiment focuses on the following 
pre-registered question: How do risk preferences change in choices for others compared to 
oneself? Post-hoc, we classified people according to their social preferences and examined 
which motives drive risk taking for others. Furthermore, we compared social preferences in 
the DfE task with those under certainty. Then, in a second pre-registered experiment, using 
different rewarding outcomes, we replicate the core results and confirm the post-hoc findings 
from the first experiment. 
Experiment 1 
Method  
Participants 
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62 participants were recruited in 4 sessions of 10-20 participants from the University 
of Warwick paid participant pool via the Sona system. The number of participants was 
determined prior to the experiment through a power analysis with 80% power to find a 
medium effect size (d = 0.5) at the 5% significance level. 4 participants were excluded, who 
could either not be matched to another participant in an individual session or failed at the 
catch trials, leaving 58 participants (Mage = 21.4, SDage = 3.1, 42 women). Participants were 
paid a show-up fee of £4 plus a variable bonus depending on their own choices or the choices 
of a matched partner (ranging from £0.50 to £8, Mvar.pay = £4.82). All research was approved 
by the University of Warwick Research Ethics Committee. All procedural details, including 
hypotheses, recruited participant numbers, exclusion criteria, and planned analyses were 
preregistered at the Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/2bts4. Code for experiments 
and analysis as well as the raw data are available at the same link. 
Procedure & Material 
Upon arrival to the laboratory, participants received an information sheet and then 
provided informed consent to participate in the experiment. The experiment was performed at 
a computer and consisted of six blocks of trials. There were 3 sampling and 3 choice blocks, 
with each sampling block followed by a choice block. The experiment was programmed with 
Psychopy 1.84 (Peirce, 2007). 
In the sampling blocks, participants distributed 40 samples among 8 decks of cards in 
whatever order or quantity they wished. Each deck had a unique symbol that was the same for 
a given distribution throughout the experiment (see Figure 1 and Table 1). The connection 
between a symbol and an underlying distribution was randomized for each participant. There 
were 4 medium-value decks (mean win = £4.5), 2 low-value decks (mean win = £2.5), and 2 
high-value decks (mean win = £6.5). Draws from the decks were randomly distributed around 
these means with a uniform distribution. Half the decks for each mean value had low variance 
[± 0.5], and the other half had high variance [± 2]. In the choice blocks (see below), all the 
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high-value and low-value decks appeared in the choices for both self and other. The 4 
medium decks, however, were split such that 2 decks (one high and one low variance) 
appeared only in self choices, and the other 2 decks only appeared in choices for the other. 
Participants could only learn about the range of possible outcomes from experience and were 
not told the means nor the variances of the different decks. 
Figure 1A shows a schematic of how, during the sampling blocks, the screen displayed 
all 8 decks as well as a decreasing count of the number of samples remaining. The 8 decks 
always appeared in the same locations, providing an additional memory cue for the symbol. 
Participants sampled from a given deck by left-clicking on it with the mouse. The symbol for 
the selected deck then disappeared and, at its former position, a random draw from the 
corresponding distribution (see above) rounded to two digits appeared for 0.5 s. After that, the 
symbol for the given deck re-appeared. While the outcome was displayed, no sampling was 
possible. Once participants had no samples left, they clicked on continue, and a choice block 
followed.  
 
Figure 1: Screenshot from the sampling block (A) and the choice block (B). Each square 
represents a deck of cards, and the symbols indicated the underlying distribution for a draw 
from that deck. The distributions could only be learned by sampling from each of the decks. 
 
In the choice blocks, participants made 21 pairs of binary choices between the decks. 
On each of the 21 trials, participants made two choices: They chose between two of the decks 
for themselves and between two (possibly different) decks for a second participant. Figure 1B 
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shows how the screen was divided down the middle by a line, and there were two decks of 
cards vertically positioned on each side (for a total of 4 decks). One side, indicated by the 
word “self”, displayed the two decks to choose between for oneself, and the other side, 
indicated by the word “other”, displayed the two decks to choose between for the other 
participant. The self/other location was counterbalanced across participants, but constant 
across trials for each participant. 
Participants made choices by clicking on their preferred deck with the mouse. After a 
mouse-click on a deck, the deck’s borders switched to green, indicating the deck had been 
clicked. Once a selection had been made for both oneself and the other, the participant 
confirmed these choices by clicking on a continue button or by pressing enter on the 
keyboard. Selections could be changed until they were confirmed. No additional feedback 
was provided during the choice blocks, and participants had to rely on what they had learned 
during the sampling blocks to guide their choices. 
Table 1 shows the 21 choice situations, each consisting of a choice between 2 decks 
for the decision maker and a choice between 2 decks for the other participant. Choices were 
presented in a random order and presented once in each block. Each of the situations was 
selected to test a particular hypothesis about how risk and inequity influence decision-making 
in this social situation. The first 5 choices examined risk attitude for self and other, comparing 
risk preference for identical choices, with a risk-return trade-off in choices 4 and 5. The next 6 
choices examined whether the rewards potentially available to the other participant (higher or 
lower) influence risky choice (and vice versa). The next 8 choices examined inequity aversion 
(both advantageous and disadvantageous) by offering different potential reward levels for self 
and other. The final two choices served as catch trials, with an obvious dominant alternative, 
and, post-hoc, as a means of classifying participants as pro-social or competitive based on 
how they chose for the other participant. 
Table 1. Choice situations in Experiment 1. 
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Choice Self-A Self-B Other-A Other-B 
Risk Attitude 
1 4.5L 4.5M 4.5L 4.5M 
2 2.5L 2.5M 2.5L 2.5M 
3 6.5L 6.5M 6.5L 6.5M 
4 2.5M 4.5L 2.5M 4.5L 
5 4.5L 6.5M 4.5L 6.5M 
Social Aspiration level 
6 4.5L 4.5M 6.5L 6.5M 
7 2.5L 2.5M 4.5L 4.5M 
8 2.5L 2.5M 6.5L 6.5M 
9 4.5L 4.5M 2.5L 2.5M 
10 6.5L 6.5M 4.5L 4.5M 
11 6.5L 6.5M 2.5L 2.5M 
Inequity Aversion 
12 4.5L 4.5M 4.5L 6.5L 
13 4.5L 4.5M 4.5M 6.5M 
14 2.5M 4.5L 4.5L 6.5M 
15 4.5L 6.5L 4.5L 4.5M 
16 4.5M 6.5M 4.5L 4.5M 
17 4.5L 6.5M 2.5M 4.5L 
18 4.5L 6.5L 4.5L 6.5L 
19 4.5M 6.5M 4.5M 6.5M 
Catch Trials & Classification 
20 2.5L 6.5L 2.5L 6.5L 
21 2.5M 6.5M 2.5M 6.5M 
Note. The first number of each option is the EV and the letter symbolizes variance levels: L = 
± 0.5, M = ± 2.0. 
 
As the task was self-paced, at the end of the experiment, some participants had to wait 
for other participants to finish. Once all participants were finished, participants were matched 
in groups of two, and one participant from each pair was randomly determined as the 
decision-maker for that pair. One trial was randomly selected, and the selected distribution 
from the decision-maker was played out for themselves and for the other group member 
separately. The outcomes of these draws determined the variable payoffs for the two group 
members, respectively. Participants saw their own outcome on the computer screen and 
learned whether their own decision has been implemented or whether their outcome was 
determined by the other participant. Nobody, however, knew exactly with whom they had 
been paired. Payment for the participants was given individually at the end of the experiment. 
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While participants waited for the payment, they filled out the paper-and-pencil 6-item version 
of the SVO-Slider (Murphy, Ackerman, & Handgraaf, 2011). The slider was not incentivized. 
 All data analysis was conducted in RStudio based on R, and regressions were 
performed with the packages lme4 and lmerTest. Regressions had subject random intercepts 
and used the logit link function with interaction and main effects as reported in the text. Effect 
sizes were calculated as Cohen’s d from the choice proportion differences, and mean 
differences are presented with 95% confidence intervals. In general, the data analyses 
followed the pre-registered plan. Any deviations from this pre-registered analysis plan are 
clearly marked in the Results section.  
Results  
Risky Choices 
First, we examined how risky choices differed when choosing for oneself or another 
participant from the same choice set. Figure 2A shows the percentage of risky choices 
aggregated over all trials and all participants for choice situations 1-5 (left), 1-3 (middle) and 
4-5 (right). For all choices 1-5 (see Table 1), there was one lower and one higher variance 
option and, as predicted, participants were 13.3 ± 6.5% more risk averse for others than for 
themselves (Wilcoxon Test W(n = 58) = 1178.5, d = 0.52, p < .001)1. Follow-up exploratory 
analyses showed that this effect, however, was entirely due to choice situations 4-5 which 
differed from choices 1-3 in that there was a risk-return trade-off between a low-variance, 
low-expected-value (EV) option and a high-variance, high-EV option. Here, people chose the 
safer option 35.3 ± 9.3% more often for others than themselves (W(n = 58) = 836, d = 0.94, p 
< .001). There was little difference, however, between choices for self and other in choices 1-
3 (-1.3 ± 6.9%), where the expected value was the same for both options (W(n = 58) = 579, d 
= 0.05, p > .250). These results were confirmed by a regression with random subject effects 																																																								
1 The pre-registration indicated that paired t-tests would be used, but the choice proportions 
were not normally distributed, so Wilcoxon tests were used instead. Sticking with the t-tests 
also yields the same qualitative conclusions. 
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showing that there was a significant interaction between the choice type (1-3 vs. 4-5) and 
choices for self and other (β = 1.83, SE = 0.22, p < .001).  
Further exploratory analyses revealed that there was a strongly bimodal distribution of 
choice proportions in the choices for others in choices 20 and 21. These situations consist of 
options with one low-EV and one high-EV option with equal variance for both self and other. 
Thus, one option clearly dominated, and in choices for oneself, these situations were used as 
catch trials. People used two clearly distinct strategies: Figure 2C shows how 25 participants 
chose the higher EV option for the other participants 5 or 6 out of 6 times they encountered 
the choice situation (green in figure), whereas 26 participants chose the higher EV option 0 or 
1 out of 6 times (yellow). In line with the literature about distributional choices, we term these 
two choice patterns as prosocial, where people try to maximize the outcome for the other 
participant, and competitive where people try to minimize the outcome for the other 
participant.  
Figure 2B shows how those participants classified as competitive chose the risky 
option 60.9 ± 13.3% more often for themselves than for others in choice situations involving a 
risk-return trade-off (W(n = 26) = 323.5, d = 1.76, p < .001) as compared to the prosocials 
who only did so 6.7 ± 7.5% more often (W(n = 25)  = 42.5, d = 0.35, p = .134). These 
competitive participants consistently chose the lower EV option for the other participant. This 
pattern was corroborated by a random-effects regression where the interaction between 
choosing for oneself or other and being classified as either competitive or prosocial was 
significant in the risk-return trade-off choices 4-5 (β = 2.49, SE = 0.45, p < .001). Moreover, 
Figure 2C (bottom) plots risky choice in risk-return trade-off choices 4-5 against the choice in 
situations 20-21: there is a strong correlation between the number of higher EV choices for 
others in the catch trials and the number of risky choices for others in the risk-return choices 
(rSpearman(56) = 0.83, p < .001).  
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. 
Figure 2. (A) Mean percentage (± 95% CI) of risky choices for all risk-attitude choice 
situations and then separately for those with the same expected value (1-3) and those with a 
risk-return trade-off (4-5). Grey dots are choice percentages for individual participants. (B) 
Mean percentage (± 95% CI) of risky choices for choice with a risk-return trade-off (4-5), 
split by participant classification as prosocial or competitive. (C) Top panel shows 
participants classified according to their other-regarding preferences, as revealed in choice 
situations where there was a dominant option for the other participant (20-21). The bottom 
panel displays the percentage of risky choices for others in the risk-return trade-off choices 
(4-5) correlated with the percentage of dominant choice for other. *** = p < .001. 
  
Classification Results Compared to the SVO Questionnaire 
Given that a substantial number of people (26) consistently chose the lower EV option 
for the other participant in the primary task, the SVO classification results are surprising: 
Using the standard classification borders, 25 people were classified as prosocial, 33 were 
classified as selfish, but 0 were classified as competitive. The number of prosocial 
participants was similar for both our classification and the SVO, but, as can be seen in Figure 
3, the two methods did not classify the same people as prosocial. Out of the 25 people 
classified as prosocial in the primary task, 12 were instead classified as selfish in the SVO. 
For the choice task, SVO prosocials would be expected to choose the higher EV option for 
others consistently, because they benefit from minimizing the difference between themselves 
and another participant or because they want to maximize the joint welfare. In contrast, those 
classified as selfish by the SVO should be indifferent with respect to the other participant’s 
outcome. Thus, they should be on chance level with respect to choices about different EV 
level options for others. In contrast, in the choice task, 26 participants consistently chose the 
lower EV option for the other participant, and this behavior was more consistent with 
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competitive behavior. Yet, none of these 26 participants were classified as competitive by the 
SVO. This difference in classification by the two tasks was corroborated by a Pearson Chi-
Square Test comparing the proportions of prosocial, selfish, and competitive in the DfE task 
and the SVO (X2 = 42.90, p < .001, Cramer’s V = 0.86).  
 
Figure 3: Comparison of classification of prosocial behavior in the decision-from-experience 
task and the SVO Questionnaire (mini-dictator games). 
 
Finally, using the continuous scale of the SVO slider (SVO angle), where higher 
values mean more prosocial behavior, there was a slight, but not significant, positive 
correlation between angle and percentage of high EV choices for the other participant in the 
choice task (rPearson(56) = .23, p = .077). Thus, the SVO scale may capture parts of the inter-
individual differences in the choice task, but fails to predict the large share of participants 
choosing out of competitive motives for the other person under uncertainty.  
In the pre-registration, we also asked questions about how the rewards of others 
influence risk preference (Choices 6-11), inequity aversion (Choices 12-19), and the sampling 
process. These analyses are included in the supplemental online materials for completeness. 
 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1, people were more risk averse when deciding for others than for 
themselves. Exploratory analyses showed that this effect was driven by those participants who 
were independently classified as competitive; they consistently chose lower EV options for 
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others in risk-return trade-off situations. In addition, a classification based on the choice task 
showed more competitive behavior than a classification with the SVO slider. 
We pre-registered a second study to confirm the exploratory result that competitive 
motives are the main reason for differences in risk attitude between choices for self and 
others. Therefore, the number of gambles examining risk attitude and classifying participants 
were increased (see Table 2). In addition, we wanted to address two further open questions:  
First, participants were risk neutral in choices that differed only in variance. This 
pattern could reflect a genuine preference, but could also reflect a lack of learning about 
variance differences between the decks. Therefore, we introduced a larger variance difference, 
reduced the number of decks, and asked participants about the ranges of outcomes.  
Second, we aimed to confirm the result of more competitive behavior in choices under 
uncertainty: Therefore, we used a computerized version of the SVO and an extra one-shot 
choice under certainty, fully incentivized so as to be more comparable to the main task. 
Method 
Participants 
69 participants were recruited in 7 sessions of 4-12 participants from the same 
participant pool as Experiment 1. The number of participants was estimated prior to the 
experiment with a power analysis as in the first experiment. Two participants were excluded 
who either could not be matched to a partner or failed the exclusion criterion (i.e., sampled 
one option less then 5 times), which left 67 participants (Mage= 23.6, SDage= 3.1, 40 women). 
Participants were paid a show-up fee of £4 plus a variable bonus depending on their own 
choices or the choices of a matched partner (ranging from £1.50 to £8.59, Mvpay= £4.71). 
Again, all methods and analyses were pre-registered and can be found together with all other 
material at: https://osf.io/2bts4. 
Procedure  
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The procedure was largely the same as in Experiment 1, with some changes in the 
reward distribution and the choice situations (see Table 2). In particular, the number of 
distributions was reduced from 8 to 6, a third variance level was introduced, and only 2 EV 
levels were used. The uniform distributions had an EV of either 4 or 6 and a range of either 
±0.5 (low), ±2 (medium), or ±3.5 (high). Table 2 shows the revised choice situations, which 
were selected to best follow up the results from the first study. There were 9 questions 
assessing risk attitude of which 3 consisted of a risk-return trade-off. Furthermore, as in the 
first experiment, 9 choice situations assessed inequity aversion, and 3 situations were used for 
classifying participants. The number of samples in each sampling block was changed slightly 
to boost learning about the 6 decks after the first block. Hence, people sampled 80 times in 
the first block and only 30 times each in the second and third sampling blocks. Again, 
participants could distribute these samples in any order they wanted among the 6 available 
decks.  
Table 2. Choice situations in Experiment 2  
 
Choice Self-A Self-B Other-A Other-B 
Risk Attitude 
1 4L 4M 4L 4M 
2 4M 4H 4M 4H 
3 4L 4H 4L 4H 
4 6L 6M 6L 6M 
5 6M 6H 6M 6H 
6 6L 6H 6L 6H 
7 4L 6M 4L 6M 
8 4M 6H 4M 6H 
9 4L 6H 4L 6H 
Inequity Aversion 
10 4L 6L 4L 4M 
11 4M 6M 4M 4H 
12 4H 6H 4M 4H 
13 4L 4M 4L 6L 
14 4M 4H 4M 6M 
15 4M 4H 4H 6H 
16 4L 6L 4L 6L 
17 4M 6M 4M 6M 
18 4H 6H 4H 6H 
Catch Trials & Classification 
19 4H 6L 4H 6L 
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20 4M 6L 4M 6L 
21 4H 6M 4H 6M 
Note. The first number of each option is the EV, and the letter symbolizes variance levels: L = 
± 0.5, M = ± 2, H = ± 3.5. 
 
After the final choice block, there was an additional choice between two certain 
options (a certain £4 vs. a certain £6) both for oneself and for another participant. After that 
question, the computerized version of the SVO slider (6 items) was presented. Finally, a 
further 4 questions assessing the participants’ knowledge about the variance of the decks were 
presented, where the symbols of all 3 decks with the same EV were displayed and participants 
were asked to select either the safest or the riskiest deck. The payment mechanism was the 
same as in the first experiment with the difference that a payoff relevant trial could also be 
chosen from the SVO choices and the choice under certainty. Thus, all choices were 
incentivized, but the questions about the decks’ variances were not.   
Results  
Risky Choices 
With more risky-choice situations (1-9 in Table 2), the pattern of Experiment 1 was 
confirmed. Figure 4A shows how, overall, people chose the risky option 8.0 ± 4.0% more 
often for themselves than for others (W(n=67) = 709, d = 0.48, p < .001). This difference was 
again driven by choice situations with a risk-return trade-off (7-9), where people chose the 
risky option 23.7 ± 7.9% more often for themselves (W(n=67) = 780.5, d = 0.72, p < .001), as 
opposed to those with equal expected value (1-6), where people only chose the risky option 
0.2 ± 4.2% more often for themselves (W(n=67) = 2202, d = 0.01, p > .250). This interaction 
in the percentage of risky choices for oneself and others in trade-off choice situations (7-9) as 
compared to choice situations with the same EV (1-6) was confirmed through a random-
effects regression (β = 1.37, SE = 0.17, p < .001).  
As pre-registered, situations where one option dominated the other in terms of EV and 
variance (19-21 in Table 2) were used as a measure of other-regarding preferences to classify 
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the participants. Participants were classified as competitive if they chose the dominating 
option for the other participant up to 2 out of 9 trials (13 participants) and as prosocial if they 
chose it at least 7 times (35 participants). This criterion left 19 participants unclassified (see 
Figure 4C). Figure 4B shows that those classified as competitive chose the safe option 70.1 ± 
12.9% more often for others than for themselves in the risk-return trade-off choice situations 
(W(n=13) = 169, d = 2.95, p < .001), whereas those classified as prosocial did so only 5.1 ± 
5.7% more often (W(n=35) = 685, d = 0.30, p = .108), which yielded a significant interaction 
in a random-effects regression (β = 3.35, SE = 0.48, p < .001). Thus, the main results of the 
first study were confirmed in this replication with different choice situations. In addition, in 
choices with the same EV where only the variance differed, people expressed very slight risk-
aversion; that is, they chose the high variance option slightly less than 50% of the time for 
themselves and others (W(n=67)self = 670.5, d = 0.23, p = .048; W(n=67)other = 745.5, d = 0.25, 
p = .071) 
 
 
Figure 4: (A) Mean percentage (± 95% CI) of risky choices for self and other in all choice 
situations with different variances (choice situations 1-9, left) and separately for those with 
the same expected value (1-6, middle) and those with a risk-return trade-off (7-9, right). Grey 
points represent individual participants. (B) Mean percentage (± 95% CI) of risky choices for 
self and other with a risk-return trade-off (7-9), split by participant classification. (C) 
Frequency distribution of participant classification as competitive, prosocial, or neither (top) 
and scatterplot of other-regarding preference (% high EV choice for others in 19-21) against 
risky choice for others with a risk-return trade-off (7-9). *** = p < .001 
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Because the SVO questionnaire in the first study did not capture the observed 
competitive behavior, we implemented a computerized and incentivized version of the SVO 
in Experiment 2. Nonetheless, classification results in the SVO were comparable to 
Experiment 1: 22 prosocial, 44 selfish, and only 1 competitive. Figure 5 shows how, once 
again, there was no strong overlap of classification between the SVO and the classification 
based on the decision from experience task. Out of 35 participants classified as prosocial in 
the main choice task, only 12 were classified as prosocial in the SVO with the others being 
classified as selfish. Conversely, out of the 13 participants classified as competitive in the 
main choice task, 3 were classified as prosocial in the SVO task. This difference in 
classification by the two tasks was corroborated by a Pearson Chi-Square Test comparing the 
proportions of prosocial, selfish, and competitive in the DfE task and the SVO (X2 = 23.17, p 
< .001, Cramer’s V = 0.59). Contrary to Exp 1, however, using the continuous scale of the 
SVO slider where higher values signify more prosocial behavior, there was a medium-sized 
positive correlation of angle and percentage of high EV choices for the other participant 
(rpearson(65) = .32, p = .008). 
In the two-choice distribution task under certainty, where people decided between 
taking either a certain £4 or £6 for themselves and then again for the other person, 17/67 
participants chose the lower outcome for the other person. Thus, competitive behavior was 
more pronounced here than in the SVO, where there are (partly) trade-offs between one’s own 
and another person’s outcome. Nonetheless, the overlap between these choices under 
certainty and in the DfE task was still not very high. Out of the 17 participants who chose the 
low outcome for others, only 9 were classified as competitive in the main task (1 prosocial, 
rest unclassified). For the 50 participants who chose the higher outcome, 4 were classified as 
competitive in the main task (34 as prosocial, rest unclassified).  
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The pre-registered analyses concerning inequity aversion (choice situations 10-18) and 
the sampling process as well as questions about each option’s variance are included in the 
online supplemental materials for completeness. 
 
Figure 5: Comparison of classification of prosocial behavior in the main task (decision from 
experience under uncertainty) and the SVO (mini-dictator games). ** p < .01 
 
General Discussion 
In two experiments, we showed that people are more risk averse for others, largely due 
to a subset of competitive participants, who showed reward-maximizing behavior for 
themselves, but not for others. This competitive behavior only emerged when there was 
uncertainty around the actual outcomes, but not in decisions with certain outcomes. These 
results represent the first examination of risky choice for others in a task that uses decisions 
from experience (Hertwig et al., 2004), building on prior work that used explicit descriptions 
of the risky outcomes (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2010; Raynold, Joseph, & Sherwood, 2009). 
These results suggest that prior interpretations of the observed enhanced risk aversion in 
terms of a sense of responsibility (Charness & Jackson, 2009) for others may need to be 
reconsidered. 
The competitive behavior amongst a significant subset of the participants seems to be 
enabled by the high level of uncertainty in the experience-based task, which is not present in 
the SVO slider, where outcomes are certain. With uncertain outcomes, EV-minimizing 
choices for others might feel less severe because the consequences have not yet materialized. 
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Similarly, people are known to give less in dictator games if the relation between one’s own 
choice and the outcome for the other person is uncertain or not transparent (Dana, Weber and 
Kuang, 2007; Haisley & Weber, 2010). This lack of transparency creates some mental wiggle 
room, which allows for maintenance of a positive self-image (Mazar, On, & Ariely, 2008; 
Rabin, 1995). Thus, in the DfE task, people could justify their selecting the as-yet-
materialized bad outcomes for the other person by engaging in wishful thinking and assuming 
that, despite the poor choice, a relatively high outcome might still occur.  
The DfE task introduces empirical uncertainty about the possible outcomes into a 
social-choice task. Similarly, greater uncertainty about another person’s motives is associated 
with less cooperative behavior, as introducing uncertainty about another person’s previous 
choices into a repeated prisoner’s dilemma leads to less cooperation (Fudenberg, Rand, & 
Dreber, 2012; Güth, Mugera, Musau, & Ploner, 2014). This study builds on these findings, 
demonstrating that uncertainty not only increases selfish behavior, but can even spur 
competitive behavior.  
The results allow elimination of several other possibilities for the apparent competitive 
behavior. First, participants classified as competitive were not indifferent with respect to the 
other person’s outcomes—choices for others systematically differed from random choice both 
for those choice situations with a risk-return trade-off and for the classification choices 
(Figures 2 and 4). In addition, participants did learn the values of the different sets, as they 
consistently selected for themselves the same high EV decks that they denied to others. 
Moreover, in a task where participants had to distinguish decks by their variability in 
Experiment 2, most participants were reliably above chance level.  
The decreased risk-taking for others in these experience-based decisions resembles 
behavior when decisions are based on summary descriptions (Raynold, Joseph, & Sherwood, 
2009). The increase in competitive behavior observed here could potentially also explain 
those findings, whenever choosing the more risk-averse option yields lower EV for the other 
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person. The explicit description of probabilistic outcomes, however, would seem to provide 
less mental wiggle room to justify competitive behavior (Haisely & Weber, 2010). Wishful 
thinking about the unrealized outcomes, however, is still possible, even when the odds and 
outcomes are fully described. When choices are made for a team including the decider, 
however, competitive motives seem like a less likely mechanism (e.g., Bolton & Ockenfels, 
2010). Here, too people are more risk averse, but there is no opportunity for competition, 
leaving social responsibility as a more plausible explanation.  
Social preferences differ significantly under risk and certainty (see also Bolton, 
Ockenfels, & Stauf, 2015; Bradler, 2009). Given the uncertainty in our daily interactions and 
in the economy more generally, measuring social preferences only under certainty likely 
underestimates the role that competitive behavior plays in daily life. Here, the SVO 
underestimated the role of competitive behaviour under uncertainty, classifying both 
competitive and prosocial individuals differently than the DfE task. Hence, there seem to be 
individual differences in how people deal with uncertainty that are not captured by social 
preferences under certainty (Roch & Samuelson, 1997). People may, for example, differ in 
the degree they create and use the mental wiggle room which provides for plausible 
deniability in these highly uncertain situations. 
 The high level of competitive behavior in the current task is more congruent with the 
competitive motives observed in real-world studies of the links between happiness and 
income rank (Clark & Oswald, 1996) than is typically observed in laboratory studies of pro-
sociality (Engel, 2011). Our results suggest that, in the real world, a key difference which 
enables the expression of such competitive behavior is the level of uncertainty. For example, 
making decisions that affect one’s own career path or the career paths of peers is only 
indirectly connected to income levels, which are only known with uncertainty. Reducing 
uncertainty would thus seem to be one way to increase prosociality. 
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Supplemental Online Material: Introduction 
This supplemental material presents analyses of additional choice situations and 
sampling behavior in the two experiments. All presented analyses were pre-registered, but 
were omitted from the main manuscript due to space and clarity concerns. Analyses of 
inequity aversion and sample sizes are provided for both experiments, whereas social 
aspiration levels were only examined in the first experiment. The numbers for the choice 
situations refer to Tables 1 and 2 (for Experiments 1 and 2 respectively) in the main 
manuscript. The pre-registeration documents can be found at https://osf.io/kn6dy/ and 
https://osf.io/nrfz3/.  
Experiment 1: Supplemental Results  
Inequity Aversion 
To examine first-order (disadvantageous) inequity aversion, as pre-registered, choices 
for the other participant were compared when the choice options were the same for both self 
and other (Equal: 18, 19, & 5) against those when the other participant had a higher expected 
value (EV) option than the decision maker (Unequal: 12-14). Inequity aversion here would 
manifest as the decision maker choosing the higher EV option for the other participant more 
often when choice options were equal than when they were unequal. Figure S1A shows that 
there was a slight trend toward such inequity aversion: participants chose the higher EV 
option for the other participant 4.6 ± 5.6% slightly more often under equality compared to 
unequal choice situations, d = 0.21, t(57) = 1.60, p = .116 as pre-registered, but W(n=58) = 
158.5, p = .049 with a Wilcoxon signed-rank tests as the choice proportions were not 
normally distributed. Using a binomial regression with subject random effects this effect was 
significant (β = -0.38, SE = 0.17, p = .025). In a follow-up exploratory analysis, Figure S1B 
shows how this effect was driven by the prosocial participants. In a regression, the interaction 
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between the prosocials and the choice sets was significant above the main effects (β = -1.11, 
SE = 0.43, p = .010). 
To examine second-order (advantageous) inequity aversion, as pre-registered, we 
compared choices for oneself in situations with identical choice options (Equal: 18, 19, & 5) 
against those made when the decision maker had a higher EV option for oneself compared to 
the choice options for the other participant (Unequal: 15-17). Figure 3C shows how people 
chose the higher EV option for themselves 4.4 ± 3.4% more often under equality than when 
the choice set was unequal, d = 0.33, t(57) = 2.55, p = .013, W(n=58) = 75, p = .018. These 
inferences are corroborated by a binomial regression with a significant group difference β = -
0.52, SE = 0.21, p = .016. In a follow-up exploratory analysis, this effect also appeared larger 
for those classified as prosocials than those classified as competitive. This interaction between 
classification and choice set, however, was not significant (β = -0.81, SE = 0.49, p = .093). 
Finally, contrary to our initial hypothesis, the level of risk did not reliably influence either 
form of inequity aversion (Wilcoxon Test: W(n = 58)first.order = 152, r = 0.03, d = 0.06, p = 
.785; W(n = 58)second.order = 254, r = 0.15, d = 0.30, p = .236). 
 
 
Figure S1: (A) Mean percentage (± 95% CI) of higher EV choices for the other participant 
depending on the presence of equal (5,18-19) or unequal EV options (12-14) for oneself and 
the other participant. (B) Mean percentage (± 95% CI) of higher EV choices for the other 
participant based on classification as prosocial or competitive (see main manuscript). (C) 
Mean percentage (± 95% CI) of higher EV choices for oneself depending on the presence of 
equal (5,18-19) or unequal EV options (15-17) for oneself and the other participant. (D) 
Mean percentage (± 95% CI) of higher EV choices for oneself split by classification. In all 
panels, grey points represent choice percentages for individual participants.  
* =  p < .05 in a binomial regression. 
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Next we set out to test the hypothesis that the relative reward level of the second 
participant would set a social aspiration level for the decision-maker and thereby alter risk 
preference. To do so, we compared situations where participants made risky choices for 
themselves, but where the other participant had the same options (1-3), worse options (6-8) or 
better options (9-11) in terms of EV. If participants use the higher EV options of the other 
participant as an aspiration level, they should choose the riskier option more often in cases 
where they choose from a lower EV choice set than when both participants have the same 
choice set. Yet, Figure S2 shows how this pattern did not emerge either in choices for oneself 
nor in choices for the other participant. In a regression, neither the higher nor the lower EV 
choices for the other participant had a reliable effect on the tendency to choose the riskier 
option for oneself (βhigher = -0.18, SE = 0.14, p = .189; βlower = - 0.13, SE = 0.15, p = .391). 
The same held true when looking at choices for the other participant given higher EV options 
for the decision maker (β = 0.03, SE = 0.16, p = .828). Surprisingly, and against the 
preregistered hypothesis, there was a small but significant effect to choose the less risky 
option for the other participant, if the decision maker had a higher EV choice set (β = - 0.33, 
SE = 0.15, p = .030). Overall, the EV of the options available for one person did not 
consistently influence risky choice for the other person.  
 
 
Figure S2: (A) Percentage (± 95% CI)  of risky choices for different aspiration levels. Same – 
options for oneself and the other have same expected values (1-3). Loss – The other has 
higher EV options (6-8) and gain – oneself has higher EV options (9-11). (B) Choices for 
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other with loss – higher EV options for oneself than for the other (9-11) and gain – higher EV 
options for the other than oneself (6-8).  
 
 
Sampling 
The total sample size was fixed at 40 for each block, so we compared how those 40 
samples were distributed between decks. As can be seen in Figure S3, there were no 
differences in sampling between different levels of variance for same EV decks (adjacent 
boxes; e.g., 4.5L vs. 4.5M). In contrast, the EV influenced sample size, as the high EV decks 
(6.5L & 6.5M) were sampled more often than the others. This difference was confirmed by a 
regression on the logarithm of sample size with subject random effects where high variance 
and low variance did not differ (β = 0.02, SE = 0.04, p = .900), but high EV decks were 
sampled more often (β = 8.36, SE = 0.76, p < .001) and low EV decks less often (β = -1.83, 
SE = 0.75, p = .016) than the medium EV decks. Finally, we hypothesized that participants 
took the target (self or other) of the decks into account, but there was no difference between 
the sample size for the decks relevant to the decision maker and the decks relevant to the 
other participant (for sample blocks 2 and 3 to allow for learning: β = 0.06, SE = 0.05, p = 
0.24). Moreover, this effect was not moderated by the classification results; there was no 
difference in sampling across prosocial or competitive participants (β = 0.09, SE = 0.08, p = 
.261)1.  
 
																																																								
1 A full analysis as stated in the preregistration was not possible because deck target was 
nested within the different levels of EV. 
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Figure S3: Boxplot with median, quartiles and whiskers as first quartile minus 1.5 times the 
interquartile range and third quartile plus 1.5 times the interquartile range of sample size for 
each of the 8 decks. Dots are individual outliers below or above the whiskers. Deck Types are 
as described in Table 1 of the main paper: The first number of each option is the EV and the 
letter symbolizes variance levels: L = ± 0.5, M = ± 2.0.   
 
Experiment 2: Supplemental Results  
Inequity Aversion 
As in Experiment 1, we examined first- and second-order inequity aversion (IA) by 
comparing situations where the decision maker and the other participant chose from the same 
choice set with situations where either the other (first-order) or the decision maker (second-
order) has one high EV option. In terms of first-order IA, Figure S4A shows how people 
chose the higher EV option 9.1±5.9% more often for the other participant when they had the 
same options than when they had worse options (W(n=67) = 243, p = .003; β = -0.67, SE = 
0.15, p < .001). In terms of second-order IA, Figure S4C shows how people chose the better 
option for themselves 5.8±4.4% more often when the choice options were the same than when 
the other person had worse options available, (W(n=67) = 143, p = .014; β = -0.52, SE = 0.17, 
p = .003).   
Splitting up participants into those classified as prosocial and competitive, Figure S4B 
and S4D show that both types of inequity aversion were mainly expressed by the prosocial 
participants. Similar to the first study, the interaction between choice sets and classification 
4.5L 4.5M 2.5L 2.5M 6.5L 6.5M 4.5L 4.5M
0
10
20
30
40
50
Deck Type
Sa
m
pl
e 
Si
ze
TAKING RISKS FOR OTHERS–Supplemental Online Material  	 7 
was significant above the main effects for first-order (β = -1.10, SE = 0.46, p = .017), but not 
second-order inequity aversion (β = -0.22, SE = 0.54, p = .69). Hence, both first- and second-
order inequity aversion were observed in this task. As in the first experiment and in line with 
our classification interpretation, inequity aversion was mainly expressed by participants 
classified as prosocial in other choice situations.  
 
Figure S4: (A) Mean percentage (± 95% CI) of higher EV choices for the other participant 
depending on the presence of equal (16-18) or unequal EV options (10-12) for oneself and the 
other participant. (B) Mean percentage (± 95% CI) of higher EV choices for the other 
participant based on classification as prosocial or competitive (see main manuscript). (C) 
Mean percentage (± 95% CI) of higher EV choices for oneself depending on the presence of 
equal (16-18) or unequal EV options (13-15) for oneself and the other participant. (D) Mean 
percentage (± 95% CI) of higher EV choices for oneself split by classification. In all panels, 
grey points represent choice percentages for individual participants.  
* = p < .05 in a binomial regression. 
 
Sampling 
The total sample sizes in Exp. 2 were fixed at 80 in the first sampling block and 30 
each in the second and third block. The relative distribution of samples was analysed together 
for all blocks. Figure S5 shows how the EV influenced sample size: High EV decks (green) 
were sampled more often than the low EV decks (blue). The different levels of variance, 
however, did not affect sample size (no effect of different shades at both EV levels). This 
pattern was confirmed by a regression of log frequencies on mean and variance as well as 
random subject effects, where only mean EV had a significant effect (β = 0.36, SE = 0.04, p < 
.001). There were no obvious differences in the sampling pattern for participants classified as 
competitive or prosocial. In sum, these results are in line with the first experiment and suggest 
that participants sampled more from high EV options than from low EV options.   
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Figure S5: Boxplot with median, quartiles and whiskers as first quartile minus 1.5 times the 
interquartile range and third quartile plus 1.5 times the interquartile range of sample size for 
each of the 8 decks. Dots are individual outliers below or above the whiskers. Deck Types are 
as described in Table 2 of the main paper: The first number of each option is the EV and the 
letter symbolizes variance levels: L = ± 0.5, M = ± 2.0, H = ± 4.0.   
 
Variance Questionnaire 
To check whether participants learned about the different levels of variance associated 
with the decks, we asked people to name the safest or riskiest out of three decks with the same 
EV. There were 4 questions with 3 potential answers, thus the guessing rate was 1.33 correct 
answers. Figure S6 plots frequencies of correct answers plotted for all participants: 52 
participants were above the guessing rate, and the average score was significantly better than 
chance (M = 2.10 ± 0.24). There were no obvious differences in performance on the variance 
task across participants classified as prosocial or competitive. In total, this task shows that 
most participants learned about variance differences in our task.  
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Figure S6. Histogram of people with number of correct answers for the variance question (4 
total questions with three answer options for each). 
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